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ABSTRACT 
There are concerns about the feasibility of democratic governance in Africa generally, and in 
Nigeria particularly due to pervasive demagoguery in the practice of democracy, which is still 
relatively understudied (particularly as it relates to the Nigerian context). In spite the seemingly 
remarkable progress of democracy in Nigeria, its survival, deepening and dividends are 
threatened by anti-democratic behaviour and practices that are antithetical to the universally 
acknowledged principles, values and culture of democracy.  The objectives of the study were to 
examine the ways in which demagoguery manifests itself in Nigeria‘s democracy, examine the 
role of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democracy in the Fourth Republic, identify the factors that 
make demagoguery thrive in the democratic politics of Nigeria, and examine the implications of 
demagoguery on democracy and good governance in Nigeria.   
The study adopted triangulation of methods, collecting data from both primary and secondary 
sources. A total of 658 respondents and 20 interviewees drawn from political parties, security 
agencies, Independent National Electoral Commission and political office holders participated in 
the study. Data were analysed using frequency and percentage distributions, cross tabulations 
and regression (for the quantitative data), and content analysis (for the qualitative data). 
Results from the quantitative data, which were complemented by the qualitative analyses, show 
that demagoguery pervades Nigeria‘s democracy and determines the country‘s politics. Also, the 
study shows that election outcomes are no reflections of a free, fair and credible democratic 
process, but are the outcome of a constellation of demagogic factors such as monetary 
inducement, intimidation, the use of security agencies and thugs to disrupt or manipulate 
democratic processes or outcomes, and election fraud. Two hypotheses were tested in the study. 
The first hypothesis showed that outcome of elections in democratic contestations in Nigeria‘s 
Fourth Republic is significantly influenced by a combination of acts of demagoguery including 
monetary inducement, intimidation and election fraud at a p-value of .000. The second 
hypothesis showed that money, though important, is not a significantly sufficient factor in 
determining the outcome of elections in Nigeria.  
 The implications of demagoguery for democracy and good governance are that democracy loses 
its idea as the government that attains or retains political power through the people and makes it 
vii 
 
a venture of self-interests through Machiavellian politics. The findings of the study inform the 
recommendations that highlight the importance of citizens‘ education, strict and impartial 
implementation of sanctions against violators of democratic and electoral laws, accentuating the 
impartiality of security agencies and the need for constitutional amendment to protect the 
democratic rights of citizens against the impunity of democratic institutions, especially political 
parties. 
 
Number of words: 425 
KEY WORDS 
Demagoguery, Democracy, Elections, Nigeria, Fourth Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TITLE 
PAGE…………………..………………………………….………………..……………….….i 
CERTIFICATION ....................................................................................................................... ii 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................ xii 
CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ............................................................................................... 1 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM .............................................................................................. 4 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................................................. 6 
1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.................................................................................. 6 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ................................................................................................ 6 
1.6 SCOPE AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY ........................................................................ 7 
1.7 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS ....................................................................... 8 
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY ........................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER TWO ........................................................................................................................................ 11 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................ 11 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................. 11 
2.1.1 DEMOCRACY AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT ................................................................. 11 
2.1.2 DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE ......................................... 13 
2.1.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ........................................................... 15 
2.1.4 DEMOCRACY: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES ............................................................. 17 
2.1.5 DEMOCRATIC IRREGULARITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF ELECTION FRAUD ...... 22 
2.1.6 DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND ELECTION MONITORING IN NIGERIA ................... 24 
2.1.7 DEMAGOGUERY, DEMAGOGUES AND GODFATHERISM............................................. 26 
ix 
 
2.1.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMAGOGUERY ......................................................................... 30 
2.1.9 DEMAGOGUES IN NIGERIA‘S FOURTH REPUBLIC‘S POLITICS .................................. 34 
2.1.10 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE ........................................................................................... 43 
2.1.11 DEMAGOGUES AND POPULISM ....................................................................................... 49 
2.1.12 DESTRUCTIVE VERSUS BENEFICIAL DEMAGOGUES ................................................. 50 
2.1.13 DEMAGOGUES AND POLITICAL PARTIES ..................................................................... 52 
2.1.14 DEMOCRACY AND DEMAGOGUERY: THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN MEDIA ........ 55 
2.1.15 MONEY, POLITICS AND NIGERIA‘S DEMOCRACY ...................................................... 55 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................ 59 
2.2.1 THE ELITE THEORY ............................................................................................................... 59 
2.2.2 MASS SOCIETY THEORY ...................................................................................................... 62 
2.2.3 SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONSIM ............................................................................................ 65 
2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................... 66 
2.4 HYPOTHESES ............................................................................................................................. 69 
CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................................... 70 
METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................... 70 
3.1 RESEARCH SETTING ................................................................................................................ 70 
3.2 STUDY POPULATION ............................................................................................................... 74 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................................................. 75 
3.4 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE ............................................................................... 75 
3.5 RELIABILITY OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT ............................................................................ 77 
3.6 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION ....................................................................................... 78 
3.7 SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION ........................................................................................ 78 
3.8 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS FOR DATA COLLECTION ...................................................... 78 
3.9 METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 79 
3.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION .................................................................................................. 80 
3.11 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .............................................................................................. 80 
CHAPTER FOUR ....................................................................................................................................... 81 
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION....................................... 81 
4.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS (FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION): SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS ....................................................... 81 
4.2 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS (CROSS TABULATION) ............................................................... 112 
x 
 
4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSES ...................................................................................................... 113 
4.4 TESTING OF HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................... 116 
4.5 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ................................................................................................... 117 
4.5.1 WAYS IN WHICH DEMAGOGUERY MANIFESTS IN NIGERIA‘S DEMOCRACY ...... 122 
4.5.2 FACTORS THAT MAKE DEMAGOGUERY THRIVE IN THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 
OF NIGERIA .................................................................................................................................... 124 
4.5.3 THE ROLE OF DEMAGOGUERY IN NIGERIA‘S DEMOCRACY ................................... 126 
4.5.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEMAGOGUERY ON DEMOCRACY AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA ........................................................................................................ 128 
CHAPTER FIVE ...................................................................................................................................... 131 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................... 131 
5.1 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 131 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................ 134 
5.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE ...................................................................................... 136 
5.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ...................................................................................... 136 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................ 137 
APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................................... 154 
APPENDIX B ......................................................................................................................... 157 
APPENDIX C ......................................................................................................................... 159 
APPENDIX D ......................................................................................................................... 178 
APPENDIX E .......................................................................................................................... 179 
APPENDIX F .......................................................................................................................... 181 
APPENDIX G ......................................................................................................................... 183 
APPENDIX H ......................................................................................................................... 189 
APPENDIX I ........................................................................................................................... 194 
APPENDIX J........................................................................................................................... 197 
APPENDIX K: BIVARIATE ANALYSIS (CROSS TABULATION) .................................. 208 
APPENDIX L (REGRESSION ANALYSIS)......................................................................... 231 
APPENDIX M......................................................................................................................... 237 
 
 
xi 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1: Differences Between Demagoguery and Godfatherism……………………………..34 
Table 3.1: Geopolitical Zones and the Randomly Selected State from Each Zone.....................75 
Table 3.2: Sampling Methods……………………………………………………………………77 
Table 3.3: Reliability Statistics....................................................................................................77 
Table 4.1.1 Socio-demographic Distribution of Respondents................................................82-83 
Table 4.1.2: Distribution of Respondents by Political Party.......................................................85 
Table 4.1.3: Distribution of Respondents by State......................................................................86 
Table 4.1.4: Votes Influenced by Money and Material Inducements.........................................87 
Table 4.1.5: Political Parties and Cost of Nomination and Expression of Interest Forms in the 
2015 General Elections...............................................................................................................88 
Table 4.1.6: Votes Influenced by Leaders/ Mentors...................................................................90 
Table 4.1.7: Votes Influenced by Threats...................................................................................91 
Table 4.1.8: Votes Influenced by a Combination of Inducement and Threats...........................92 
Table 4.1.9: Voting Process Influenced by Intimidation/ Fraud................................................93 
Table 4.1.10: Voting Process Violated Democratic Rules or Principles...................................94 
Table 4.1.11: Poverty is Responsible for the Inability of Delegates and Voters to Choose 
Candidates Independently of What Their Leaders Tell Them...................................................95 
Table 4.1.12: Votes Influenced by Monetary Inducement Only................................................96 
Table 4.1.13: Votes Influenced by Religious Sentiments..........................................................97 
Table 4.1.14: Votes Influenced by Ethnic Sentiments...............................................................98 
Table 4.1.15: Votes Influenced by Use of Force.......................................................................99 
Table 4.1.16: Votes Influenced by Intimidation......................................................................100 
xii 
 
Table 4.1.17: Use of Thugs to Intimidate Voters........................................................................101 
Table 4.1.18: Use of Security Agencies to Intimidate Delegates...............................................102 
Table 4.1.19: Party Leaders Opposed to Imposition of Candidates Were Subject to 
Harassment.................................................................................................................................103 
Table 4.1.20: Election Did Not Follow Due Process and Rule of Law.....................................104 
Table 4.1.21: Candidates Produced By Primary Elections May Not Be Based On Merit or 
Leadership Qualities of Candidates...........................................................................................105 
Table 4.1.22: Poor Leadership Can Result From Imposition of Candidates on the People.......106 
Table 4.1.23: Political Leaders Undermine Democracy through Imposition of Candidates and 
Rigging of Elections...................................................................................................................107 
Table 4.1.24: Election Rigging Is As a Result of Fielding Imposed Candidates for 
Elections.....................................................................................................................................108 
Table 4.1.25: Nigeria's Democracy Will Not Grow If There Is Imposition of Candidates and 
Other Forms of Electoral Malpractices......................................................................................109 
Table 4.1.26: The Greatest Challenge to Democracy in Nigeria is the Abuse of Power and 
Disregard for Due Process and the Rule of Law in Democratic Activities…………………….110 
Table 4.1.27: Qualified and Willing Nigerians Avoid Politics Because of the Dangers and 
Maneuverings Associated With Democratic Politics in Nigeria................................................111 
Table 4.2: Party Leaders Opposed to Imposition of Candidates Were Harassed.......................112 
Table 4.3.1 Model Summary.......................................................................................................114 
Table 4.3.2 ANOVA....................................................................................................................114 
Table 4.3.3 Coefficients...............................................................................................................115 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Fig. 2.1: Conceptual Framework…………………………….......................................................67 
Fig. 3.1 (a&b): Map of Nigeria showing the six geo-political zones............................................71 
Fig. 4.1: Cost of Nomination Forms............................................................................................89
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
―Even as democratic legitimacy has been established or restored in many countries over the 
last two decades, it is threatened today by a new danger, which I call ―fig leaf democracy‖. 
                                                                            Kofi Annan (2000) 
―The story of democracy contains both a celebration of the end of arbitrary rule and 
paternalistic politics, and anxiety that democracy could mean rule by the rabble.‖  
                                                                              David Held (2006:231) 
       
The global perception that democracy is the best form of government has resulted in the 
acceptance and adoption of democratic regimes across the globe, particularly in hitherto 
dictatorial States of Africa. Thus, Nigeria returned to democracy on the 29
th
 of May, 1999 with 
the hope of solving the governance and development predicaments that military rule had plunged 
the country into over the years. This is because leadership failure has been identified as the major 
problem bedeviling the Third World Countries, especially in countries where other forms of 
government, except democracy, are in place (Ake, 2001; 2008; Onyeonoru, 2004).  
This political revolution was occasioned by the struggle, in many countries of Africa, and 
especially Nigeria, for democratic governance to be adopted and thereby jettisoning other forms 
of government which have been termed dictatorship. While most African countries, including 
Nigeria, have become ‗officially‘, democratic States, there is yet to be seen, in practice, 
adherence to democratic standards, norms, values and expectations in these nations due to the 
manipulative activities of politicians, especially political elites and political entrepreneurs who 
engage or sponsor all kinds of demagoguery in the quest for power. Having witnessed several 
elections at both State and National levels in the Fourth Republic, and seen elections being 
turned to war-like occasions, with losses in human lives and properties undermining the 
processes and outcomes of elections in Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic, one is moved to investigate 
the anti-democratic practices and the roles they play in the country‘s democracy. Thus, with the 
massive contentions and claims about democratic irregularities such as imposition of candidates, 
intimidation of opponents and election fraud in Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic, democracy seems to 
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have all the features of dictatorship as experienced prior to 1999, except for the occurrence of 
elections that are highly and violently compromised and contentious.  
Understandably, the idea of democracy has always brought about excitements and apprehensions 
wherever it exists as a system or form of government. Excitement because it is, expectedly, the 
solution to the tyranny, misrule and injustice of one (or minority) over another (the majority) in 
any society, and apprehensions because of the derisive maneuvering and conspicuous failings 
associated with the practice of democracy (Kirkpatrick, 1982; Ake, 1993, 1998; Fund, 2008; 
Signer, 2009; Urim, Imhonopi & Ojukwu, 2013). Thus, even though democracy should mean the 
form of government in which the people rule themselves either directly or through freely and 
fairly elected representatives, it has been rightly emphasized that ―not every nation that calls 
itself a democracy allows the people to rule‖ (Bessette and Pitney, 2012: 9) and democracy does 
not necessarily translate to good governance (Kirkpatrick, 1982; Onyeonoru, 2004). For instance, 
South Korea represents a paradigm of a ―democracy‖ that the people do not rule! By name, the 
country is called ―The Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea‖, yet it does not allow for 
opposition political parties, free elections and democratic accountability, press freedom, rule of 
law and other democratic essentials that probably informed the formation of the name.  
In Zimbabwe also, democracy has presented its people no choice of leadership except the 
ZANU-PF headed by President Robert Mugabe. The same experience is true in Cameroun where 
Paul Biya and his party, Cameroonian People's Democratic Movement (RDPC), have remained 
the only option to rule the people. In some countries, especially in Africa, where democracy 
continue to suffer political blasphemy in the hands of its supposed ‗political priests‘, many 
citizens have had to sacrifice their lives in the fight to enforce true democracy in their countries. 
This is especially true for countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, 
Zimbabwe, and many more that have engaged and continue to engage antidemocratic elements 
and forces to enthrone authentic democracy that survives and thrives on the principle of popular 
sovereignty (that political power derives from the people) and its expected dividends of securing 
the rights of the people to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (which is the very purpose of 
government). 
At the centre of the controversies surrounding the practice of democracy in most parts of the 
developing world is the practice of demagoguery, which involves the illegal, manipulative and 
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unconstitutional method of undermining the rules, values and ideals of democracy thereby, 
circumventing the democratic process before, during and after elections to achieve or promote 
the political ambitions of a few, to the disadvantage of the majority (Schmitt, 1976; Muravchik, 
1991;Ake, 1993; Larson 1996).  
In the Nigerian context, the highhandedness of politicians in power continues to raise serious 
concern about the country‘s nascent democracy. For example, during the Obasanjo regime 
(particularly in the second tenure between 2003 and 2007), his third term ambition was identified 
as the main reason for avoidable political crisis between the former president and his Vice, Atiku 
Abubakar, and other political actors that were opposed to his then seemingly unbridled ambition 
of elongating his tenure through a constitutional amendment (Ariye, Ogbomah, Ebipre ,& Eric, 
2012; Adeniyi, 2011). This trend of abuse of power by the executive persists in the democratic 
experience of Nigeria until the period of this study.  
From the foregoing compendia of facts, therefore, it becomes very necessary to investigate and 
understand how demagoguery threatens democracy and all that it represents in the context of 
procedure and outcome.  Furthermore, this research will provide the platform to investigate the 
nature of demagoguery and understand the configuration and character of demagogues as 
different from the concept of godfatherism that existing researches seem to have exhaustively 
dissected as the problem of democracy and good governance in Nigeria. Very importantly also, 
the role of demagoguery, how demagoguery manifests and the implications of demagoguery on 
Nigeria‘s democracy will be investigated.   
The outcome of a scientific investigation and sociological analysis of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s 
democracy will present much more comprehensive facts on demagoguery and demagogues and 
how the highly sophisticated network of demagogues frustrate the country‘s quest for a truly free 
and democratic state where popular sovereignty and the principles of separation of powers and 
checks and balances in government will be visible realities of democratic practices.  
 
 
 
4 
 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Failure to conduct free, fair and credible elections, which is a cardinal factor in democratic 
system, can undermine the essence of democracy as the best form of government where the 
power to choose leaders is vested in the people. Democracy empowers the people to choose 
leaders on the basis of freedom of choice and credible elections, but political leaders and 
institutions of State are requiring, through coercion and election fraud, that the people have little 
or no choice on who leads them. This situation has made the promise of democracy unrealizable 
in Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic. Fund (2008) recommends that country-specific studies be 
undertaken to identify the challenges that confront democracies across the world, as every 
democratic regime has its peculiar challenges that creates anxieties and frustrations with 
democratic practice. 
Despite the seemingly remarkable progress of democracy in Nigeria, its survival, deepening and 
dividends are threatened by pervasive electoral fraud the overbearing influence and manipulative 
political behaviour of demagogues which have made misrule, abuse of power, corruption, 
uncertainty, poverty and unemployment undeniable features of the country‘s democracy 
(Ofeimum, 2010). These democratic failings have continued to agitate democratic stakeholders 
worldwide because statistics show that only around 50% of countries that have embarked on 
democratic transitions since 1980 have achieved full democracies because of the ever-present 
tendencies of antidemocratic forces ever willing to stall democracy, promote authoritarian 
regime and make democratic gains seem unachievable (Bjornlund, 2004). All across the political 
nooks and crannies of Nigeria we are presented with incidences of violence due to allegations 
and provable indictments of abuse of power and the use of the military and thugs by politicians 
to impose themselves or their favoured candidates for elections as well as rigging of elections to 
subvert the choices of the masses (Kofamata, 2007; Bakare, 2013).  
Accordingly, there is an ongoing struggle, a more fierce and justifiable battle, to free the 
Nigerian nation from demagoguery and the conspiracy of the few elites who have constituted 
themselves as the political leviathans of the country to undermine the will of the people in 
electing political leaders. Consequently, the fight has shifted from that of democracy as a form of 
government versus military rule to the battle of establishing the true meaning and practice of 
democracy: democracy becoming the government of the people, by the people and for the people 
in every sense of the analysis. Some of the major threats to realizing this democratic ideal in the 
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Nigerian political context include demagoguery and the overbearing influence and manipulative 
political behaviour of political actors, especially demagogues, a special type of elites who have 
overpowering control over the masses or take undue advantage of the political positions they 
occupy to undermine democratic practices in favour of their political ambitions.  
The notoriety concomitant with democracy or democratic practice in Nigeria is further 
exacerbated by the seemingly tolerable posture of democratic institutions and the Nigerian 
people to electoral irregularities and election fraud, where the end, and not the means, appears to 
be the priority. This is a problem that has led to increasing doubts about the ability of democracy 
to produce leaders that reflect the will of the people. 
Although scholars have studied the influence of demagoguery on democratic processes and 
outcomes on how democratic progress has been hampered by demagogic practices of political 
actors (Fund, 2008; Signer, 2009), most of these studies have focused on country-specific 
democratic experiences without dwelling on the Nigerian democratic context. Thus, to 
understand the role of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democracy, a study on demagoguery as it 
relates to the Nigerian democratic situation is pertinent and a response to the recommendation by 
Fund (2008) that researchers should undertake country-specific studies on demagoguery and 
what it represents for democratic opportunities, growth and dividends for the particular country.  
Current studies that relate to undemocratic practices in Nigeria‘s democratic politics have 
centred on the role of godfatherism in undermining democratic values, ethos, principles and 
public participation in the process and outcome of democracy (Yahaya, 2007; Animasawun, 
2013). However, existing studies have seldom dealt with the demagoguery perpetuated by 
Nigerian democratic stakeholders, including not just the godfathers, but the ‗godsons‘, the 
electorates, the officials of the electoral body (Independent National Electoral Commission), and 
the Nigerian security agencies/agents. A study on demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democracy could 
help ascertain the impact of demagoguery on the practice of democracy in Nigeria‘s Fourth 
Republic. 
From the foregoing, this study which is an investigation of demagoguery in the Nigerian 
democratic context (with particular focus on the role of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democratic 
politics; factors that account for the emergence and thriving of demagoguery in Nigeria; how 
demagoguery manifests and the implications of demagoguery on democracy and good 
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governance in Nigeria), shows the problematic of democratic practice in Nigeria‘s Fourth 
Republic.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following questions were raised in this study. 
1. How does demagoguery manifest in the democratic politics of Nigeria? 
2. What role does demagoguery play in Nigeria‘s democracy in the Fourth Republic? 
3. What factors give rise to demagoguery in the democratic governance of Nigeria? 
4. What are the implications of demagoguery on democracy and good governance in 
Nigeria? 
1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
The aim of this study is to examine the basis and manifestations of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s 
democracy and how the failings of democratic governance in Nigeria has remained a threat to the 
survival and deepening of democracy in the country.  The specific objectives of this study which 
derive from the research questions are to: 
1. examine the ways that demagoguery manifest in Nigeria‘s democracy; 
2. investigate the role of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democracy in the Fourth Republic; 
3. identify the factors that make demagoguery thrive in the democratic politics of Nigeria; 
and 
4. examine the implications of demagoguery on democracy and good governance in 
Nigeria.   
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
This study is important because it investigates and provides a sociological analysis of 
demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democratic space, and shows how the political leaders in Nigeria‘s 
democratic dispensation of the Fourth Republic emerge through undemocratic routes.  
The study will be of immense benefit to government, democratic institutions and the research 
community. For the government, it provides the basis for the Nigerian government to develop 
policies and action plans that will ensure the demilitarization of elections and the need to amend 
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the constitution to stop the impunity of political or democratic institutions that undermine 
citizens‘ democratic rights. Also, the study has provided useful information for democratic 
institutions and stakeholders to tackle election fraud in Nigeria from an informed standpoint. 
Finally, it has contributed to the body of knowledge, particularly in Political Sociology, on 
elections and democracy in Nigeria. 
 
1.6 SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study was carried out to investigate the existence, role and effect of demagoguery in 
Nigeria‘s democracy in the Fourth Republic. While it investigated the practices, behaviour, and 
actions of participants in the Nigerian democratic scene, it focused on Nigeria‘s democratic 
experience in the Fourth Republic, specifically from 1999 to 2015. Geographically, the study 
was conducted in six states and the Federal Capital Territory. Each state was randomly selected 
from each of the six geopolitical zones that make up Nigeria, while the FCT was included as the 
capital of Nigeria.  
The sample population selected for this study was limited to the delegates of the All Progressives 
Congress (APC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the two leading political parties for the 
2015 governorship/presidential elections in Nigeria. Only a few stakeholders, mainly those 
actively involved in Nigeria‘s democratic elections in the Fourth Republic participated in the 
study as key informants. Besides, the study‘s focus was on the primary elections conducted by 
the two major political parties (i.e., APC and PDP). Although the study did not involve other 
political parties and was not conducted in all the thirty-six states of Nigeria, the sample is, 
however, representative of the population in various other states in Nigeria, and thus can be 
reasonably generalized. The reason for adopting this route was because, the parties, PDP and 
APC, are the major political parties with widespread presence in Nigeria, while the other 
political parties (excepting APGA), are either only existing in names or as political twigs of the 
two main political parties discussed. Also, the decision to randomly select one state per political 
zone was informed by financial and time constraints.  
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1.7 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
The following key terms used in this study have been contextually explained to avoid possible 
ambiguity.  
Demagoguery: Demagoguery, as used in this study, refers to behaviour and actions undertaken 
by stakeholders of democracy which undermine democratic norms, ethos, principles, and the 
democratic politics of free and fair elections, thereby threatening the growth and sustenance of 
democracy. This involves manipulative activities that undermine the sanctity, values and ideals 
of democracy, and includes actions such as fraudulent voter registration, bribery, intimidation, 
election fraud, violence, and all other irregularities that violate the constitution of Nigeria, the 
electoral act and other relevant laws. It also implies the use of resources and political might to act 
unconstitutionally and/or illegally to undermine democratic norms, principles and culture in the 
quest to either attain power or gain political advantage. 
Demagogue: A demagogue is a leader in a political system that uses foul means, including 
wealth, violence, and intimidation to exploit the fears, emotions, prejudices, ignorance and 
weaknesses of the electorate with the goal of gaining political power, sustaining power and 
promotion of political motives for personal or group interests.  
Democracy: This is a form of government where eligible citizens choose their leaders in a free 
and fair election and whereby the actions and inactions of all within its confines are guided by 
the rule of law.   
Democratic governance: Democratic governance, as used in this study, means a system of 
government where individuals and institutions function according to democratic processes and 
norms, both internally and in their interaction with other institutions. 
Democratic institutions: These are the establishments, such as the courts, independent electoral 
body, the judiciary, legislature, political parties, et cetera, that underpin and support democracy 
in order to achieve good governance. 
Demo-dictatorship: This refers to a democratic government that operates dictatorially or 
imperiously with little or no commitment to the ethos and values of democracy. 
9 
 
Election fraud: This refers to irregularities relating to voting that have the potential of tainting 
an election, and includes phony voter registrations, bribery, intimidation, illegal absentee ballots, 
ballot box stuffing, forgery and any such acts as spelt out in the Electoral Act.  
Elitism: This is a class of people in society, few in number, who assume superiority over others 
as a result of their privileged socio-economic status as defined by their wealth, educational level, 
occupation, specialized training or experience and other distinctive attributes that make them to 
arrogate the competence to govern to themselves.  
Godfatherism: This is a political relationship between a sponsor (godfather) and a legatee 
(godson or goddaughter) in which the godfather uses his political power and wealth to secure 
political position for the godson/goddaughter, who upon ascension into power, offers 
compensations to his/her benefactor (godfather) in kind or in cash. It is the political idea of 
reciprocal altruism and it operates on the principle of Quid pro quo ("something for 
something") or tit for tat. 
Liberalism: As implied in this study, liberalism is the notion of the importance of adhering to 
the values of reason, freedom of choice, open-mindedness, fairness and tolerance in the pursuit 
of political objectives and goals.   
Plutocracy: This is a system of government that is controlled or ruled by the wealth-owning 
class. 
Political economy: Although political economy generally implies the interdisciplinary studies 
that draws upon economics, political science, law, history, sociology and other disciplines in the 
social sciences in explaining the crucial role of political factors in determining economic 
outcomes, the concept as used here refers to the political and economic benefits that necessitate 
(and justify) the attractiveness and supremacy of demagoguery in the Nigerian political context. 
A political economy approach in Sociology is applied to study the effects of people's 
involvement in society as members of groups, and how that changes their ability to function 
effectively in their cultural, social, economic and political contexts. 
Populism: This is a political movement that thrives on the strength of mobilized masses aimed at 
establishing populist political and socio-economic ideals through the direct actions of the masses.  
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1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study was organized into five chapters with each chapter addressing specific areas of study 
as shown below. 
Chapter 1: Introduction: this section of the thesis provides an informative and significant 
discourse of what necessitated the study and it includes the background to the study, statement of 
the problem, research questions, objectives of the study, significance of the study and the 
definition of key terms. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework: this section of the thesis situates the 
study in the context of previous studies and scholarly materials through an exhaustive review of 
related literature on the subject of democracy, demagogues and other related concepts being 
studied as available from scholars and researchers, and in research journals, articles, books, 
magazines, newspapers, seminars, and other papers. Furthermore, the gap in the literature was 
identified, which the current study attempted to fill. The theoretical framework for this study was 
also presented in this section. The theories used are symbolic interactionism, elitist theory of 
democracy and the theory of mass society.  
Chapter 3: Methodology: This section presented the description of the methods that was 
adopted for the study, including the area and population of study, sample and sampling 
procedures, research instruments and the procedures for collection and analysis of data.  
Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Analysis: in this section of the thesis, the data and information 
that emerged as a result of the study were presented and analyzed by the use of tables, and other 
visual representations to illustrate the data 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations: this final chapter of the study summarized the 
major findings of the research, presented the conclusion and made recommendations that could 
save our democracy from the conundrums of demagoguery, and thus ensure the survival and 
thriving of democratic government in the contexts of freedom, liberty, rule of law, human 
happiness and national prosperity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter involves a comprehensive review of existing literature on the concepts of 
democracy, demagoguery, demagogue, election, godfatherism, political economy and current 
studies that seek to identify and address the problematic realities of operating democracies, 
especially in the context of the roles played by political actors in the subversion of democracies 
across the world while providing justifiable basis to undertake a study on demagoguery in the 
democratic governance of Nigeria in the fourth republic to fill identifiable knowledge gap in 
existing discourse on the subject. 
2.1.1 DEMOCRACY AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
The concept of democracy as a form of government, regardless of its etymology, is ambiguous 
and vehemently contentious (Habermas, 1996; Held, 2006; Signer, 2009). Democracy is a term 
derived from the Greek word demokratia, the root meanings of which are demos (people) and 
kratos (rule) (Held, 2006; Bessette and Pitney, 2012). Thus, simply put, democracy as a form of 
government is the type of political regime where the people rule.  
In describing the controversial notion of the concept of democracy, Held (2006) notes that all 
political leaders, irrespective of their extraordinarily diverse views, claim to have the support of 
‗the people‘ and thus democratic. This is due to the fact that the political ideals of democracy 
which include liberty, equality among citizens, the rule of law, consent of the governed, and 
justice are values with universal appeals that legitimize all forms of governance, for which even 
the most brutal of dictators claim to uphold (Signer, 2009; Carto, 1996; Bessette and Pitney, 
2012). The complexity of the concept of democracy since its inception has spurred intellectual 
discussions on the subject by experts. Diamond (1999) and Zakaria (1997) make distinctions 
between electoral democracies, liberal democracies, illiberal democracies, quasi democracies, 
incomplete democracies, and fragile democracies. Nigeria practices liberal democracy 
(Onyeonoru, 2004). 
The emergence of liberal democracy in the modern era was a product of the dialectical struggle 
between monarchs and estates over the domain of rightful authority, religious strife and the 
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challenge to the universal claims of Catholicism, the rebellion of peasants against the burden of 
excessive taxation and social obligations, the struggle between church and state (Held, 2006). 
Democracy was thus conceived as a political solution to the unbridled conflict of interests and 
the domination of the few over the powerless majority in the society. But because this system of 
governance does not reckon with the tyrannical nature of power-mongers, democracy has 
suffered and continues to face stiff opposition from the corrupt control of an illegitimate 
minority, who are either in power or desperately seeking to attain power (Kirkpatrick, 1982; 
Samsons, 2004; Yahaya, 2007; Achebe, 2012).  
Because power in a democracy resides with the people, the power to make decisions lies with the 
people. Consequently, whoever has the ears of the people or the authorized representatives of the 
people have power. Signer (2006:33) cautioned that ―that power can lead to a wide range of 
actions, from justice to massacres‖, as have been witnessed in South Africa, Germany, Rwanda, 
Italy, among other nations, in the past. 
Schumpeter (1976: 285) contributes to the debate of the definitional problem of democracy thus: 
Democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any 
obvious sense of the terms ―people‖ and ―rule‖. Democracy means only that the 
people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule 
them…Now one aspect of this may be expressed by saying that democracy is the 
rule of the politician. 
 
Also, the extent to which political leaders value ―the people‖ will largely be determined by what 
they do with the power entrusted into their hands. Nwatu (2004) states that the notion of ―the 
people‖ in Nigeria‘s political dialogue, especially among politicians, carries a derogatory 
connotation implying a collection of poor, uneducated, vulnerable and uninformed populace who 
are unknowledgeable in matters relating to the public good, and for which they have to be 
governed with or without their consent. There is no doubting the fact that such a besmirched idea 
of ―the people‖ can create an intellectual and immoral justification for the tyranny of the ruler(s) 
over the ruled.  
There are fundamentally two types of democracy, viz: direct and indirect democracy. It is from 
these two exemplifications of democracy that all other forms of democracy sprout (Held, 2006). 
The direct democracy, which was practiced in the Athens city of ancient Greece, involved the 
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direct involvement of the people in passing of laws and making of key decisions on the 
administration of the society (Bessette and Pitney, 2010). This is sometimes referred to as 
classical democracy because of its orthodox root (Held, 2006). In direct democracy it was out of 
place for any single person or group to arrogate leadership of the people to himself or themselves 
as all eligible citizens were obliged to vote directly on legislation and executive bills. Obviously 
this type of democracy was suitable for a small town or city with very little population but 
impracticable in modern societies. Thus, in contemporary societies all over the world, indirect 
democracy cum representative democracy where elected officials, chosen by the people in free 
and credible elections, represent the people in political affairs and are held accountable for their 
conduct is the form of democracy that is practiced. While Athens is the paradigmatic model of 
direct democracy, the United States of America is the paradigmatic model of indirect or liberal 
representative democracy.  
2.1.2 DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 
Democratic structures and culture are the building blocks for the emergence of genuine 
democracy, survival of democracy as well as ensuring the possibility of good governance and 
acceptable democratic politics. Nigeria‘s democratic structure exists within a framework of a 
federal, presidential, representative democratic republic, in which executive power is exercised 
by the government. That is, the Nigerian Constitution establishes the operation of three tiers of 
government made up of the Federal government, State government and the Local government. It 
also provides for the presidential system of government that comprises of the Executive, 
Legislature and the Judiciary. Each of these structural components is to act as a check and 
balance of the powers and actions of the other two arms. 
Democratic culture refers to the norms, values, traditions and ethos which are required to 
structure the behaviours and practices of participants and stakeholders in a democratic system. 
These traditions and values include, but not limited to the rule of law, respect for human rights, 
periodic elections, citizens participation in decision making, freedom of the press, separation of 
powers and judicial independence. 
According to Luckham, Goetz, Kaldor, Ayers, Bastian, Gyimah-Boadi, Hassim and Puhovski 
(2012), democratic structure and culture are envisioned to meet the following goals: 
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i. to enable citizens‘ participation directly or through elected representatives in free and 
fair elections; 
ii. to avoid tyranny both by despotic leaders and the oppression of the minority by the 
majority; 
iii. to assure open and fair competition for power on the basis of the popular vote, and 
thus the accountability of governments and circulation of elites and power; and 
iv. to provide a forum for rational discussion of political problems and optimum 
settlement of different and potentially conflicting social interests.  
The success or failure of democracy largely depends on the success or failure of democratic 
institutions (Gberevbie, 2014; Onyeonoru, 2004). Thus, where democratic institutions are weak 
and unable to protect democratic ideals from the bullish politics of demagoguery, whether by 
those seeking power or those who seek to hold onto power, the chances of survival for 
democracy and good governance cannot be guaranteed. Luckham et al (2012) warned of the 
danger of a democratic structure and culture that emphasized political contestation at the expense 
of politics of inclusion and participation. Bjornlund (2004:32) has also faulted democracies that 
undermine democratic cultures arguing that ―genuine democracy requires substantially more than 
democratic elections.‖ Similarly, Zakaria (2003) noted that ―across the globe, democratically 
elected regimes … are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their 
citizens of basic rights.‖ 
According to Luckham et al (2012), whereas the institutional arrangement and democratic 
culture of direct democracy were designed to maximize active citizenship participation as well as 
laid emphasis on civic virtue, liberal representative democracy emphasized political contestation, 
rational discussion, rule of law and on avoiding tyranny. Also, the liberal representative 
democratic model put more emphasis on institutions than the direct democracy of Athens. The 
democratic institutions are required to be effective in order to override the tyrannical tendencies 
of the executives through the separation of power and checks and balances. Representative 
democracy (or indirect democracy) provides key advantages over direct democracy. A major 
advantage of representative democracy over direct democracy is that it posibilitizes an extension 
of democratic rule to a large population of people, such as a country. An example of this 
advantage is India with a population of about 1.3 billion, and reputed to be the largest democracy 
in the world. Also, representative democracy permits the body of elected and accountable 
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officials to make sounder judgment about the public good, while remaining true to underlying 
public desires, than would the people themselves acting directly (Bessette & Pitney, 2012). 
Consequently, the elected representatives are expected to legislate and execute bills that reflect 
the overriding interest of the people and provide leadership that secures the rights of citizens and 
promotes their freedoms or liberty. Hence, the indirect or representative democracy is also 
referred to as liberal democracy describing the primacy of modern democratic states to provide 
the enabling environment for citizens to have the liberty to pursue their own interests, uphold the 
rule of law so as to protect the liberty of individuals without political impediments.  
In gauging the democratic structure and culture of Nigeria, Onyeonoru (2004) noted that the 
question of the appropriate democratic structure remains unresolved and the democratic culture 
remains rudimentary. While it seems true that the democratic structure remains unresolved and 
might remain so in order to satisfy the interests of the architects of the structure, it is 
controversial to conclude that Nigeria‘s democratic culture is rudimentary, except if the word 
―rudimentary‖ does not imply elementary, but crude or rough, especially in the context of 
political contestations. If anything, the democratic culture of Nigeria may not resemble the 
globally accepted values that sustain democracy because it is pigeonholed by demagoguery. 
Thus, this study further investigates the unique cultures that define ‗the Nigerian democracy‘ and 
how the Nigerian people relate with them.  
2.1.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
Held (2006) reiterates the complicated factors and changes in history that contributed to the 
emergence of modern liberal and democratic thought all over the world. These contributory 
historical realities that initiated liberal democracies include: the power-struggle between the 
crowned heads (monarchs) and estates over the territory of rightful authority; peasant rebellions 
against excessive taxation burden and other social obligations; the expansion of economic 
activities of trade, commerce and market relations; advances in military technology; the 
consolidation of national monarchies, notably, in France, Spain and England; the expansive 
influence of renaissance culture; the struggle against the universal claims of Catholicism and 
other religious strife; the struggle between the Church and the State. Liberal democracy was 
conceived as a guaranteed solution to the tyranny of the few that characterized the monarchies 
and other undemocratic regimes.  
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Following the liberal democratic tradition, the idea of the state in modern political thought is 
―often linked to the notion of an impersonal and privileged legal and constitutional order with the 
capability of administering and controlling a given territory…i.e. a legally circumscribed 
structure of power separate from ruler and ruled with supreme jurisdiction over a territory‖ 
(Held, 2006:58). Thus, in an ideal liberal democracy, the type that is practiced today in many 
countries of the world, there should be an impersonal and sovereign political order that abates the 
proclivity of the political class for despotism. Unfortunately, for the Nigerian state, there are 
certain cultural, social, economic and political dynamics that have been institutionalized by the 
political class, which serve a constraining influence on the actualization of authentic democracy 
and immaculate democratic governance. Ofeimum (2010) observed that the democratic practice 
in Nigeria has suffered from the supervening force of malfeasance and abuse of the electoral 
process because of the creepy culture of satisfying personal exigencies at the expense of an 
enduring ideology of collective progress among the ruling class. Thus, Nigerian leaders, having 
failed to deliver democratic dividends to its populace and thereby afraid of facing the electorates 
in a free and fair election, resort to all forms of demagoguery to frustrate every opposition to 
their political ambitions of holding onto power (Ake, 2008; Ofeimum, 2010; Achebe, 2012).  
Liberal democracy inspires progressive deliberation. This is what Bessette (1980) refers to as 
‗deliberative democracy‘, a philosophical ideal of democracy that jettisons contemporary 
democracy that seems to celebrate a seemingly ―descent into personality clashes, celebrity 
politics, sound-bite ‗debates‘ and the naked pursuit of personal gain and ambition‖ (Held, 
2006:232).    Perhaps, it may be appropriate to say that Nigeria‘s democratic situation today 
lacks the deliberative character of a truly liberal democracy as the ―naked pursuit of gain and 
ambition‖ has rapaciously immoralized our political space to the extent that men and women of 
virtue stay away from the political firmament like the world dreads Ebola-plagued patients. 
Suffice to say, therefore, that democratic politics, when lacking the deliberative feature that 
nurtures its survival and robustness, becomes shallow, hysterical, media-driven, mean and empty 
of both ideas and quality leadership. The result is that political contestations in democratic states 
become mere struggle among elites to dominate a vulnerable and susceptible electorate 
(Schumpeter, 1976 & Fishkin, 1991).  
From the following discourse, it becomes clear on why democracy is averse to demagoguery and 
why it does not ensemble demagogues. Demagogues take full advantage of their veneration by 
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the vulnerable people they claim to represent their interests to undermine democratic procedures 
in the quest to either attain or retain power. Besides, demagogues consider electoral contests as 
‗a winner takes it all‘ project and in which opposing views are considered and treated as 
intolerable threats to their survival (Ake, 2001; Adeniyi, 2011; Bakare, 2013).  
Fishkin (1991) has, however, noted that demagoguery could be associated with all models of 
democracy, including participatory or deliberative democracy, warning that ―it is a dubious 
accomplishment to give power to the people under conditions when they are not really in a 
position to exercise that power due to being vulnerable to demagoguery‖ (Fishkin, 1991:21).   
 
2.1.4 DEMOCRACY: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 
Even though there is no agreement by scholars on what democracy means, there is an 
overwhelming consensus that it is the best form of government and the driving force for political 
stability and development (Oyediran and Agbaje, 1999; Igbuzor, 2005; Fund, 2008; Held, 2006; 
Ofeimum, 2010). This global view was laconically echoed by Sen (1999) when he stated that: 
Among the great variety of developments that have occurred in the twentieth 
century, I did not, ultimately, have any difficulty in choosing one as the 
preeminent development of the period: the rise of democracy….In the distant 
future, when people look back at what happened in [the twentieth] century, they 
will find it difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the 
preeminently acceptable form of governance. 
The unending debates over the ability of democratic governance to deliver the needed political 
leadership for nations have been amplified by pervasive demagoguery or democratic 
irregularities and the obnoxious activities of demagogues who have engaged undemocratic 
means to undermine ―the peoples‘‖ will to elect their leaders in free and fair elections or change 
unpopular and nonperforming regimes. Signer (2009) argued that the greatest challenge facing 
democracies of the world today, especially developing countries, is how to stop demagogues 
whose hold on the democracies of their nations have made the future less bright with democracy. 
He stressed that wherever and whenever demagogues exist, they are not just a set of self-
contained demented personalities, but a phenomenon endemic to the ideal observance of 
democratic practice and a notorious challenge in humanity‘s ongoing struggle for a lasting state 
of liberty and prosperity for the masses. According to Signer (2009), demagoguery remains the 
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strategy of demagogues to violate the sanctity of democracy in their quest to either attain or 
retain political power.  
 
The history of democracy has been the history of demagoguery and demagogues. Thus, 
Huntington (1991) classified the account of democracy into three ―waves‖ each followed by a 
―reverse wave‖ featuring the ignoble roles of demagogues. In his classification, the first wave, 
from 1828 to 1926, comprised of the series of European revolutions (particularly in 1848), its 
consequent economic modernization, and the political freedoms experienced in the twentieth 
century. However, its consequent ―wave reverse‖ started in 1922 when Benito Mussolini 
overthrew Italy‘s nascent democracy. This reverse wave continued through World War II and 
swept up many European and Latin American countries. The second wave, which Huntington 
referred to as ―short wave‖ was the era that extended from 1943 to 1962 in which the Allied 
Forces installed democracies in the conquered Axis countries, resulting in the increased presence 
of democracy in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Following the second wave again was a second 
reverse wave which occurred between the periods, 1958 to 1975, when authoritarian regimes 
held sway across the world. The third ―wave‖ started in Portugal in 1974 pinnacled with the 
defeat of the Soviet Union, the consequent revolutions in Eastern Europe and the rise of 
democracies in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The reverse wave for the third wave is clearly 
staring on our faces today with the feared danger of conscripting democracy in most nations, and 
especially, in sub-Saharan Africa, where the unforgiveable failures of ―elected‖ leaders to deliver 
the desired dividends of democracy for the masses have strengthened the revolutionary request 
of demagogues (and their ever-willing mobs). Obviously, therefore, the reverse wave of the 
current wave of democracy is the rise of demagogues as a result of the monumental failures of 
legitimately elected leaders to stick to the universally acclaimed democratic principles, character 
and practice, which have in turn resulted in the impoverishment and enslavement of the masses.  
Jowett (2001) related Aristotle‘s argument that the history of revolutions in democracies have 
generally been caused by the overindulgence of demagogues in acts of demagoguery. This 
assertion cannot be far from the truth in the case of the overthrow of democratically elected 
governments in Africa generally and in Nigeria particularly, as successive military regimes in the 
past have cited the imperious and undemocratic role of demagogues as responsible for toppling 
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of the democratic governments that preceded them. Demagogues take advantage of the 
frustrations of the people who are the victims of the misrule, incompetence and lack of progress 
of an incumbent administration to endear themselves to the people as promising alternative(s). 
Elharathi (2014) emphasized how demagogues in the Egyptian military led by General Assisi 
influenced the people to march against the democratic (but highly controversial) regime of the 
Brotherhood presidency headed by Mohammed Morsi on the 30th of June, 2013.   
Thus, democracy, as we experience it in many African countries today bears close resemblance 
with the features that Landa (2004) associates with fascism, including despotism and elitism. 
Politicians employ all resources at their disposal, whether negative or positive, ranging from 
funds to violence, intimidation, willful deception in courting votes and seeking to expand their 
―mass basis.‖ Herein lays the intellectual connection between Aristotle‘s views on demagoguery 
and demagogues that link the origin of demagogues/demagoguery to democracy, and 
Tocqueville‘s prophecy that democracy would degenerate to totalitarianism if the excesses of 
democratic rule and the tyranny of the majority were not addressed.   
Noting that democracy was not indestructible, Keane (2009) warns that there was no in-built 
historical guarantee for the survival of democracy against the ever present and preying influence 
of the enemies of democracy, who are on the rise, and even commentators and panjandrums 
partially sympathetic to it are openly cynical about claims that it is the most desirable political 
model for all the people of the world. This sort of warning is not unconnected with the tragedy of 
today‘s democracy under the control of self-styled democrats, who through demagoguery have 
altered the idea of democracy almost beyond recognition (Dunn, 2005). 
In analyzing the painful experiences of citizens under the traditional totalitarian regimes of 
fascism and communism, and comparing the experiences with what is obtainable in democracies 
across the world generally, and in Africa particularly, Zencey (2012) argues that the three 
systems of fascism, communism and the governments and economic systems that exist in liberal 
free-market democracies are much more similar than different in large and interrelated aspects.  
Within a democratic system, demagogues are concerned with electoral democracies, but with 
little or no consideration for liberal democratic value. Dahl (1979) observes that whereas 
electoral democracies accentuate the conduct of elections, liberal democracies emphasize the 
essential democratic elements of political accountability for individuals entrusted with power, 
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checks and balances among the institutions of government, judicial review, freedom of speech, a 
free flow of information, and the rule of law. The reality of democracy in Africa generally, and 
Nigeria particularly, suggest that there has been more towards electoral democracy than liberal 
democracy, using Dahl‘s description of the two brands of democratic experience.  
Furthermore, the sit-tight syndrome among African leaders has been a major source of concern 
for the survival of democracy in the continent. For instance, among the longest serving 
presidents in the world are African presidents. For example, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo 
of Equitorial Guinea has been in office since 1979 (about 36 years); José Eduardo dos Santos of 
the Republic of Angola has also been in office since 1979; Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe who 
has been president since 1980; and a host of others. 
History has shown that under no circumstances or forms of government are people silent over (or 
comfortable with) despotic power. Mill (1861) warns against the despotic use of political power 
on the grounds of undesirability, inefficiency and impracticability in the long run because no 
one, including the despot, is superhuman to arrogate to himself or herself the knowledge of the 
common good for progressivity and deprive the people from deciding their own fate. Held 
(2006) argued that the democratic privilege of citizens or electorates of being able to replace one 
government by another through elections and a choice between (at least two) largely different 
political party platforms is key to putting in check the threat of tyranny by political office 
holders. Unfortunately, however, the tyrannical instinct of man, more correctly, politicians, have 
been proven stubborn, especially in developing countries where political office holders, in all 
forms of government, have sought ways of prolonging their reign through all means by 
manipulating the political ethics and ethos of the constitution to either deprive the people of their 
democratic right to change their government(s) or choose between different political platforms. 
Oni (2013) and Jombo (2015) have identified adversarial legislative-executive relations, 
particularly in the States, as a major drawback of democracy in the Fourth Republic. Acceding to 
the demand of political godfathers and ―Abuja-based‖ politicians, House of Assembly Members 
of several States have undermined constitutional provisions for the removal or impeachment of 
governors and deputy-governors as a means of settling personal political standoffs. For example, 
in Oyo State, the House of Assembly members, acting on the instruction of Adedibu, the 
acclaimed godfather of Oyo politics, impeached Ladoja, the governor, without resorting to the 
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constitutional provisions or procedures for impeachment. Although the Supreme Court reinstated 
the governor some months after his illegal removal, it remains a setback on Nigeria‘s democracy. 
That precedence was followed by many States that have their governors removed 
unconstitutionally by their Houses of Assembly (either through inducement or intimidation or a 
combination of both) (Ofeimun, 2010; Adeniji, 2011). Notable cases includes the removal of 
DSP Alamaseigha of Bayelsa State, Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State (in which case resulted in political 
situation where two persons, the deputy governor and the House of Assembly Speaker declared 
themselves as Ekiti State governor making Obasanjo, the president, to declare a State of 
emergency in the State), Nyako of Adamawa and his deputy‘s forced resignation which paved 
way for the Speaker to the become governor of the State, and the removal of deputy governors 
on flimsy allegations such as ―disloyalty to the governor‖ (not to the constitution) (Ondo), 
poultry farming in government residence (Enugu) and so many examples. 
According to Ake (2008), Adeniyi (2011) and Abdul-Jelil (2012), the monetization of politics as 
well as the violent and fraudulent nature of politics in Nigeria, evidenced in the ―do-or-die‖ 
approach of desperate politicians, are largely responsible for the abnegation of politics by 
morally upright and intellectually sounds citizens of the country who ordinarily should be the 
leaders of the people. These arguments were corroborated by Lesch (2014) who noted that the 
propertied political order of developing countries is sustained by violence and other coercive 
instrumentality of politics which makes the demagogue particularly suited for the democratic 
character of the spontaneous moment and popular movement. This interpretation of political 
activities as not being compatible with the moral life best explains the self-extraction of 
competent and qualified Nigerians from the political theater and thus leaving the stage for actors 
who accept and subscribe to the ‗immoral nature‘ of politics and politicking. Thus, taking 
advantage of the fears and apprehensions of the people, demagogues exploit the freedom secured 
under democracy to gain a level of power for themselves that overrules the rule of law, thereby 
undermining democratic values. Satkunanandan (2014) also corroborated Lesch‘s observation by 
emphasizing that demagogues ―make hard-headed consequentialist calculations about political 
means‖ that have little or no moral route. Thus, for an average politician in Nigeria, the 
Machiavellian ideal for acquisition and preservation of power is a priority in Nigerian politics 
(Ofeimun, 2010; Adeniyi, 2011; Animasawun, 2013; Adebayo, 2015).  
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2.1.5 DEMOCRATIC IRREGULARITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF ELECTION 
FRAUD 
Simply put, demagoguery means political mischiefs that undermine the credibility of democracy. 
Researchers have reported that the major challenge facing democracies all over the world 
remains election fraud (Bjornlund, 2004; Alvarez, Hall and Hyde, 2008; Cavdar, 2008; Smith 
and Donovan, 2008). Even the United States of America, reputed to be the bastion of modern 
democracy, underscored its democratic hypocrisy with the Florida election frauds in the 
November 2000 presidential elections.  
According to Alvarez and Katz (2008), the social science literature boasts of little empirical 
analysis of election fraud, and most of the few literature on election fraud focused on estimating 
the extent of election fraud. The reason for the scanty empirical study of demagoguery and 
election fraud is due to the fact that the concepts of demagoguery and election fraud are not 
universal but rather ―rooted in each country‘s cultural and political milieu‖ (Cox, 1997; 
Bjornlund, 2004; Alvarez, Hall and Hyde, 2008). 
This study, which focuses on Nigeria‘s democracy, is a response to Cox‘s call for researches that 
target country-specific demagoguery and election frauds as reflected in the cultural and political 
milieu of democracies all around the World. Thus, the study will add to and enrich existing 
knowledge on country-specific democratic irregularities and the consequences they have on the 
progress of democracy in Nigeria. 
The need to understand country-specific demagoguery and election fraud stems from the fact that 
whereas election outcomes can be highly predictable in some countries based on a handful of 
variables such as economic progress and political stability (Fund, 2008), the same variables that 
explain the humiliating failures of politicians in some climes may not affect the victories of 
politicians in some other climes (Gelman and King, 2003). For instance, Alvarez and Katz 
(2008) and Gelman and King (2003) have noted that in the United States and several developed 
countries election outcomes can be predicted before elections occur with high levels of accuracy 
when the variables of the state of the national economy, incumbency and partisanship are 
considered. However, in several developing countries, experience has shown that incumbency is 
the major predictor of election victories irrespective of the performance of the economy and 
other factors. Thus, for instance, whereas incumbents lose elections in developed democracies 
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when the leadership fails to perform in office (Bessette and Pitney, 2012), hardly do incumbents 
lose elections in Africa irrespective of their performance in office (Ake, 2001; Ofeimun, 2010; 
Bakare, 2013). President Robert Mugabe is a prime example of this argument.  
Thus, the most determined democrat previously, in the face of an unpopular regime, but adamant 
to hold on to power, might turn a demagogue overnight. This seems to be the tragedy of 
Nigerians under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, who prior to his 
emergence as the elected President of Nigeria in 2011 was considered by majority of Nigerians, 
including the opposition as a democrat. However, in his quest to retain his position in the 2015 
election engaged in undemocratic practices through his actions and inactions, directly or 
indirectly (Bakare, 2013; Adoyi, 2013). A few examples will suffice. In the 2012 Governors 
Forum elections to elect the Chairman of the forum, the Presidency engaged in several ignoble 
social encounters to ensure the emergence of a favoured candidate, Jonah Jang of Plateau State 
against the candidacy of Rotimi Amaechi, the ‗rebel‘ governor of Rivers state who had become 
the most unfriendly and treacherous political figure to the Jonathan presidency. When the result 
of that contest among the state governors was announced, the Presidency‘s favoured candidate 
was defeated as he polled sixteen (16) votes to the nineteen (19) votes polled by the incumbent 
Chairman of the Governors‘ Forum, Rotimi Amaechi. Appalled by the result of the election, the 
‗President‘s governors‘ revolted against the election and proceeded to set up a ‗parallel‘ forum 
that selected Jonah Jang as its Chairman.  With all the embarrassment that the confusion brought 
to Nigeria, the Presidency recognized ―the sixteen‖ over ―the nineteen‖ by organizing a meeting 
with the Jonah Jang faction to formally get presidential endorsement (The Nation, 2014).  
Also, the conspiracy that resulted in the disenfranchisement of Silva Timipreye, an incumbent 
governor at the time, from contesting under the Peoples‘ Democratic Party (PDP) was another 
highpoint in the demagogic exercise of the Jonathan administration. Others include the use of the 
military to restrict the movement of opposition figures, the harassment and intimidation of 
politicians opposed to his government, the confiscation of newspapers by the armed forces and 
the use of police for partisan objectives (Okojie, 2015). 
The governors (both former and incumbents) of the 36 states of the Federation have also, in one 
way or the other, undermined and continue to undermine democracy using their positions and 
paraphernalia of office at their disposal. For example, in Ekiti State, under the leadership of 
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Ayodele Fayose, six (6) House of Assembly members ‗impeached‘ the Speaker and suspended 
the other members in a House that is composed of twenty-five (25) members to the admiration of 
the ‗democratically‘ elected governor who provided the means, in active connivance of the 
police, for the success of that legislative coup. Similarly, in defiance to the political imbroglio 
being perpetuated against the government of Rivers state by the Federal government and its 
agents, the Rivers state governor, Rotimi Amaechi, had sought to fight back by engaging in 
several undemocratic tactics thereby demonstrating, at times, the symptoms of demagoguery.  A 
clear example of such act of demagoguery was the case in which the governor had to ‗lead‘ his 
security details and some government officials to forcefully halt the purported impeachment of 
the Rivers state House of Assembly Speaker by the anti-Amaechi faction which was bent on 
impeaching the governor. Also, in Katsina state, the governor, Ibrahim Shema, had in a televised 
campaign urged his supporters to crush opposition members, whom he referred to as 
cockroaches. The story of how ‗democratically‘ elected leaders at all levels of governance in 
Nigeria undermine democracy in order to achieve their selfish and parochial interests pervades 
the length and breadth of the country to the consternation of the vulnerable populace. 
 
2.1.6 DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND ELECTION MONITORING IN NIGERIA 
The global significance attached to democracy requires that elections must be credible for 
democracy to be acceptable as well as guarantee political stability. According to Huntington 
(1991), free, fair and credible elections are the essence of democracy. Thus, flawed elections 
contribute significantly to flawed democracy.  
Bjornlund (2004) outlines five practical and philosophical reasons why election is the best 
democratic means of addressing and resolving political competition. One, International 
declarations and International norms explicitly institute periodic and genuine elections as the 
basis of legitimate government. Specifically, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) states that ―every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity…to vote and to 
be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot.‖ Two, elections contribute to respect for other rights. According to 
Karatnycky (1999), elections lead to admirable progress in the areas of civil liberties and human 
rights. Three, elections lead to practical and political consequence, including bringing an end to 
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dictatorship. Nigeria, Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, South Africa, Poland and Yugoslavia represent 
typical examples of countries where elections have catalyzed political transitions, and thereby 
ending violent political instabilities. Four, elections provide opportunities for citizen 
participation and political involvement in democracy. The prime example here is the fact that 
women and other minority groups that have been excluded from political participation in other 
forms of government have found their voices in democratic governments. In Nigeria, for 
example, the years of military rule never produced a woman in any key political positions such 
as Military Administrators or Ministers; but as a result of democracy in Nigeria, there are many 
women who have served Nigeria as Ministers, Deputy Governors, and other key political 
positions. Besides, for the first time, a minority among the minority tribes produced the leader 
(President) of Nigeria, all because of democracy.  Five, elections contribute to effective, 
accountable, and stable governance. Unlike the chaos created and sustained by dictatorial, non-
democratic regimes, democratic elections are acceptably viable means of managing political 
contestations, achieving domestic stability and gaining international legitimacy for regimes, 
leaders and policies.  
From the aforementioned reasons, it is clear that elections are inevitable precondition to genuine 
democratic governments. Notably, however, not all countries and persons that have accepted 
democracy subscribe to free, fair and credible elections as politicians engage in all sorts of 
election frauds in the quest to achieve electoral victories.  
The pervasive fraud that have been characteristic of Nigeria‘s elections in the Fourth Republic 
have been largely responsible for the frailties associated with democratic consolidation, 
including lack of confidence in the democratic process by the populace (Ake, 2001).  
Thus, as a way of reducing or preventing election fraud, independent election observers monitor 
elections with the goal of reporting their findings on the credibility or otherwise of the elections 
and ―seeking to persuade national and international decision makers or to influence national or 
international public opinion‖ (Bjornlund, 2004: 37). Election observation and election 
monitoring describe a range of activities that focuses on either confirming the credibility of 
elections or exposing their flaws while offering recommendations that will improve elections in 
the context. In addition to this role of election observation/monitoring, the observers and 
monitors can educate or exhort voters and other democratic stakeholders to adhere to 
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international standards of democratic values and principles, recommendation of election law 
reform, media monitoring and related activities.  
Both domestic and international observers and election monitors have been involved in the 
elections that have been conducted in Nigeria since the advent of the fourth republic. While there 
have been claims and counter claims that domestic observers and monitors have always been 
compromised by politicians, the activities of the non-partisan international observers and 
monitors have been largely limited by coverage (Ofeimum, 2010; Adeniji, 2012). Hence, the 
international observers and monitors always report what they see in urban areas but not what 
happens in the rural areas. Unfortunately, however, the bulk of election fraud actually takes place 
in the rural areas which also has the larger population of voters.  
 
2.1.7 DEMAGOGUERY, DEMAGOGUES AND GODFATHERISM 
The term ―demagogue‖ was first used in the ancient Greeks to describe a new set of leaders of 
the mob who quickly emerged to fill a power vacuum left by the demise of a reigning class of 
elite statesmen (Signer, 2009). The word ―demagogue‖ comes from two Greek words: ―demos‖ 
meaning ―people‖ and ―agogos‖ which means ―leader‖. Thus, demagogue literarily translates to 
mean leader of the people. Demagogues emerge in any political system that grants power to 
those who command followership.  
The etymology of the terms demagogue and democracy provides a clear difference between the 
two. Whereas democracy emphasizes the ‗government or rule of the people‘, demagogue hinges 
on the ‗leader of the people‘. The implication here is that while democracy is concerned with the 
process, demagogue emphasizes personality. Hence, in an ideal democratic situation, every 
person or citizen that qualifies to lead based on the people‘s constitution have the opportunity to 
vote and be voted for. But demagogues, arrogating leadership right to themselves, undermine the 
will of the people in the quest to either impose themselves or their preferred candidates on the 
people. 
Signer (2009) stated that the demagogic pattern emerged first in ancient Athens, which practiced 
the first democracy, and continued in the Roman Republic. It reappeared in its most potent, 
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recent and vivid form in the destruction of the Weimar Germany democracy under the 
dictatorship of Adolf Hitler.  
The word ―demagogue‖ was first invented by the ancient Greeks to depict ―a new class of mob 
leaders who quickly evolved to fill a power vacuum left by the demise of a reigning class of elite 
statesmen‖ (Signer, 2006: 34). Demos meant ―people‖ and ―agogos‖ meant ―leader‖. Thus, at 
that time, as at present, demagogues emerged in any political system that granted power to those 
who connected deeply with the people.  
Cooper (1956) presented a formal and a most comprehensive account of demagogues about two 
hundred years ago in his essay titled ―On Demagogues‖ in 1838. Cooper described a demagogue 
as ‗a leader of the rabble‘ committed to advancing his own interests by affecting a deep devotion 
to the interests of the general public. This description is quite consistent with contemporary 
descriptions of demagogues as political figures who present their interests as the interests of their 
‗people‘. In Nigeria‘s political experience, we often see individuals who claim to represent their 
people either in parts or as a whole. Thus, it is common to see different sections of ‗youth 
leaders‘, ‗women leaders‘, ‗ethnic leaders‘, and so on who claim to represent as well as serve as 
the spokespersons of these various groups. While the ‗leaders‘ of these groups are not 
necessarily the real demagogues, they are vital instruments of propaganda and subterfuge in the 
structural composition of the main political demagogue in a democracy. 
Cooper (1956) identifies four major rules that guide demagogues, namely: 
i. they fashion themselves as a man/men or woman/women of the common people as 
opposed to the elites; 
ii. their politics is largely dependent on a powerful, primitive connection with the masses 
that dramatically transcends ordinary political popularity; 
iii. they take advantage of and manipulate this connection, and the raging popularity it 
affords, for their personal benefit and ambition; and 
iv. they threaten or completely violate established rules of conduct, institutions and the law. 
While these four major rules that describe demagogues as provided by Cooper fit their 
personality, a very core characteristic of demagogues in power, particularly in most developing 
countries, is economic corruption. In most developing countries where demagogues hold sway, a 
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major oddity common among them is corruption, epitomized by the crass exhibition of opulence 
resulting from the appropriation of the wealth of the state. Thus, it will be apt to say that 
demagogues, more often than not, have auspicious disposition for corrupt acquirement of wealth.  
As we reflect on the four dispositional philosophy or principles of demagogues as captured by 
Cooper and Signer, it is important to note that demagogues may not necessarily reflect the 
extremist dispositions of a Hitler, a Mussolini or even an Abacha. It includes interesting 
characters like Chavez of Venezuela, Fidel Castrol of Cuba, Adedibu of Ibadan, Obasanjo, 
Buhari, among others.  Thus, Ceaser (1979) outlined two types of demagogues: the ―hard‖ 
demagogues and the ―soft‖ demagogues. Whereas hard demagogues use antagonism and division 
to appeal to the people for a revolution, soft demagogues use blandishment, deceptive skills, 
currying favour through difficult or unattainable vision and promises. Signer (2009) emphasized 
that whether hard or soft; demagogues connect with large groups of ordinary people and are 
deservedly reputed as villains.   
Signer‘s harsh conclusion that all demagogues are villains have been challenged by scholars who 
have argued that there are demagogues who serve the interest of the public without necessarily 
subscribing to the western conception of democracy, especially the liberal democratic culture 
(Kirkpatrick, 1982; Held, 2006). Despite categorizing all demagogues as villains, Signer 
accepted that there are variants of demagogues, ranging from soft to hard demagogues, 
differentiated on the bases of their levels of education, ideologies on violence, funds, among 
other factors. In Nigeria for instance, Ajidahun (2015) has argued that most youths involved in 
political violence and thuggery have little or no education and are not gainfully employed. 
However, the sponsors of political violence are politicians that are educated but subscribe to 
political violence as a necessary requirement for achieving political objectives or goals.   
Current literature on the activities of demagogues in the Nigerian political space is limited to the 
concept of ―godfatherism.‖ Researchers that have investigated this subject area present accounts 
of the ignominious roles played by plutocrats, Nigeria‘s wealth owning, dominating class in 
determining who occupies available political offices in the country and how their actions have 
undermined the will of the masses in choosing their leaders. However, they fail to capture the 
sophisticated network of demagogues as transcending just the owners of wealth or godfathers 
(plutocrats) but a constellation of political entrepreneurs, gory and bloodthirsty political thugs, 
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the armed forces and sycophantic intellectuals and religious contractors whose common interest 
is the acquisition of power at all cost in order to protect or advance personal and group interests. 
As different as they are, all of these enemies of genuine liberation of the people through genuine 
democracy have a common theme: use their privileged positions and resources to attain power 
and thus use the power to advance their interest and govern the people tyrannically with little or 
no value for core democratic values (Ake, 1993, 2008; Bakare, 2013; Ofeimum, 2010).  
Also, previous studies in this area (Abdul-jelil, 2012; Animasawun, 2013; Ajidahun, 2015) have 
tended to present plutocratic governments as a spontaneous phenomenon by failing to show the 
exhaustive, though guarded, planning, obnoxious maneuverings, salacious compromises, and 
sacrilegious paraphernalia constructing the relationship amongst the members of the demagogic 
cartel. Thus, this study presents an empirical underpinning of the extent to which demagogues 
use all means at their disposal to engender undemocratic processes that will both weaken 
oppositions and strengthen governing political elites‘ hold on power (in the case of dominant 
demagogues), on one hand, and the undemocratic methods applied by power-seeking 
demagogues to undermine the authority of the ruling government, and how these dialectics have 
deprived the Nigerian state of qualitative leadership, democratic stability and national progress.   
Demagoguery, as noted earlier, is a manipulative approach — often associated with dictators and 
corrupt politicians. Demagoguery does not operate on reason, issues, and doing the right thing; it 
is largely based on stirring up fear and hatred to control people (Schmitt, 1976; Kirkpatrick, 
1982; Signer, 2010). Demagoguery correlates strongly to authoritarianism. It operates on 
falsified or manipulated premises to cajole the vulnerable public to support unpopular regimes as 
well as intimidate uncompromising political opponents. Demagoguery is one of the most 
negative aspects of politics that undermines democracy (Signer, 2009; Fund, 2008). They noted 
that demagoguery operates and thrives where the constitution, electoral laws and relevant 
democratic institutions are undermined by political stakeholders, including citizens. This vital 
point emphasizes the idea that no set of laws, no institutions, no complex bureaucracy, no 
intricate mechanisms of checks and balances, is adequate to preserve democracy and sustain its 
health if the democratic spirit takes leave of the hearts of the people (Cavdar, 2008; Schedler, 
2008). Sadly, every demagogue claims to be for the people. According to Samson (2004), ―The 
will of the nation‖ is one of the phrases most generally abused by demagogues of every age. The 
tactics for demagogues in power is to silence dissenting voices from the scene by enacting or 
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influencing the enactment of laws that perpetuates his or her political interest. An example of this 
strategy was the recent decision by the Venezuelan parliament that allowed the president to rule 
by decree (The Guardian, 21/04/2015). 
On the other hand, the demagogues seeking power undermine constitutional authorities, and may 
create their own state within the state through defiance to constituted authorities of the State 
(Signer, 2009).  
Clearly, therefore, there are two kinds of demagogues: the demagogue in power and the 
demagogue seeking power. Of these two kinds, the demagogue in power is the more dangerous 
(Signer, 2009) because he or shes uses state apparatus and the paraphernalia of office to further 
his or her political goal by intimidating and harassing opposition leaders and their followers. 
They could use their incumbent power to create their rules, and in some cases, change the 
constitution to achieve their political objectives.   
Whether soft or hard, ‗in power‘ or seeking power, minor or major, demagogues rank among 
history‘s most fascinating figures, command large followership and are devotedly revered by 
their fanatical supporters. Similarly, Signer (2009) stressed that all demagogues are threats to 
genuine democracy because they undermine democratic ethos in the pursuit of power, and that 
many will debate about labeling a particular demagogue as ―destructive‖ or ―beneficial‖ because 
of their personal biases toward the system being threatened by the demagogue. Thus, a leader of 
the people in whatever context that threatens or undermines democratic values is more or less of 
a demagogue and can range from a minor to a major threat to democracy.  
 
 
2.1.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMAGOGUERY 
There are certain features that have been identified with demagoguery which define its political 
manifestations (Trish Roberts-miller, 2015). Some of such features or characteristics are 
discussed below. 
i. Authoritarianism: Signer (2009) and Fund (2008) have identified authoritarianism 
as a feature of demagoguery. When democracy begins to drift as a result of the failure 
of politicians, particularly those in power, to abide by the values and practices of 
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democracy, despotic and tyrannical tendencies begin to play out in an attempt to 
curtail opposition.  
In the run-up to the 2015 elections, former Nigerian President and a member of the 
ruling party publicly accused President Jonathan of resorting to authoritarian and 
despotic tactics to stifle and intimidate opposition members in order to further his 
political ambition of re-election as president (Adoyi, 2013). 
ii. Disregard for rules with Impunity: Nigerian politicians take advantage of their 
wealth and connections with government‘s coercive apparatus to violate established 
rule and undermine democratic ideals in order to promote personal political agenda. 
Some carry out their nefarious activities with the support of the security agencies. For 
example, in the run-up to the 2015 general elections in 2015, political thugs in Rivers 
state made it impossible for the All Progressive Congress in Rivers state to hold any 
political campaign or rally in Okrika, the hometown of the wife of the former 
president, Patience Jonathan, with punitive violence meted out to those who dared to 
insist on their constitutional and democratic rights.  
 
iii. Chauvinism: this is a kind of aggressive, bigoted behaviour displayed by politicians 
and their associates to weep up ethnic and/or religious sentiments to gain political 
advantage. 
 
iv. Political persecution: this involves the use of security agencies and other state 
institutions to intimidate harass and punish real and perceived opponents with the aim 
of muzzling opposition.  
 
v. Bribery: here, the president or his allies engage in corrupt practices that includes the 
inducement of relevant individuals or institutions that will serve the interest of the 
president on an issue. For example, during the third term agenda of president 
Obasanjo, it was alleged that the president‘s allies offered bribes in millions of dollars 
to the lawmakers in order to support the amendment of the constitution in favour of 
the third term agenda. Also, delegates for presidential primaries are also offered 
bribes to ensure they cast their votes for the presidents or their preferred candidates.  
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It is important to clarify that there is a clear difference between the concepts of demagogue and 
godfatherism. First, in their etymology and history, the two concepts are distinguishable. 
Whereas ―demagogue‖ comes from two Greek words: ―demos‖ meaning ―people‖ and ―agogos‖ 
meaning ―leader‖ (Signer, 2009), godfatherism  originated in orthodox Christianity (Yahaya, 
2007) and implied the commitment of a godparent to nurture and care for a ‗godchild‘ (new 
convert) upon baptism. Also, whereas demagogue as a political term originated from Athens, the 
political usage of the term ‗godfatherism‘ is traceable to Nigeria which was made possible by the 
long years of military rule that created the ‗Big-Man rule‘ in Nigeria (Sklar, 2006; Yahaya, 2007; 
Animasawun, 2013). Godfatherism is synonymous to patron-client political relationship 
(Animasawun, 2013) and neopatrimonialism (Sklar, 2006) in the logic that there is a mutual 
understanding that the godfathers‘ resources will be deployed to aid the ‗godson‘ to achieve 
political power, and in turn the godfather will be paid back with contracts or monetary rewards 
by the godson upon attaining political power. 
Second, a demagogue, unlike a godfather, may not necessarily be driven by economic interest 
but most definitely by power or political relevance (the unyielding desire to be in control of 
political power). In other words, whereas a demagogue may not be a political entrepreneur, a 
‗godfather‘ is one whose investments in the political activities must yield economic returns. 
Third, whereas the strength of a demagogue is derivable from the people, a godfather derives his 
strength from his or her wealth or connection with the elites and powerbrokers in society (Smith, 
2007; Yahaya, 2007; Animasawun, 2013). The third point highlights the argument of 
demagogues as political figures who may either be in position of power or those seeking power. 
When, for example, Olusegun Obasanjo was contesting for the position of president in 
1998/1999, he was seen as man of the people taking into cognizance the fact that he had suffered 
political persecution for supporting democratic ideals against the military regime of Abacha. So, 
at that point, he was considered by the common people as a ‗democrat‘. However, events that 
followed his assumption of office as a democratically elected president, such as his dictatorial 
disposition to issues, the fight against his Vice and all those who opposed the amendment of the 
constitution which many commentators had alleged as a ploy to elongate his tenure in office, and 
the rigging of the 2007 presidential election in favour of Umar Yar‘adua remain prime example 
of how a supposed ‗democrat‘ can turn to a demagogue with time.  
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Having stated these differences between demagogue(ry) and godfather(ism), it is pertinent to 
state that the borderline between the two can be very faint and difficult to identify because of 
their common identity as non-democratic elites (as the political behaviour they display 
undermine democratic culture and practices) and the primary purpose that they all pursue 
ultimately is to acquire political power. Also, an individual could combine the elements of 
godfatherism and demagoguery, such that the individual both has the support of the masses and 
seeks power or supports people to attain or sustain power as a means of attaining economic 
profit. 
Godfatherism has been identified to be a major threat to the survival and deepening of 
democracy in Nigeria (Yahaya, 2007; Animasawun, 2013). Godfatherism does not only 
undermine the will of the people to choose their leaders (both at the primary and general 
elections), it goes further to deprive the people of the opportunity to experience good 
governance. This is because, as the candidates of the godfathers emerge at the usually flawed 
party primaries (Animasawun, 2013) as well as go on to ―win‖ the electoral contests, two evils 
emerge. On the one hand, the protégés or stooges of the demagogue become mere, ceremonial 
leaders, acting out the scripts of their political haranguers, especially in the context of looting the 
national resources, as they were selected by these godfathers with anti-democratic agreements to 
protect their interests at all times by distributing the commonwealth of the people to this few but 
powerful political clique who benefit from the collective misery of the masses. On the other 
hand, as experiences from other states of the nation have shown, crisis arises between the 
beneficiaries of the manipulative activities (i.e. the godsons) and the godfathers when the former 
refuses to be loyal to the later as contained in the pre-election agreement between them 
(Adegbamigbe, 2007). The major occasions where godfatherism played out in the fourth republic 
include Saraki vs. Lawal in Kwara State, Offor vs. Mbadinunju (1999–2003), Uba vs Ngige 
(2003–2006) in Anambra State, Kachalla vs. Modu Sherif in Borno State (2002–2003), Uzor 
Kalu vs Orji (2007-2011) in Abia State, Chimaroke vs Chime (2007-2011) in Enugu State, and a 
host of others (Yahaya, 2007; Ofeimun, 2010).  
Thus, in discussing the role of non-democratic elites in Nigeria‘s fourth republic, researchers 
have done so much work on the contemptuous roles of godfathers and godfatherism but have not 
done much on the role of demagoguery (and demagogues) in Nigeria‘s democracy.   
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The following table shows the major differences between a demagogue and a godfather, even 
though the two are elites in a political system. 
TABLE 2.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEMAGOGUERY AND GODFATHERISM 
  Demagoguery Godfatherism 
Meaning/Etymology/Origin ―demos‖ meaning ―people‖ and ―agogos‖ 
meaning ―leader‖/Athens 
patron-client political relationship; 
originated in orthodox Christianity 
Motive  Driven by ambition for Power  Driven majorly by economic 
interest 
Source of Relevance The people or access to power (incumbency 
power) 
Wealth or connection with the elites 
and powerbrokers in society.  
Actors Benefactor and Beneficiary (godfather 
and/or godson) 
 Benefactor (Godfather) 
Goal  Pursuit of power both as a means and an end Power as a means 
Similarities Non-democratic  
Threatens democracy 
Non-democratic 
Threatens democracy 
Source: Field Survey, 2015 
2.1.9 DEMAGOGUES IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC’S POLITICS 
Demagogues are political leaders who have influence over a large number of people in a political 
territory and use that commanding influence over the people to advance their personal interests 
by affecting a deep devotion to the interests of the masses (Cooper, 1956; Signer, 2009). 
Demagogues, as part of their undemocratic recipe, engage in demagoguery by appealing to 
ethnic, religious or class sentiments while creating a mass leader persona. Also, demagogues 
defy order (including democratic norms) and always have the people willing to champion revolts 
aimed at either seizing power or maintaining power without commitment to democratic path or 
ideals.  
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Throughout the political history of Nigeria, there exist indications and evidences of 
demagoguery exhibited in one way or the other by its leaders. Thus, whether of civilian or 
military regimes, Nigeria has produced political leaders at both State and national levels who 
have governed with despotism or repression and/or have sought to undermine the will of the 
people in the quest to either gain or retain political power.  Oyediran and Agbaje (1999) have 
noted that the political leaders that have emerged in Nigeria, since it became a republic in 1963, 
have shown little or no commitment to the ideals of democracy, good governance and 
development as a result of either their personal or sectional interests. They maintained that the 
First republic was ousted by the Southern military officers because of the anti-democratic 
attempts by politicians of ethnic consciousness to entrench ethnic agenda at the centre (Agbaje, 
2015). The January coup which had ethno-sectional outlook led to the July counter-coup that was 
considered a vengeance mission by the Northern military officers that culminated in the about 
three years civil war between 1967 and 1970.  
The military regime of General Yakubu Gowon displayed symptoms of demagoguery as the 
regime failed to articulate plans (or be committed) to return to civilian or democratic rule.  Thus, 
harping on the mendaciousness of the Gowon-led regime to enthrone democracy or civilian rule, 
the regime was overthrown in July 1975 by General Murtala Muhammed. The Murtala/Obasanjo 
regime quickly scheduled a democratic transition programme that led to the eventual transfer of 
power to a democratically elected President on 1
st
 October, 1979.  
Unfortunately the democratic experimentation of the Second Republic under Shehu Shagari 
failed to survive beyond December 31 of 1983 as the political class failed to adhere to the norms 
of democratic practice and process that guarantee the protection, survival and promotion of 
democracy. Consequently, General Muhammad Buhari ousted the regime of Shagari and 
returned Nigeria to military regime once more.  
The regime of Buhari, with all its accolades for fighting corruption and instilling the culture of 
discipline in the country, failed to show commitment to ending military rule and returning 
Nigeria to democratic civilian rule. This would not pacify Nigerians and the international 
community because the ‗best form military regime is considered worse than the worst form of 
civilian rule.‘ Dissatisfied with Buhari‘s failure to articulate a democratic transition plan as well 
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as the allegations of despotism against the regime, General Ibrahim Babangida took advantage of 
the political firmament to oust the Buhari/Idiagbon regime in August, 1985.  
Following the success of the coup led by Babangida in 1985, the regime scheduled a transition 
plan meant to lead to the Third Republic by setting up a seventeen-member Political Bureau in 
1986 to formulate a blueprint for the transition. But this was to be the beginning of the 
‗maradonic‘ or Machiavellian approach to politics that Babangida became reputable for. Thus, 
after series of failed promises to democratize Nigeria, the highlight of which was the botched 
June 12, 1993 presidential election that was won by M.K.O. Abiola, Babangida succumbed to 
local and international protests and pressure by ―stepping aside‖ for an interim government that 
he constituted, but headed by Ernest Shonekan.  
The interim national government (ING) was declared illegal by a Nigerian High Court on 
November 10, and by November 17 the military, led by General Sani Abacha, sacked the interim 
government of Shonekan, paving way for him to become the new Head of State of Nigeria from 
1993 through 1998. The General, before his demise in office in 1998, had earned the reputation 
as the most dangerous demagogue in power Nigeria has ever had and one of the most notorious 
despot to have emerged in African history, as he used the paraphernalia of his office to 
undermine democracy, good governance and human rights in his quest to remain in power.  
From the foregoing, therefore, it is clear that demagogues have always accompanied the political 
history of Nigeria, starting from the autocratic colonial rule to democratic regimes of the First, 
Second, the botched Third Republic and Fourth Republics (as democratically elected leaders 
blatantly undercut democratic values, especially in upholding the sanctity of the electoral process 
and human rights), from civilian to military regimes, and from one military regime to the other. 
The worst manifestation of demagogues in the democratic history of politics in Nigeria is the 
violation of the constitution. Thus, aware of (but impatient with) the constraints that the 
constitution imposes on the abuse of power by politicians, demagogues undermine the 
inviolability of the constitution they swore to uphold and defend by promoting the 
indestructability of their ambition to hold on to power to the detriment of the constitution and 
other democratic constitution. Oyediran and Agbaje (1999:15) emphasized the fragility of 
Nigeria‘s constitution when they stated that ―Nigeria has witnessed a lot of constitutions but it is 
yet to entrench constitutionalism.‖ In fact, the various constitutions in the recent history of 
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Nigeria have been a contentious subject, starting from the criticism that none of these 
constitutions have emerged from ―the people‖ under an authentic democratic platform. Thus, 
operating within the parameters and constrictions of these pale constitutions, Nigeria‘s leaders 
under successive democratic regimes have undermined the spirit and letters of the constitution in 
pursuit of their ambition to maintain their hold on power at all cost. 
The following demagogues have had a troubling influence on Nigeria‘s democratic politics 
which have either undermined or threatened democracy in the Fourth Republic. The choice of 
these personalities for the purpose of this review was informed by the fact they are among the 
very few elites that have had and continue to have the most influence on the Nigerian democratic 
space in the Fourth Republic.   
I. OLUSEGUN OBASANJO 
Former President, Olusegun Obasanjo, is regarded as one of the most privileged 
Nigerians ever (Kofamata, 2007). This observation may not be unconnected with the 
résumé of the frontrunner in the Nigerian political space. He is a traditional Chief; a 
‗Four-Star‘ General; a hero of the Nigerian civil war; a former member of Federal 
Executive Ruling Councils under two defunct military administrations; served as second 
in command to the military government of late General Murtala Mohammed; a former 
Head of State, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (1976 – 1979) after 
the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed; the first military leader to hand over 
power to a democratically elected president; survived the condemned imprisonment by 
the late despot, General Sani Abacha and two-term Nigerian civilian President, 
Commander-in-Chief, Armed forces of the federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 – 2007).  
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo has led Nigeria both as a military Head of State and an elected 
President at the onset of the fourth republic (from 1999 to 2003). However, the most 
controversies that surrounded Obasanjo occurred during his second term as the 
democratically elected president of Nigeria between 2003 and 2007. At this period, the 
Ogun state born former Army General engaged in certain unconstitutional actions that 
undermined democratic principles and thus threatened the survival of democracy in 
Nigeria. Ariye, Ogbomah, Ebipre, and Eric (2012) have identified some instances in 
which Obasanjo acted in ways that violated democratic values and culture to include the 
following: 
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i. Declaring of state of emergencies in Plateau and Ekiti States without recourse to 
the National Assembly as required by the Nigerian constitution; 
ii. The illegal withholding of the funds meant for the Local Government Areas of 
Lagos State; 
iii. Violations of court judgments; 
iv. Subversion of the popular will through rigged elections (especially in the 2007 
general elections); 
v. Undermined the rule of law; 
vi. Intimidation and harassment of opposition; 
vii. Human rights violations (Odi and Zaki Biam cases); and 
viii. Unsuccessful attempt to elongate his tenure (third-term agenda). 
 
II. LAMIDI ARIBIYI ADEDIBU  
The strongman of Ibadan politics, as he was fondly called, this Ibadan-based politician 
was notoriously famous for formalizing prebendalism and political patronage, especially 
between 2003 and 2007 (Abdul-Jellil, 2013). This political personality possessed some of 
the rules or elements that qualify for a demagogue as specified by Cooper (1956). He was 
a man of the common people (at least, within his political territory) and inspired 
overpowering reactions among them. His style of politics depended on a primitive 
connection with the masses which transcended mere political popularity. He took 
advantage of this connection with his people and the raging popularity it afforded him to 
advance his political interest. And above all, he violated established rules of conduct, 
institutions and the law (Simbine, 2004; Yahaya, 2007; Abdul-Jelil, 2012). The 
demagogue cum godfather was above the law as the state, relevant security agencies and 
institutions could not rise up to their constitutional duties of preventing the lawlessness 
that Adedibu exhibited against the governor of the State (Adegbamide, 2007). Adedibu 
was considered to be the most influential figure that made it possible for Senator Rashidi 
Ladoja to emerge as the governor of Oyo state in the 2003 general elections (Simbine, 
2004). The relationship between the two deteriorated as a result of the failure of the 
governor (who was referred to as the godson of Adedibu) to honour the alleged 
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agreements between them, especially as it had to do with the regular financial settlement 
of the godfather from the states treasury (Abdul-Jellil, 2012). 
 
The tension that resulted from the claims of Adedibu and the counter-claim by the governor 
resulted in bloody confrontations by their supporters and the arrogant declaration by Adedibu 
that the governor will be impeached (Simbine, 2004). At the height of the confrontation and 
terrorism that followed in Ibadan, the following statement was made by Adedibu. 
He (Ladoja) was collecting N65 million as security vote every month. You know that 
governors don‘t account for security vote. He was to give me N15 million of that every 
month. He reneged. Later it was reduced to N10 million. Yet he did not give me. 
(Adegbamigbe, 2007: 23). 
Adedibu succeeded in ensuring the impeachment of the governor days after he boasted about it, 
though illegally as the procedure employed undermined the constitution (Abdul-Jellil, 2012). 
 
III. BOLA AHMED TINUBU 
Chief Bola Ahmed Tinubu is considered the most influential politician from the South-West 
region of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic (Olupohunda, 2014). Many reasons can be adduced for 
this view, but the major reasons as provided by Olupohunda include: the most persistent and 
successful opposition leader in the Fourth Republic; successfully coordinated the ‗takeover‘ of 
the South West States from the ruling Peoples‘ Democratic Party (PDP) through the judgments 
of the courts post-2007 elections and consolidating the effort in the 2011 general elections where 
the opposition party, Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), won the governorship elections; and 
playing a very prominent role that resulted in the formation of the All Progressives Congress 
(APC) and the subsequent victory of the opposition party at the national level in the 2015 
elections.  
What qualifies Tinubu as a demagogue is not much because of the accomplishments noted above 
but his mass leader appeal and political popularity that defied national demagogues that were 
opposed to his unyielding political cause through his way of inspiring the masses to political 
fanaticism. And as emphasized by Signer (2009:36), ―A demagogue can be sincerely committed 
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to his own causesas long as they facilitate his own relentless ambition and forge a powerful 
connection with the common people.‖ Also, Tinubu has always been accused of using the tools 
of propaganda and threats to further his political ambitions (Olupohunda, 2014). The maxim 
―Rig and Roast‖ is attributed to Tinubu‘s threat of violence in the event of rigging elections 
against his political party in the South-West (Oyeleke, 2014). Thus, the use of threat to respond 
to the perceived rigging plans of the ruling party or INEC was a recurring practice by Tinubu and 
some of his followers.  
IV. GOODLUCK JONATHAN 
President Goodluck Jonathan had ‗lucky‘ political experiences that characterized his rise to 
becoming the third democratically elected president of the fourth republic. After his emergence 
as the Deputy Governor of Bayelsa state in 1999, Jonathan became Governor in 2006 after the 
controversial impeachment of DSP Alamaseigha. In 2006, his party, under Obasanjo, nominated 
him as the Vice Presidential candidate to Musa Yar‘adua in the 2007 presidential elections in 
which they were declared winners by the electoral body. Again in 2010, the incumbent president 
at the time, Musa Yar‘adua, died in office, paving the way for Jonathan to be sworn-in as the 
president of Nigeria.  
In 2011, Jonathan was elected as president, the first time in the history of Nigeria for a politician 
from the ‗Minority Ethnic‘ group to achieve such feet. Jonathan‘s actions or inactions in 
handling constitutional issues and the overbearing influence of his wife and aides posed serious 
threats to democracy in Nigeria. Among the most worrying dispositions of the Jonathan regime 
that brought disrepute to democracy include: 
i. Masterminding the disqualification of Sylva Timipreye, then incumbent governor of 
his home state, from contesting for re-election under the Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP) in 2011; 
ii. The endorsement and recognition of the faction of the governors forum led by Jonah 
Jang which lost the forum‘s chairmanship election to governor Rotimi Amaechi by 16 
to 19; 
iii. The undemocratic process that led to his emergence as the sole candidate of the PDP 
for the Presidential elections of 2015; 
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iv. The harassment and intimidation of opposition leaders across the country by the 
security agencies and other agencies of the Federal Government (e.g. Federal Airport 
Authority of Nigeria not allowing jets carrying opposition leaders from flying or 
landing) (Ibeh, 2013); 
v. The militarization of elections in Ekiti and Osun States; 
vi. The unconstitutional impeachment of the Ekiti state House of Assembly Speaker and 
suspension of 18 other lawmakers, all of the opposition party, by 7 members of the 
House of Assembly; and 
vii. The undermining of democratic institutions and authorities by the security agencies as 
it played out in the invasion of the National Assembly and Rivers state House of 
Assembly by the police. 
However, the acceptance of defeat and peaceful handover of power by former President 
Goodluck Jonathan to President Muhammadu Buhari strongly suggests that Goodluck 
Jonathan does not subscribe to the political ideology of violence. This is unique, given the 
antecedence of violence that have always followed the declaration of results at all levels, 
local, state and federal, of political contestation in Nigeria‘s democracy.  
 
V. MUHAMMADU BUHARI 
General Muhammadu Buhari qualifies as a demagogue because he meets the fundamental rules 
or elements of a demagogue. One, he is considered by many as the man of the common people 
such that he has successfully created and sustained a mass leader persona. Two, he inspires 
overpowering emotional reactions among the masses. Three, he has extreme political ambition 
and successfully gets the people un-frustratingly and convincingly committed to his political 
ambition. All these qualities combined to ensure he benefitted politically as he emerged the 
winner of the March 28, 2015 Presidential election, beating an incumbent, the First to have 
happened in Nigeria‘s political and democratic history. However, he has been accused of using 
intimidation tactics on voters as well as appealing to ethnic and religious sentiments in soliciting 
for votes (Akannam and Dangida, 2015). 
Besides the prominent demagogues discussed above, the following list of persons can be 
considered to be demagogues in Nigeria‘s fourth republic whose political behaviour can be 
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interrogated in the light of democratic culture and values, and ultimately examine its effect on 
democracy in Nigeria. 
i. Governor Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti State (intimidation and use of grassroots appeal to 
undermine democratic institutions and values) such that the opposition members of 
the legislative arm in Ekiti State left the State due to harassment and intimidation by 
the executive arm (Dare, 2015).  
ii. Chris Uba of Anambra State (monetized politics, intimidation, violence and use of 
security agencies to undermine democratic values and institutions). This was evident 
in the letter of Obasanjo and Audu Ogbe (See Appendixes F and G). 
iii. Ibrahim Idris of Kogi State (monetized politics, intimidation, violence and use of 
thugs and security agencies to undermine democratic values and institutions) 
iv. James Ibori of Delta State 
v. Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State 
vi. Kwankwaso Ibrahim of Kano State (the Kwankwasia movement was a grassroots 
movement that made the former Kano Governor unassailable politically in Kano) 
vii. Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State (monetized politics, intimidation, violence and 
use of security agencies to undermine democratic values and institutions) 
The fact remains that governors and other political heavyweights in Nigeria resort to all forms of 
demagoguery to outwit their opponents in democratic or political contexts (Adeniyi, 2011). The 
ferociousness may be in degrees, but it is seldom the case to find Nigerian politicians who would 
not explore demagogic routes to either attaining or retaining power. So, listing all the political 
demagogues in Nigeria‘s politics using Cooper‘s instruments of measurement will make the 
volume of this thesis unlimited.  
 
The list of demagogues in Nigeria‘s politics is inexhaustible and they exist all across the length 
and breadth of the country, though in varied capacities in their ―mass leader personae‖ attributes 
and support for undemocratic practices that helps them achieve their political goals. And as 
observed by Signer (2009:35, 37) ―demagogues do not need to reach the extremes of a Hitler to 
undermine democracy…meaning he can be more or less of a demagogue and can range from a 
minor to a major threat to democracy.‖ What is certain, however, is that the most extreme 
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demagogues pose the greatest challenges to democracy, and demagogues in power are likely to 
pose the greater danger to democracy and its ideals than those out-of-powers or seeking power. 
Signer also argued that many will disagree whether a demagogue is destructive or beneficial due 
to personal biases and subjective interpretations toward the system being threatened by the 
demagogue.  
The task is not to argue whether someone ―is‖ or ―is not‖ a demagogue, but rather holding 
political leaders, whether in power, out of power or seeking power, to a high standard as 
demanded by democratic principles and constitutional democracy where internalized set of 
constitutional values and the rule of law must prevail to short-circuit demagogues, wherever they 
function. To achieve this, the people must take responsibility of salvaging democracy from 
demagoguery and demagogues by becoming well-informed, temperate, and dedicated to the rule 
of law so that the laws, not the decrees of the people, rules. Signer (2009:65) emphasized the role 
of the people in preventing the success of the demagogues in democracy because ―the 
demagogue is a product of the people, and only the people can stop him.‖ 
 
2.1.10 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
The tenet of democratic governance moves beyond the sheer procedures of democracy and the 
establishment of democratic institutions. It involves promoting the sustainability of democracy 
which includes creating an enduring capacity for credible electoral process; the separation of 
powers and independence of the branches of government; the exercise of power in accordance 
with the rule of law; the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and, the 
transparency and accountability of a responsible civil service, functioning at both the national 
and local levels (Ake, 2001; Collier, 2007). Thus, to avoid tyranny in all its undemocratic forms 
or democratic pretenses, political stakeholders, especially public office holders, at all levels of 
governance, must actively ensure rule of law, restrain in the exercise of power, ‗free and open‘ 
political life in which citizens are able to develop and realize their capacities, and support and 
promote the democratic ideals of equality and liberty. Democratic governance highlights the 
priority of liberty and equality.   
Aristotle (1941) and Held (2006) emphasized that effective democratic governance must meet 
the two criteria of liberty: (i) ‗ruling and being ruled in turn‘ and (ii) ‗living as one chooses‘, and 
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also the criteria of equality which include: (i) citizens have equal voting power and (ii) equal 
chances to hold office. Thus, liberty and equality are inextricably linked to the extent that 
equality is the practical and moral bases for liberty. Where officeholders fail to subscribe to this 
ethos, but rather turn themselves to mini-gods, indeed, demagogues, through braggadocio and 
belligerence, then democracy would have transformed to demagoguery. 
An ideal democratic governance structure will involve a system of government where institutions 
function according to democratic processes and norms, both internally and in their interaction 
with other institutions (Norris, 2012). This fact is premised on the generally accepted idea that 
genuine democracy operates on significant principles, objectives and the entrenchment of certain 
institutional and political arrangements that are independent of politicians (Held, 2006).  
Democracy can only survive, deepen and make meaning to people only if the democratic process 
and outcome meet the yearnings of the masses in addressing significant problems that directly 
affect their wellbeing. These problems include injustice, poverty, insecurity, human rights 
violations, disregard for the rule of law and inequality.  However, the task of surmounting these 
challenges so as to deepen democracy and continue along the path towards genuine 
democratization requires the concerted effort of both the government and citizens. The 
government must accept responsibility for the welfare of its people and take actions that will 
better citizens‘ lives through the provision of good governance in the context of meeting their 
immediate needs for basic infrastructure, poverty reduction and security of lives and property 
(International IDEA, 2001). 
In decrying the plight of democratic governance in Nigeria, wherein politicians demonstrate 
opulence to the astonishment of the pauperized populace, Bakare (2013) called for an audit of 
democratic governance in Nigeria with a view to helping the people to demand that the ruling 
class adapt to the norms and values of democracy, and that the political leaders of the country 
manage the resources of the people to deliver on their electoral promises. Luchman et al (2012) 
corroborate this welfarist conception of democracy by stressing that democratic governance must 
deliver certain basic democratic privileges and entitlements that include reduction of poverty and 
freedom from gross social inequality.  
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In a study carried out by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) in 2001, it was clearly stated that the challenges of good governance in 
Nigeria manifest in five (5) aspects, namely: 
i. How to handle conflict flashpoints in a democratic manner and in a way that 
preserves human dignity; 
ii. How to allocate resources more equitably; 
iii. How to increase accountability and trust in government; 
iv. How to preserve the environment in oil-producing communities; and 
v. How to expand the ownership of the political process 
The first point as stated by IIDEA has been a source of controversy, in and out of court, between 
victims of the undemocratic response, indeed genocidal approach, to conflicts in Nigeria by 
democratic governments. Two examples stand out here. The first was the mass murder and 
massive destruction of properties that was carried out by the Nigerian government under the 
Obasanjo administration in 2002 in Odi community of Rivers state. The second was the mass 
killing and massive destruction of properties at Zaki Biam of Benue State in 2005 on the revenge 
mission against the Tivs for killing nineteen (19) soldiers who were on peace keeping mission in 
the area. While the actions of the villagers who carried out the crime in the two communities 
were most despicable and punishable, the mass killing of thousands of innocent villagers was at 
variance with democratic practice and standard.  
The second point which emphasizes the disparity in the allocation of resources is a major 
challenge to Nigeria‘s democratic promise of collective prosperity for its people. There is an 
ongoing outrage against the lawmakers on the jumbo salary and other outrageous earnings that 
despise the economic realities of the nation and the plight of the ordinary citizen. For example, 
whereas the minimum wage for workers in Nigeria is eighteen thousand naira (less than US 
$100) per month or less than one thousand, two hundred dollars per year, the earning of a senator 
in Nigeria is put at about 240 million naira (about $1.3 million) in salaries and allowances per 
year, and a member of the House of Representatives earns 204 million naira (about 1.45million 
US dollars) per annum (Vanguard Newspaper, 2013). The same scenario of exorbitant 
remunerations exists for government officials, especially ministers and other Presidential aides in 
Nigeria. When these figures are compared with what is obtainable in the United States of 
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America (Iginla, 2015), where a Senator earns 174,000 US dollars and in the UK where a 
Member of Parliament earns about 64,000 US dollars per year, the picture of inequality among 
Nigerians in terms of allocation of the country‘s resources (and the reason for taking electoral 
contests as a ‗do-or-die‘ affair) becomes very clear.  
 
The third point which stressed on the need to increase accountability and trust in government 
brings to the fore the problem of corruption in Nigeria. The average Nigerian politician, even in 
democracy, is considered to be fraudulent.  This reputation of the average politician in Nigeria is 
not out of place, considering the rate of unexplainable wealth and display of avarice that are 
associated with politicians who, prior to attaining political offices, had little or no wealth, in 
addition to moderate lifestyles. Thus, political corruption demonstrated by uncorroborated means 
of income and flamboyant lifestyles by politicians and their family members, makes it awkward 
for them to be accountable and earn the trust of the people they govern.  
The fourth point noted by International IDEA was the need to preserve the environment in oil-
producing communities both from the degradation that they suffer and importantly also from the 
economic hazard that oil exploration has brought on the people in the region. Although the 
Nigerian governments under democratic regimes have taken deliberate steps to address the plight 
of the oil-producing communities through the creation of new ministries and parastatals such as 
the Niger Delta Ministry and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), unfortunately, 
the government has failed to use these establishments to make viable impact in the Niger Delta 
areas in terms of addressing basic infrastructures and facilitating programmes that will address 
the widespread poverty of the masses in the area. The reason for this failure has been attributed 
to the massive corruption in these Federal government controlled organizations where they have 
become the source of funding for political activities and contract scam by government officials 
and their cronies (Ofeimun, 2010). Also, these agencies are much more concerned with the 
political economy aspects of their responsibility than addressing issues of degradation and oil 
spillages resulting from the unethical practices of the oil companies.  
The fifth and final concern of democratic governance listed by International IDEA was how to 
expand the ownership of the political process. One of the greatest challenges facing democracy 
in Nigeria is the unwillingness for the political class to expand the ownership of the political 
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process, especially as it relates to free, fair and credible elections. Having failed to serve the 
interest of the people, politicians engage in all forms of demagoguery and electoral fraud to 
subvert the democratic process in such a way that they can hold on to power whether they are 
wanted by the electorates or not. Thus, demagogues in positions of power, as have been the case 
in Nigeria, engage in electoral malpractices to undermine the will of the people ―by the 
supervening force of malfeasance and abuse of the electoral process‖ (Ofeimum, 2010: 176). The 
election tribunal and court judgments that have retrieved stolen mandates from fraudulent 
politicians back to the rightful winners of electoral contests as the outcomes were in Ekiti state, 
Edo state, Rivers state, Osun State and other states and national assembly elections clearly show 
how the desperation of politicians to gain or maintain power has pushed them to the point of 
attempting (and in most cases succeeding) to usurp the ownership of the electoral process at the 
expense of the people and other stakeholders.  
The argument, therefore, is that democracy cannot be deepened if the structure of democratic 
governance fails to deliver the dividends of democracy (Ake, 1993). Also, studies have 
emphasized that the survival and deepening of democracy can only be guaranteed where 
democratic culture thrives (Held, 2006; International IDEA, 2001; Ofeimum, 2010; Ake, 1993).  
In Nigeria, democracy has been undermined by the intemperance of demagogues, especially the 
authoritarianism of demagogues in power whose actions and reactions to political issues 
undermine democracy in the light of the key principles, objectives and goal of democracy. Thus 
the democratic culture of debates and deliberations, liberty, press freedom, civil rights, due 
process and the rule of law are still in short supply in the democratic life of Nigeria (Ofeimum, 
2010).  
The task of building and adhering to the culture of democracy in a country that has had over 
thirty (30) years of military rule in his political history since independence in 1960 may not be an 
easy one, but the necessity to build and adhere to globally accepted democratic culture cannot be 
overemphasized (International IDEA, 2001). To achieve this daunting but indispensable task, the 
first step will be to demilitarize the national psyche traceable to the military culture of 
arbitrariness, command-and-obey-syndrome, intemperate language, intimidation of civil society, 
disregard for civil rights, disregard for the rule of law and due process, impunity, and the 
emasculation of the judiciary (Ake, 1993; International IDEA, 2001; Ofeimum, 2010). The 
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Nigerian society and especially the political class require massive education for the total re-
orientation from authoritarian and despotic culture to embrace the ethics and values of 
democracy. This arduous task of national reorientation can best be achieved by the combined 
efforts of the family, society and state (International IDEA, 2001). 
The quest to entrench good governance through democracy does not augur well for anti-
democratic elements who consider the entrenchment of democratic values in the Nigerian 
political system as adversative to their parochial interests. Ake (2001) stated that the struggle for 
power by the Nigerian political elites was so absorbing that everything else, including acceptable 
democratic culture and commitment to good governance and development, was undermined and 
marginalized. It, therefore, means that when democratic governance, defined by the adherence to 
democratic culture, is not taken seriously, it engenders political instability and other negative 
consequences that affect peace and development. For example, Roberts and Charles (1999) have 
shown that there is a positive correlation between democratic governance and economic 
development because in democratic governance, there is the likelihood that the state will attract 
investment in human and physical capital and thus generate the conditions necessary for 
enduring prosperity. Similarly, Norris (2012) emphasized the positive impact that democratic 
governance has on standard indicators of economic growth, human dignity, and levels of inter-
state and internal peace and security.   
Another main challenge to the survival and deepening of democracy in Nigeria is the willingness 
of the state and political actors to identify with the culture of democratic governance in the 
pursuit of power (Ake, 1993; Ofeimum, 2010). To achieve this, there has to be a commitment to 
building strong democratic institutions that include viable political parties, independent judiciary, 
independent media, independent electoral body, separation of powers, among others. These 
democratic institutions can only be strengthened by an active and broad-based democratic 
politics that is not undermined by the imperious influence of demagogues seeking to attain or 
maintain power (John and Strom, 2004). The extent to which demagogues can be prevented from 
undermining democracy in Nigeria will be determined by the extent to which the people of 
Nigeria are willing to support the process and effort at building strong democratic institutions 
that will enforce the spirit and letters of the constitution on all political actors, including the state.  
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From the foregoing arguments and submissions, it becomes clear that the yearnings of the people 
of Nigeria for genuine democratic governance can only be realized when the following minimum 
benchmarks are in place.  
i. Political stakeholders and the Nigerian state must embrace civic virtues of self-
restraint, civic knowledge, civic participation and service, and the promotion of the 
collective good.  
ii. The Nigerian state must create the platform and the best circumstances for all its 
citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, sex and religion, to express and fulfill their 
potentialities. 
iii. Protection from the arbitrary use of power to undermine the democratic rights of 
citizens, including the power to vote and be voted for without fear or intimidation. 
iv. The state must demonstrate responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry by 
expanding economic opportunities that reflect transparent management of the 
country‘s resources. This is because the major reasons that the military regimes that 
have overthrown democratic regimes in Nigeria have given is the corruption of 
politicians and the mismanagement of the nation‘s resources (Ake, 1993; 
International IDEA, 2001). There is no doubt that the pervasive corruption and 
mismanagement of the economy by Nigeria‘s political class has been the major 
source of instability and the frustrations of Nigerians with their governments.  
2.1.11 DEMAGOGUES AND POPULISM 
The arguments that demagogues are the product of democracy and that demagogues command 
large followership have been affirmed by various scholars (Kirkpatrick, 1982, Carto, 1996; 
Signer, 2009). Thus, Zakaria (1997) stated that when democracy backslides, it becomes a useful 
tool for demagogues to wipe up sentiments and passionately appeal to the people for a 
revolution.  According to Jowett (2001), Aristotle had warned of the traps of demagogues to 
scuttle democracy or democratic ideals taking advantage of unforgivable ills of a democratic 
government against the people. Demagogues, like all other political actors, believe that ―the 
people themselves are the only safe depository of power‖ (Carto, 1996:5). Thus, their politics is 
highly dependent on a powerful, extemporaneous connection with the people that dramatically 
transcend normal political popularity (Signer, 2006). Cooper (1956) emphasized the popularity 
50 
 
of a demagogue among the people by noting that because the demagogue is a ‗leader of the 
rabble‘, he advances his own interests by affecting a deep devotion to the interests of the masses.  
This fact explains the popularity of demagogues and the fanatical nature of their followers, even 
though in reality they are seldom guided by public interest.  
In evaluating the character of demagogues, there is always the temptation to see them as 
populists. This is because, like populists, demagogues have unbelievably large, obsessive 
followership. However, whereas populists are driven by values that address public interests, 
demagogues are fundamentally driven by personal or group interests that, in most, if not all 
cases, are at variance with public interest and democratic tenets (Signer, 2009). Also, whereas 
populists play by the rule, demagogues bully the rule of law. ―Demagogues‖, Signer (2009:36) 
emphasized, ―break rules of order and, often, order itself.‖  
In an attempt to distinguish between a demagogue and a populist, Carto (1996) describes a 
demagogue as a politician who belongs to an artificial aristocracy, defined by wealth and/or 
birth, but lacking either the required talent or virtue to serve the interest of the masses. On the 
other hand, the populist belongs to a natural aristocracy among men, on the basis of virtue and 
talent. The populist, Carto argues, endowed with natural aristocracy, is the most precious gift of 
nature, for the instruction, the trusts and government of society while the demagogue, of the 
artificial aristocracy, represents a mischievous influence for political opportunism that must be 
stopped by the people from either coming into power or continuing in power.  
The populist, unlike the demagogue, seeks or takes up public duty with the sole inspiration to 
render just service to the public at great personal sacrifice and will seldom expect any monetary 
or material compensation beyond actual expenses incurred during such period of service. These 
public precepts are vehemently resisted by demagogic schemes because the demagogues by their 
philosophy exploit the vulnerabilities of the masses to their personal advantage.  
2.1.12 DESTRUCTIVE VERSUS BENEFICIAL DEMAGOGUES 
It takes a demagogue to oust another demagogue from the political scene. For example, in Cuba, 
it required a demagogue in the person of Fidel Castro to dethrone his predecessor, Fulgencio 
Batista, from office; in Venezuela, it took a demagogue in the person of Chavez to overthrow his 
predecessor, Caldera.  
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There are individual mass leaders who ignore democratic route to power because of the 
institutionalized barriers to attaining political power that have been erected by demagogues 
within the existing power structure.  For example, Charles Taylor, Robert Mugabe, Paul Biya, 
and so many other African leaders who got to power through ‗democratic‘ means have erected 
and continue to create barriers that will make it impossible for other qualified citizens to attain 
power or takeover government through democratic means. In such a situation, demagogues are 
normally required to mobilize popular protests, and where necessary undertake a coup to end the 
tyranny of such government, be it democracy or monarchy or any other form of government.  
So, destructive demagogues are leaders of a people who either in the quest to gain or sustain 
political power apply all resources at their disposal, both human and material, to initiate, 
encourage and implement intimidation, harm and destruction to achieve their political objectives. 
Sociopaths like Adolf Hitler of Germany, Benito Mussolini of Italy, General Sani Abacha of 
Nigeria, Charles Taylor of Liberia, Bashir Assad of Syria and Bashir of Sudan are typical 
examples of destructive demagogues. For these leaders, to be in power is a ‗do-or-die‘ 
phenomenon. How do they advance their course? Signer (2006) stated that the destructive 
demagogue threatens and destroys all opposition to its interest.  
Perhaps, Plato (1908) best captures the disposition of a destructive demagogue: 
The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up 
with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf…And the protector 
of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained 
from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favourite method of false accusation 
he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, 
and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he 
kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and 
partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either 
perish at the hands of his enemies or from being a man become a wolf-that is, a 
tyrant?        
 
On the other hand is a demagogue who emerges as a general force for good (Signer, 2006). 
When the rules of order are subverted to ensure the invincibility of a demagogue in power, it 
serves the good of the people for a leader of the people with extreme ambition, courage, who has 
a powerful connection with the people and the wherewithal to stand up to challenge the despotic 
system. In such instances, forces within and outside the country might come together to support 
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the overthrow of the demagogue in power. Few examples all over the world include: Boris 
Yeltsin of Russia who was instrumental to the overthrow of the despotic Soviet system; General 
Muhammad Buhari of Nigeria who led the coup against the inept and corrupt government of 
Shehu Shagari; Hugo Chavez of Venezuela who stirred the masses against the brutal and corrupt 
regime of Caldera; among others. 
The beneficial demagogue can be a general force for good by steering the frustrated masses to 
undermine and/or overthrow a despotic and corrupt regime (Signer, 2009). 
2.1.13 DEMAGOGUES AND POLITICAL PARTIES 
Political parties are central to the realization of an individual‘s political ambition as the Nigerian 
constitution and the electoral act do not recognize independent candidacy for contesting for 
political offices. Thus, it is a fundamental requirement for persons with elective political 
ambition to be registered members of political parties in order to be supported and sponsored for 
elective positions at all levels, from councilor to the president. It is in this sense that Ogroh and 
Ikporukpo (2015) have argued that political parties in Nigeria have played key roles in Nigeria‘s 
democracy.  
For demagogues to operate efficiently, the first strategy is to takeover and thus, be in control of 
the party structure, starting from the ward level. Once in charge of the party machinery, 
demagogues can use either of the following techniques of mischief to successfully victimize 
politicians whom they are opposed to their political ambitions, however popular they may be, 
and as a result sidestep the norms of party politics expected in a democracy.  
i. Denial of Nomination form: this happens when demagogues arm-twist the leadership of 
a party to deprive a member or members of the political party who are willing and 
eligible to contest for primary election in the party so as to pave way for the aspirant(s) of 
the demagogues to be the candidate(s) of the party. A valid example of this technique was 
applied in 2014 by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) when other presidential aspirants 
under the party, notably, Abduljhelili Tafawa Balewa and Mrs. Abiola Duke, were denied 
the party‘s nomination form so as to pave the way for the emergence of the incumbent 
president, Goodluck Jonathan, who had been ―endorsed‖ by the party leadership as the 
sole candidate for the party‘s presidential ticket for the 2015 presidential election. 
Similarly, the All Progressives Congress (APC) leadership ―endorsed‖ the 2014 
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governorship candidacy of Kayode Fayemi, then incumbent, to the exclusion of other 
aspirants within the party.  
ii. Party Screening: it is a norm for political parties to screen all aspirants running for 
political positions under the party. Demagogues seize this practice as an opportunity to 
influence the screening out (and thus stop) perceived political foes from being offered the 
party‘s tickets and so unable to contest in the primary election of the party. This 
demagogic strategy of scuttling the political ambitions of politicians within a party-
system was employed against the former (but then incumbent) governor of Bayelsa state 
who, at the time, was said to have political scuffle with the national party leader, 
president Goodluck Jonathan, who also is an indigene of the State.  
iii. Substitution of Candidate: the trick here is that the duly elected candidate(s) by a 
political party to contest for an elective position is substituted by new candidate(s) who 
emerge either through direct substitution of name to the electoral body or a doctored 
rescheduled party primary election where the newly favoured candidate(s) of the 
demagogue(s) emerge. A clear example of this undemocratic scheme played out in Rivers 
State in 2007 when Rotimi Amaechi, having been duly nominated as the governorship 
candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) was substituted for Celestine Omehia at 
the eleventh hour by the party hierarchy, obviously on the directive of the national leader 
and president at the time, Olusegun Obasanjo. Similarly, in Kogi State, there was the last 
minute decision of the party to dump the original candidate of the PDP, Isah Echocho for 
Captain Idris Wada (the eventual winner of the December 2011 governorship election in 
the State). 
Following the successes recorded at the courts by aggrieved party members that were 
short-changed by their political parties, demagoguery played out in the amendments to 
the Electoral Act in 2010 such that the powers of political parties to present candidates to 
INEC was made absolute. Hence, political parties have now been strengthened to 
continue their undemocratic practice of undermining internal party democracy where the 
will of delegates to elect party candidates are subject to the dictates of the rich and 
powerful politicians.  
iv. Suspension or Expulsion of Aspirant/Candidate: this political technique enables 
demagogues to influence their political parties to either suspend or expel seemingly 
54 
 
rebellious aspirants or candidates who defy party position or decision on political issues 
that are at variance with their interests. Virtually all political parties in Nigeria have been 
accused of employing this tactic to shortchange aspirants or candidates that are not 
favoured by the godfathers or demagogues within the political parties. For example, in 
the gubernatorial election for Imo state in 2007, the Peoples‘ Democratic Party (PDP) 
candidate, Ifeanyi Ararume, was expelled by the party leadership few days to the election 
and thereby failed to present a candidate for the governorship election for daring to 
challenge the decision of the party to substitute his candidature for the preferred 
candidate of the demagogues after he had won the primary election of the party. Few 
years after the incident, the Chairman of the PDP at the time, Ahmadu Ali, confirmed and 
justified that decision (Daily Trust, September 25, 2014).  
Also, political parties take revenge on its members who fail to support its position on partisan 
matters. For example, it was stated in the National Democratic Institute (NDI) 2007 Report on 
Nigeria‘s General elections that:   
As many as 75 percent of Nigeria‘s incumbent national legislators did not secure 
their party‘s nomination for re-election. Some PDP watchers asserted that 
perceptions of party disloyalty disadvantaged many incumbents, particularly those 
who failed to support President Obasanjo‘s proposed third term amendment. 
The mistrust and misgivings that party politics and politicking generate in the Nigerian political 
terrain have been a major source of political tensions and crises in the democratic history of 
Nigeria. For instance, Oyediran (1999:142) quoted Awosika, a member of the Political Bureau, 
as saying that: 
Party politics is poisonous. It is the politics of war not of peace; of acrimony and 
hatred and mudslinging, not of love and brotherhood, of anarchy and discord, not 
of orderliness and concord; it is politics of cleavages, divisions and disunity; it is 
the politics of hypocrisy and charlatanism, not of integrity and patriotism, it is the 
politics of rascality, not maturity, of blackmail and near gangsterism not of 
constructive and honest contribution. 
The above description of political party and what it represents cannot be far from what 
political parties and their leaders epitomize in Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic, even though 
these actions clearly violate the ―Code of Conduct‖ for political parties in Nigeria (See 
Appendix C). Obeying party constitutions when it suits the interest of a stalwart or 
disobeying rules and guidelines to impose candidates have continued to feature 
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prominently in the politics of political parties in the Fourth Republic (Ofeimum, 2010; 
Adeniji, 2012). 
2.1.14 DEMOCRACY AND DEMAGOGUERY: THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN 
MEDIA  
The Nigerian media has over the years been a veritable tool in many ways, including the 
education of citizens on their democratic rights and the fight against authoritarian regimes (Uche, 
1989). Unfortunately, in Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic, the media platform has failed to live up to 
the doctrine of fairness thereby becoming highly politicized and biased (Konkwo, 2015:89). For 
instance, Konkwo (2015) observed that ―broadcasters who work in the government broadcast 
media are completely beholden to the powers that-be in terms of programme, organization, 
planning, production and transmission.‖ Thus, the public are only given access to news that 
promote the political interest of the incumbent regime, and it gets worse during campaigns where 
opposition candidates and political parties are denied or given little access to air their political 
programmes. Also, politicians who own media outlets use the channels to engage in campaigns 
of calumny against their political opponents. This practice attained a dangerous trend in the build 
up to the 2015 general elections when caution was thrown to the air in the way owners of 
television and newspaper media defamed the candidates of opposition party, their families and 
supporters. For example, ―death wish‖ adverts were sponsored in newspapers by a governor from 
the South-West against the person of Muhammadu Buhari and a private television station aired 
disparaging attacks on his chief political ally, Bola Tinubu (ThisDay 2015, March 3
rd
).   
Generally, whereas the media has been most instrumental to the transition to democratic regime 
in Nigeria, it has failed to be fair to all and free from partisanship.  
2.1.15 MONEY, POLITICS AND NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY 
Sociologists have long investigated the role that money plays in determining the direction of 
human interactions. Simmel (1907) argued that when money becomes the predominant means 
for establishing value in social relationships, the properties and dynamics of social relations are 
transformed. The consequence, according to Turner, Beeghley and Powers (2002), is that other 
criteria of value, such as logic, ethics, and aesthetics are displaced by monetary criterion. They 
argued that ―the use of money has the power to transform the structure of social relations in 
society‖ (Turner et al, 2002:282). They further emphasized that money is a tool that facilitates 
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the acquisition of objects; used to calculate values at every juncture so that all objects in the 
society (including a man‘s worth) become assessed by their monetary value. 
Simmel (1907) identified seven elements that make money crucial in social exchange, including: 
i. the desire for a valued object that one does not have; 
ii. the possession of the valued object by an identifiable other; 
iii. the offer of an object of value to secure from another the desired object;  
iv. the acceptance of this offer by the possessor of the valued object; 
v. collective units and individuals participate in exchange relations and, hence, are subject 
to the above four processes; 
vi. the more liquid the resources of an actor are in an exchange (that is, the more resources 
that can be used in many types of exchanges), the greater that actor‘s options and power 
will be at any given situation, including significant power to manipulate any exchange; 
and  
vii. exchanges will occur only if both parties perceive that the object given is less valuable 
than the one received.  
From the arguments of Simmel (1907) and (Turner et al, 2002) on the role of money in social 
relations, this study seeks to understand how money impacts voters decisions and how 
candidates‘ electoral outcomes at elections are determined by how much money they have to 
spend. Furthermore, the study examines the consequences of money in Nigeria‘s democracy.  
Turner et al (2002: 285) argue that because of the premium on monetary value by society‘s 
members, moral constraints on what is possible decrease ―because anything is possible if one just 
has the money.‖ They argued further, thus: 
Money releases people from the constraints of tradition and moral authority; 
money creates a system in which it is difficult to restrain individual aspirations 
and desires. Deviance and pathology are, therefore, more likely in systems where 
money becomes the prevalent medium of exchange.  
In examining democratic practices in Nigeria, it is important to examine what impact money has 
had, and continues to have on individuals, groups and democratic institutions. This is important 
because, Nigeria‘s democracy has been adjudged to be the most expensive democracy in the 
world because of the huge fund required to contest elections, whether primary elections of 
political parties and the general elections (Babanawa, 2013). Moreover, the Human Rights 
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Watch investigation of the political crises in Rivers State between 1999 and 2007 clearly showed 
that politicians employed monetary inducements to undermine democracy by arming thugs with 
weapons and paying stipends to cult groups and individuals to assist in rigging elections in 
favour of their benefactors (See Appendix J). 
Nigeria‘s democracy and governance reflect the reality of the Marxist proposition that the 
general character of a nation‘s social, intellectual and political condition is the outcome of its 
mode of production or economic system (Baran, 1957, Ake, 2008). There exists a plethora of 
studies, both theoretical and empirical, that emphasize the enormous influence that the economy 
has over other institutions in the state (Ravallion and Van de Walle, 2008; Goldstein and Udry, 
2008; Besley, Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2006; Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau, 2002). 
For instance, Suleiman (2010) concluded, based on a study on privatization policy under the 
civilian regimes in Nigeria that political expediencies have been largely responsible for most 
privatizations in Nigeria where the beneficiaries of the privatized companies are political allies 
of the government in power. Thus, privatization in Nigeria has been complicated by the political 
class, such that the very idea of natural monopolies which ensure restriction on privatization 
have been undermined by the managers of Nigeria, who are quite aware that achieving minimum 
standard and collective prosperity in some sectors can best be assured with public provision 
(Suleiman, 2013; Caporaso and Levine, 1992).  Even in ‗democratic‘ regimes, Nigerians 
continue to witness unrestrained anarchy of ambitions sustained by the immoral and deceitful 
commitment to political brigandage by political thespians that are bent on appropriating the 
political and economic institutions of the country to achieve personal and/or group interests.  
Furthermore, the political economy of Nigeria has been bedeviled with ethnocentrism, ethno-
religious sentiments and incompetent leadership, all of which have fuelled corruption and lack of 
patriotic and competent political leadership for the country.  Thus, lack of creativity in providing 
leadership has resulted in the overdependence of the country on unstable oil revenue (Kesselman, 
2004). More so, the peculiar nature of Nigeria‘s federalism that allows for the central 
government to superintend the extraction, deployment and allocation of the resources of its 
component states or regions makes presidential competition to assume a ‗do-or-die‖ method. The 
consequence is that the state controls the resources and economic opportunities and thus 
becomes the focus of competition among the various groups and interests, and for those in 
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government, governance becomes an industry for which survival and patronage are dependent on 
rent-seeking behaviour characterized by selfish interest, political connivance, corruption and 
electoral fraud (Achebe, 2012).  
Ake (1993, 2008) and Luqman (2011) stressed that the political context of Nigeria revolves 
around political economy because political actors in Nigeria, right from the founding fathers, 
have framed the goals of their struggles as not just struggles against tyranny but the struggles for 
material survival and the ‗equitable‘ distribution of resources to all the ethnic nationalities and 
interests in the country. Thus, continuing in that tradition, democratic contests have always 
engendered bitter rivalry among individuals and ethnic groups in Nigeria, where demagogues 
exploit these concerns to promote their parochial interests.  
Prior to the introduction of the political vocabulary of ―stomach infrastructure‖ occasioned by 
the 2014 Ekiti state governorship contest, the popularity and acceptance of candidates or 
‗candidates‘ favoured by political godfathers was largely dependent on the capacity of the 
candidates to distribute cars, money, food and other material benefits to the electorates. Where 
this strategy failed, the desperate political gladiators could resort to the use of intimidation and 
violence, including the illegal use of the security agencies and thugs, to achieve electoral 
success. Thus, political contestation in Nigeria‘s democratic experience, especially in the fourth 
republic, is characterized by massive electoral corruption, intimidation and violence where the 
probability of winning is highly dependent on candidates‘ or candidates‘ backers‘ superiority in 
terms of fund, capacity to manipulate security agencies and the electoral process, capacity to use 
violence and successfully subvert the democratic process to their advantage (Nwatu, 2004; 
Igbuzor, 2005; Ofeimum, 2010).   
Because of the pervasive level of poverty in every nook and cranny of the country (International 
IDEA, 2001) occasioned by the high level of unemployment (Ofeimum, 2010), the Nigerian 
politician is never in short supply of people, especially young people, to recruit for political 
exigencies. Looking forward to illusive promises of jobs or positions when their political 
ambitions are realized, these motley crowds of youths (uneducated and educated) are assigned all 
forms of illegal political roles: ranging from disruption or destruction of opponents‘ 
electioneering campaigns to killing of opponents and/or their supporters to scuttle the democratic 
process to enable their preferred candidate(s) emerge as ‗winners‘. 
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The economic cost of political contestation in Nigeria makes access to power an exclusive 
preserve of the rich. For instance, Ake (1993) lamented the huge cost of nomination form for the 
1993 presidential elections in Nigeria. Similarly, in the All Progressives Congress, the candidate 
for the 2015 presidential election, General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd.) lamented the huge cost of 
the nomination form (above 27 million naira) which he could not afford except for the 
intervention of his bankers who loaned him the money (Aziken, 2014). 
For politicians who are not rich enough to fund their political ambitions, they could seek for 
sponsorship from wealthy and willing godfathers. Yahaya (2007) has observed that desperation 
by politicians to win elections at all costs in Nigeria makes the courting of godfathers appealing. 
He emphasized that the relationship between the godfathers and their ‗godsons‘ is highly 
contractual, reciprocal and always at variance with the will and interests of the electorates. It has 
also been observed that Nigeria has one of the most expensive democracies in the world in the 
context of financing elections because there is a balanced demand and supply for material 
inducement for votes by the electorates and aspirants/candidates (Babanawa, 2013). 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study draws its theoretical strength from three theories, namely: the elite theory, theory of 
mass society and symbolic interactionism. 
 
2.2.1 THE ELITE THEORY  
There is no consensus among scholars on the definition of elite. Keller (1963:4) defines elite ―as 
a minority of individuals designated to serve a collectivity in a socially valued way.‖ Lasswell 
and Kaplan (1950) as well as Sartori (1979) describe elites as those citizens of a society that 
control the resources of society through incumbency of certain top positions in organizations. For 
the purpose of this study, the most fitting definition of elites is that provided by Dogan and 
Higley (1998:15) as ―the holders of strategic positions in powerful organizations including 
dissident ones, who are able to affect national and political outcomes regularly.‖  
Although the idea probably always has been present in some form, elitism emerged as a 
recognizable and clearly defined part of Western political thought in the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries. The leading contributors to the theory were Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), 
Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) and Robert Michels (1876-1936). 
Their explanation of elitism was a reaction to the Marxist analysis of politics and political power 
as dependent on two social classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Sitton (1996) argued that 
the Marxist theory, irrespective of its new forms, continues to emphasize the dominance of 
economic class and the mode of production as the prime forces that structure politics in all 
human societies.  But Mosca and Pareto contended that political elites determine the nature of 
regimes in any given society. They observed, however, that the political elites do not have power 
distributed equally among them at any given time; some individuals and subgroups in society 
will possess more power than others. Thus, there are dominant political elites (or governing 
elites) and non-dominant elites (out-of-power or power-seeking elites). The dominant political 
elites are the incumbent ruling elites, and will continue to hold onto power as long as they retain 
their unity and character (Rotherm, 2001). 
It drew attention to the occurrence, and the important effects, of divisions that may arise within 
the elite of a society. Its central proposition, as stated by Higley and Burton (1989), is as follows: 
"A disunified national elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of unstable 
regimes that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals. 
A consensually unified national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a stable regime 
that may evolve into a modern democracy, as in Sweden, or Britain, or the United States, if 
economic and other facilitative conditions permit." 
Scholars such as Eldersveld (1989), Putman (1976), Carlton (1996), and Ingelhart (1976) have 
all carried out empirical studies around the world with convincing consensus findings that permit 
some generalizations about the character of political elites. A central character among political 
elites in all societies is their unquenchable thirst for power. Elites struggle to attain power but do 
worse things to maintain that power. This attribute of political elites makes demagogues out of 
leaders, whether in a democracy or in monocracy.  Also, they shared the idea that the political 
order of any society is determined by the extent to which elites are willing to adjust and reach 
compromises on their ambitions for power.  What they failed to identify in their discourse of 
political elitism, however, is the ignoble roles of demagogues in harnessing human and economic 
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resources, and the paraphernalia of government (in the case of dominant political elites) to either 
gain or retain political power.  
Ake (1993:21) observed that the ruling elites in Nigeria continue to remain a very formidable 
problem that ―survives against all odds‖ because of their common features that resonates in their 
shared political culture ranging from its vast resources accumulated by means of state power and 
its success in ―pushing the premium of political power ever higher and making political 
competition destructively intense.‖  More so, the ties that bind the Nigerian political elites 
together are far stronger than the differences that they pretentiously portray for parochial 
political objectives. They all approach politics with bizarre crudity, they all undermine 
democratic tenets in the pursuit of their personal ambitions for power, and they share a common 
identity for making bogus electoral promises with little or no roadmap for achieving them.  
Fundamentally, the elite theory provides an argument for elite‘s control of democratic politics on 
the basis that elites in society have the training, wisdom and wherewithal to govern, and as such 
democracy should provide the platform for elites to decide who attains and retains power, and 
not on the large population. Unfortunately, however, such argument undermines the normative 
significance of democracy as a system that enables ―the people‖ to choose their leaders, and thus 
rendering democracy as a mere conservative doctrine (Walker, 1966). The elite theory advances 
the idea that the average citizen is uninformed, unwise and lacking the ability to dexterously 
determine policies and ideology to drive national development, thus arrogating political offices 
as befitting their personalities.  The consequence of such ideas is that the democratic system is 
conditioned to rely on the ―wisdom, loyalty and skill of their political leaders, not on the 
population at large‖ (Walker, 1966: 286). This explains the situation where political leaders in 
Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic have been reputed to impose candidates on political parties even when 
the candidates may not be the will of party members in general (Ofeimum, 2010; Adeniyi, 2012). 
Walker (1966: 286) noted that in democratic system of government, there are two groups, 
namely: the elite and the citizens at large. Whereas the elite are considered as those ―who possess 
ideological commitments and manipulative skills; the citizens at large or the masses of the 
system, a much larger class of passive, inert followers who have little knowledge of public 
affairs and even less interest‖. 
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 The mode of politics in Nigeria represents an unfortunate political culture that is anything but 
democratic, particularly in the context of political leaders imposing candidates on parties and in 
the general elections through election rigging. Political activities, including internal party politics 
or party primaries, political campaigns, elections, and post-election reactions, are all realities of 
the extent of degeneration in the country‘s polity, and the people‘s tolerance of this degeneration 
as ‗the Nigerian factor‘ represents the extent to which the political enterprise have been left to 
the whims and caprices of the corrupt and illegitimate minority for which the Nigerian people 
―have been conditioned to expect the worst from our politics and politicians‖ (Ake, 1993). 
Thus, the battered political culture that has failed to promise a bright democratic future for the 
people of Nigeria has created latitudes for the emergence of alternate elites, nay demagogues, 
who offer themselves as progressive or change political agents. Herein lies the dilemma of the 
Nigerian people. The Nigerian masses thus must necessarily be subjected to the rule of the 
demagogue, even in democracy, because the political reality of Nigeria favours demagogic 
democracy where only Nigerians of means or their blasphemed allies, irrespective of their moral 
and intellectual history, have realistic chances of attaining or retaining political power. 
Condemned to demagogic democracy, the Nigerian political climate is turned to politics of 
warfare rather than welfare so much that the constitutional standards which ought to inspire 
political culture become inactive, giving room for barbarism. And because ―Barbarism is the 
absence of standards to which appeal can be made‖ (Ortega, 1930), demagogic democracy 
becomes the route to Hobbesian state, where life is brutish and short.  The consequence is that 
political competitions and relations are not subject to a regulating principle to protect interests 
involved. 
2.2.2 MASS SOCIETY THEORY  
The theory of mass society (or mass society theory) emerged in the 1940s following the coinage 
of the term ―mass society‖ by Karl Mannheim (1935). However, the concept was popularized in 
the 1950s by C. Wright Mills. The theory provides a good example of sociological thinking 
migrating across fields in the social sciences in analyzing the group behaviour in the socio-
political context.  
Perhaps, the pioneer scholar who aroused the intellectuality of other social scientists on the place 
and power of the masses in defining political destiny was the Spanish essayist, José Ortega 
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Gasset, who lived from 1883 to 1955. According to Ortega (1930) the mass society theory 
promotes the notion of gullible and mobilizable anti-democratic forces which constitute the 
frustrated strata of a country who are fanatical backers or supporters of demagogues. These 
members of society are easily propagandized, manipulated and mobilized by demagogues to 
work against regimes which have failed to salvage them out of their socio-economic 
predicaments.  
Because democracy rides on the mantra of popular vote, elites in society make the most of the 
masses to achieve their political objectives and goals in a democratic system. According to 
Pinard (1968) the mass society theory is considered by social scientists as the most applicable 
and comprehensive statement of about the genesis and character of mass movements in political 
action. The frustration of the masses either occasioned by the corruption or ineptitude of the 
ruling class empowers the demagogue to engage in immoderate politics through the 
instrumentality of the masses. The central idea of mass society theory is that a society can 
develop mass tendencies in the event that the state fails to meet the economic, political and 
sociocultural aspirations of the populace. Thus, when the incumbent regime of a people fails to 
provide the leadership that responds to the yearnings of the masses, especially in addressing their 
economic and political concerns, people can turn to mass behaviour and mass movements either 
initiated or synchronized by the demagogue to initiate a revolution against the incumbent. The 
demagogue, if in power, could use the masses as a restraining force from altering the status quo. 
But if out of power, demagogues could use the masses as a revolutionary force to achieve power. 
Nevertheless, what constitutes a major shortcoming of mass theory is its failure to recognize that 
secondary groupings can also exert neutral or mobilizing functions. The maintenance and 
persistence of democratic norm depends on the behaviour of the tiny political elites in power 
whose actions may well lead to the overthrow and the enthronement of ‗mass authoritarianism‘ 
under the control of the demagogue (Mills, 1956; Hamilton, 2001).  
The core characteristics of the mass society theory are the concepts of mobilization and extremist 
politics. To actualize political objectives, the demagogue courts this group (the frustrated 
masses) which possesses the raw energy and the willingness to risk their un-propertied lives for 
revolutionary political objectives. Marx describes the social character of this mass society to 
include ―vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jail birds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, 
mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, procurers, brothel keepers, porters, 
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literati, organ grinders, rag pickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars—in short, the whole 
indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither‖ (Marx, 1852: 75). The theory 
emphasizes the functional appeal of this stratum of mass society who lack political experience 
but are supportive and accessible in times of crisis for demagogues to use to achieve political 
objectives. Thus, the mass society theory posits the existence of a demagogic, charismatic and 
antidemocratic leader who takes advantage of the failings associated with the alienation of the 
masses by the government to organize a mass-executed revolt to seize political power (Hamilton, 
2001). This theory helps to explain how political leaders prey on people's emotions or prejudices 
to manipulate them to achieve power. 
It is important to understand the collective aspiration of demagogues and the group referred to as 
the mass society. Their collective aspiration of changing the incumbent regime is premised on 
the shared predicament of alienation, even though from different perspectives. For the 
demagogues, they have been alienated from power as they have little or no say in the running of 
the state. But for the vulnerable ―mass society‖, they have been deprived (alienated) of the 
wealth of the commonwealth through poor and corrupt leadership and oppressive regime which 
have caused them severe strains (Pinard, 1968). So, the change that demagogues desperately seek 
to navigate can be made possible by the commitment of the mass society to the cause of the 
demagogues. Unfortunately, progressive rebellion of the masses does not represent a viable 
solution to the failings of democratic governance; especially that violence and tyranny cannot 
bring about the demagogues‘ promise of freedom and development.  
Bell (1955) stated that the theory of mass society is not just a description of the reactionary 
forces against institutionalized lapses of conservatism but an ideology of romantic remonstration 
against the deficits of all forms of governments made possible by the unrealized promises of 
rogue political elites existing in all forms of regimes, whether democratic or monocratic.  
This theory helps to explain why the masses, especially the frustrated and not-well-to-do masses, 
are susceptible to being engaged by politicians to subvert democracy through ballot box 
snatching and electoral violence. 
In the context of this study, the mass society theory provides the rationale on why and how a 
small, but cohesive and interconnected elites control the unorganized, uninformed and gullible 
masses to achieve their political ambition through the instrumentality of persuasion and 
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manipulation. Understandably, the poverty and lack of order that pervades the large number of 
youthful population in a society or political system that promises everything good, but achieves 
little or no collective prosperity for its citizens create the enabling environment for them to 
engage in undemocratic tendencies, in active connivance with another set of disgruntled elites, to 
either ensure change of government or undermine existing authorities. 
The elites, using their resources (both material and intellectual), engage in propaganda, arm the 
masses for violence (if need be) or violent reaction to possible authoritarian response from States 
and their coercive agencies, with the ultimate aim of achieving their political ambition. In fact, 
the mass society theory provides an understanding of the political struggles in Nigeria‘s Fourth 
Republic where democratic contests have assumed war-like situations before, during and after 
elections where the contending elites recruit, train and deploy willing masses to engage one 
another in violence for political reasons.  
2.2.3 SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONSIM 
The symbolic interactionist theory is a sociological theory that explains the behaviour of actors 
from the platform of the meanings that they give to their actions. In other words, Symbolic 
interactionism represents a perspective in micro-level sociological theory that addresses how 
members of society create and preserve society through face-to-face, recurring, meaningful 
interactions. In understanding how demagoguery occurs in the Nigerian political scene, it is 
important to know what politicians and voters in Nigeria consider as demagoguery or democratic 
irregularity and how they relate with actions that typify demagoguery. According to Ake (2008) 
demagoguery is the survival strategy of Nigerian politicians. To rule, you have to beat the rules, 
if the rules will deprive you of ruling. However, it is not just the politicians that have to beat the 
rules. The electorates do so too. The implication, therefore, is that the political behaviour and 
practices of the candidates and electorates is a function of the shared conversations and ideas 
about what has to be done for elections to be conducted ‗successfully‘ where all the stakeholders 
will benefit from the process and outcome at the level of individuals, including monetary 
inducement for voters and compromising electoral officials, candidates and even observers. 
Demagoguery, thus, is a socially constructed reality about political contestations where the actors 
in the field are allowed some degree of freedom by the society and democratic institutions to 
engage in some degree of undemocratic practices as far as it ―does not constitute to substantial 
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irregularities‖, even though what ―substantial irregularity‖ means is highly subjective and subject 
to the discretional interpretations of court judges. The point here, as emphasized by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) and Allan (2006) is that the everyday knowledge, those things that ―everybody 
knows‖ and that politicians do as they seek to gain or retain power is known and affected by the 
society through institutionalization or the reciprocal typification of habitualized actions.  
Furthermore, symbolic interactionism makes it possible to explain how the ‗cultural truths‘ of 
Nigerian politics reflect the behavioural disposition of political competitors and the political 
consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the country‘s ‗own‘ democratic culture. Hence, 
studies such as this that sets out to understand the behaviour of social actors (politicians) within a 
context (Nigeria) have to employ the symbolic interactionist perspective so as to appreciate the 
role of ideas, particularly beliefs and values, about democratic and political contestations affect 
the practice of democracy in the context under study. Doing this requires getting factual data 
about the experiences of political actors; how they interact to create, justify, sustain and relate 
with a democracy that reflects the social realities of the people, rather than an abstract or utopian 
description of democratic values.  
Demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democracy can be understood within the theoretical framework of 
symbolic interactionism if the behaviour of actors is subjected to social-exchange analysis, 
―where social interaction amounts to a negotiation in which individuals are guided by what they 
stand to gain and lose from others‖ (Macionis and Plummer, 2005:28). In Nigeria‘s democratic 
context, the negotiation and exchange exist between the politicians and the electorates in which 
case the politicians gain power while the voters gain monetary or material inducement (Ofeimun, 
2010; Adeniyi, 2011; Bakare, 2013). 
Symbolic interactionism provides the logic for understanding the political behaviour of 
stakeholders in Nigeria‘s brand of democracy and demagoguery  
2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework for this study is shown in the next page (Figure 2.1). The 
diagrammatic representation (Fig. 2.1) shows the contrived relationships between democracy and 
demagoguery. It describes the conundrums that structure democracy in the context how 
demagoguery undermines democracy ideals. 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015  
Elections are central to democracy and democratic governance (Fund, 2008). Hence, when the 
processes and outcomes of elections in a democracy do not reflect the democratic traditions of 
popular sovereignty, free and fair elections, independent democratic institutions and the 
observance of the principles of separation of powers or checks and balances, then demagoguery 
becomes evident, as election outcomes can be determined by anti-democratic practices including 
propaganda, violence, bribery, intimidation, use of thugs and security agencies to undermine the 
will of the people in electing their political leaders. It has been argued that the challenges of 
democratic practice in Nigeria are traceable to acts of demagoguery which usually manifests in 
Nigerian elections (Signer, 2009). 
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The democratic tradition involves the principles, values and practices that highlight genuine 
democracy. They include: popular sovereignty, independent democratic institutions, free and fair 
elections, separation of power and checks and balances, rule of law, respect for human rights, 
and a secure and level playing ground for all stakeholders to perform their democratic rights 
without intimidation. These minimum requirements for democratic practice are constantly 
threatened and undermined by acts of demagoguery as politicians resort to manipulative and 
illegal activities to achieve electoral victories.  
The interloping effect of demagoguery on democratic traditions or standards represents an 
affront to the will of the people and the sanctity of popular sovereignty that defines democracy. 
Unfortunately, a vast majority of the Nigerian people seems to identify with and compromise 
with politicians to use demagoguery to attain or retain political power. Demagoguery takes the 
form of propaganda, intimidation, bribery, threats and violence, election fraud (vote buying, 
ballot snatching, ballot box stuffing, and falsification of results). Politicians take advantage of the 
ignorance, poverty and naivety of the masses using propaganda, ethnic and religious sentiments, 
and intimidation to manipulate their way to power (Akannam and Dangida, 2015; Adeniyi, 
2011). When politicians attain political power without being ‗truly‘ elected by their people, it 
gives room for misrule, as they may not be accountable to their people (having not been truly 
elected by them). According to Ofeimum (2010), Nigerian leaders perpetuate tyranny and 
corruption because they have more confidence in winning elections through election fraud than 
depending on the people to vote for them.   
When the democratic politics of a nation violate basic democratic ethos and values, there is the 
likelihood that some qualified and willing citizens will avoid politics so as to be free from the 
vices that accompany active political partisanship. Thus, some of the implications of 
demagoguery in a democracy include disenfranchisement of eligible voters and candidates, 
misrule, political apathy, corruption, et cetera (Adebayo, 2015; Achebe, 2012).  
The issues presented in the conceptual framework and their interrelationships are crucial, not just 
to the emergence, survival and growth of democracy, but the crises and political instability that 
can transpire as a result of demagoguery in the democratic politics of in Nigeria.  
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2.4 HYPOTHESES 
The following hypotheses, stated in the alternative, were tested in this study: 
HYPOTHESIS ONE 
Alternative Hypothesis (HA): The outcome of elections in democratic contestations in Nigeria 
depends on acts of demagoguery including monetary inducement, intimidation and election 
fraud. 
HYPOTHESIS TWO 
Alternative Hypothesis (HA): Money is the most significant factor in determining the outcome 
of elections in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
This section presents the description of the methods that was used for the study. It includes the 
study area, population of study, sample and sampling procedures, research instruments and the 
procedures for collection and analysis of data.  
 
3.1 RESEARCH SETTING 
The research setting includes the geo-political locations, population, history, major cities and 
languages, and cultural and economic information of the Nigerian States that were randomly 
selected for this study.  
Nigeria is the focus of this study. The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a federal constitutional 
republic comprising 36 states and its Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Nigeria is located in West 
Africa and shares land borders with the Republic of Benin in the west, Chad and Cameroon in 
the east, and Niger in the north. Its coast in the south lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
The world population data sheet of Population Reference Bureau estimates the country‘s 
population to be one hundred and seventy-seven million, five hundred and forty-two thousand 
(177,542,000) in 2014 (Prborg, 2014).  
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Fig. 3.1a Map of Nigeria showing the six geo-political zones 
 
Source: Nigeria Population Commission, 2015 
Fig. 3.1b Map of Nigeria showing the six geo-political zones and States therein 
 
 
Source: Nigeria Population Commission, 2015 
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As shown in Fig. 3.1a and Fig. 3.1b, Nigeria is structured into six (6) geopolitical zones that 
include North-West Zone, North-East Zone, North-Central Zone, South-West Zone, South-South 
Zone and South-East Zone. Each of the 36 States in Nigeria produces three (senators) while the 
Federal Capital Territory produces one (1) senator. Thus, there are one hundred and nine (109) 
senators in Nigeria. However, in the Federal House of Representatives, there are three hundred 
and sixty members (360). This brings the total number of members of the National Assembly to 
four hundred and sixty-nine (469). Besides, there are seven hundred and seventy-four (774) local 
governments in Nigeria.  
The six States that were randomly selected for this study are Adamawa, Edo, Enugu, Kaduna, 
Kogi and Ondo, plus the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The following is a brief history of the 
States containing key information on each.  
i. Adamawa State is located in the North-East geo -political region of Nigeria and was 
created in August 1991 from the former Gongola State. The State occupies about 
38,000 square kilometers with a population of 3,178,950 (2006 census). The state is 
made up of 21 LGAs. The main languages are Hausa and Fulfulde besides the over 78 
tribes/ethnic groups in the state. 
ii. Edo State was created from the defunct Bendel State in August 1991 and has Benin 
City as its capital. Edo State has 18 Local Government Areas (LGAs). The state 
consists of mainly Benin, Isan and Etsako-speaking groups/dialects. Arts amd crafts 
are very popular in the state and the state can boast of the world‘s best wood carvers, 
brass and bronze sculptors. Edo State is popular for rubber, timber, oil palm and 
cocoa that are located in Akoko Edo, Owan and Etsako areas. The state is also 
endowed with several minerals such as quantize, marble, gypsum, limestone, lignite 
and gold. Petroleum is found in Ovia and Orhionmwon areas of the state. 
iii. Enugu State is one of the states in south-eastern Nigeria. The state is bounded by 
Abia State to the south, Anambra State to the west, Kogi and Benue states to the 
north, and Ebonyi State to the east. Enugu State has 17 Local Government Areas 
(LGAs) and a total population of 3,257,298 based on the 2006 National Population 
Census. The people of the state are of Igbo extraction, and the major language is Igbo. 
The major towns in Enugu State are Enugu, Nsukka, Awgu, Udi, Oji-River, Ninth 
Mile, Oboloafor, Agbani and Adanni. 
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iv. Kaduna State was part of the former North–Central State, which was created in 1967 
when Nigeria changed from four (4) Regional systems to 19 state structures. In 1987, 
it was divided into two along the line of the old provincial boundary, thus Katsina 
province became Katsina State, while Zaria province formed the present Kaduna 
State.The state capital is Kaduna – a status it has enjoyed since the old Northern 
Region days. There are twenty three (23) Local Government Areas in the state, and it 
covers an area of 44,408.3 square kilometers. The population according to 2006 
census is 6,066,562, which then put the density at about 137 persons per square 
kilometer. Kaduna State is a major industrial axis in the North, while Kaduna town 
has a lot of commercial activities and industries like the Peugeot car assembly and the 
petroleum refinery. Few textile industries still exist. The state has an airport, which is 
accessible all year round because of fair weather. It is also a major railway junction 
for the entire railway system between the North and the South. 
v. Kogi State, with a land area of 29,833 square kilometres, was carved out of Kwara 
and Benue states on August 27, 1991. Kogi is one of the states in the north-central 
zone of Nigeria. It is popularly called the confluence state due to the fact that the 
confluence of Rivers Niger and Benue occur there. There are three main ethnic 
groups in the state namely Igala, Ebira, and Okun; with the Igalas being the largest 
ethnic group. Lokoja is the state capital. Kogi State, with a population of 3,314,043 
according to 2006 census, is the most centrally located of all the states of the 
federation. It shares common boundaries with Niger, Kwara and Nasarawa states as 
well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to the north Benue and Enugu states to the 
East; Enugu and Anambra states to the south; and to the west by Ondo, Ekiti and Edo 
states. The state has important tourist attractions which include colonial relics such as 
Lord Lugard House and Ogidi (an African town with formations of Igneous Rock 
Mountains and a traditional art & craft industry). 
vi. Ondo State was created in 1976 out of the former Western State. The state lies 
between latitudes 5� 450 and 7� 520N and longitudes 4� 200 and 6 030E. It is 
bounded on the east by Edo and Delta states, on the west by Ogun and Osun states, on 
the north by Ekiti and Kogi states, and to the south by the Bight of Benin of the 
Atlantic Ocean. The state occupies a land area of about 15,000 Square kilometers 
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with a population of 3,441,924 people according to 2006 census. The state has 
eighteen (18) Local Government Areas, with Akure as the capital city as well as the 
largest settlement. Some of the other prominent towns in the state are Ondo, Owo, 
Ore, Okitipupa, Ikare, Idanre, and Ile-Oluji. The people of the state are mostly 
Yoruba, although other Nigerians and foreign nationals equally live in the state. 
Agriculture is the mainstay of the people of Ondo State. The state has notable tourist 
attractions including Owo Museum, Ipale Iloro Water Falls, Igbokoda Water Front, 
Oke Maria Hills and Olumirin Water Falls. 
vii. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT), which has Abuja as capital, is located almost at 
the geographical centre of Nigeria. Abuja is also the federal capital of Nigeria, having 
been moved from Lagos on December 12, 1991. The FCT lies within latitudes 8 23‘ 
and 9 15‘ N and longitudes 6 35‘E. It is bounded on the west by Niger State, on the 
north by Niger and Kogi states, on the east by Nasarawa State and on south by Niger, 
Kogi and Nasarawa states. 
 
3.2 STUDY POPULATION 
The study population is key political actors in Nigeria‘s democracy. Nigerian political 
stakeholders (adults) of all political parties, irrespective of religious background, ethnic group 
and educational background constituted the study population for this research. For the 
quantitative aspect of the study, party delegates of the two major political parties, PDP and APC, 
in the 2015 elections provided responses to the self-administered questionnaire, while the 
qualitative aspect of the study involved in-depth interviews with senior INEC officials, security 
personnel, politicians and electorates. 
The study utilized a combination of the quantitative and qualitative methods of research. The 
benefits of using both quantitative and qualitative methods in a single study include richness of 
data and deeper insight into the phenomena under study (Bhattacherjee, 2012). In the qualitative 
aspect of the study, in-depth and telephone interviews were conducted with purposively selected 
respondents who have adequate knowledge of the topics and situations under study.    
75 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The study utilized methodological triangulation, involving the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. The benefits of using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a single study include richness of data and deeper insight into the 
phenomena under study (Bhattacherjee, 2012). In the qualitative aspect of the study, in-depth and 
telephone interviews were conducted. On the other hand, the quantitative aspect involved survey.  
 
3.4 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
The multistage sampling technique was used in selecting the sample for the study. In the first 
instance, the population was delineated by the six geopolitical zones that make up Nigeria.    
Through the use of simple random technique, six states, one state from each zone, were selected 
for the study. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT), the central seat of government, was also 
added for the study.  
The Table below shows the geopolitical zones and the randomly selected state from each zone. 
Table 3.1: Geo-political Zones and the Randomly Selected State from Each Zone 
GEOPOLITICAL ZONES STATES ACCORDING TO 
POLITICAL ZONES 
RANDOMLY SELECTED 
STATES 
North-Central Benue, Kogi, Kwara, 
Nasarawa, Plateau  
Kogi 
North-East Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, 
Taraba, Yobe 
Adamawa 
North-West Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, 
Kaduna, Sokoto 
Kaduna 
South-East Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, 
Enugu, Imo 
Enugu 
South-South Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross 
River, Delta, Edo, Rivers 
Edo 
South-West Ekiti, Lagos, Osun, Ondo, 
Oyo 
Ondo 
Source: Field Survey, 2015 
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Seven hundred (700) respondents, made up of 100 delegates per State and the FCT, participated 
in the quantitative aspect of study that involves the distribution of self-administered 
questionnaire. The decision to use convenience sampling technique to choose 100 delegates per 
State was based on the reality that political parties declined to provide the sampling frame that 
contained the details of the delegates. The researcher and research assistants worked with 
insiders and known delegates to be able to administer the questionnaires to the sampled 
delegates. Each political party (APC and PDP) was allotted 50 copies of the questionnaire. The 
equal number of allotment was due to the fact that the two political parties are at par in terms of 
strength of membership and political fortunes as evidenced in the composition of the National 
Assembly where the two political parties produced over 90% of the National Assembly 
members, and 35 governors out of the 36 States of Nigeria. 
For the in-depth and telephone interviews, 20 respondents were purposively interviewed. The 
interviews were conducted using the detailed interview guide. Based on the request of 
interviewees, some of the top INEC officials and security agents were interviewed over the 
telephone.  
The rationale for purposively selecting only two major political parties are: 
(a) The two parties (APC and PDP) produced all the senators in the 2015 election. 
(b)  Over 98% of contestants who emerge as winners in the 2015 House of Representatives 
are from the two parties. 
(c)  Only five (5) out of the three hundred and sixty (360) representatives were not from the 
All Progressives Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).  
In addition to those that the questionnaire was administered to, twenty (20) respondents were 
selected from the civil service, academia, security agencies, leaders and senior officials of 
political parties, civil society and media organizations. The in-depth interview sessions were 
tape-recorded, in addition to writing down the responses on paper (note taking). 
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Table 3.2: Sampling Methods 
Sampling strategy adopted  A mixture of probability and non-probability 
sampling 
Sampling techniques adopted Multi-stage sampling, convenience sampling 
and purposive sampling 
Sample size for the study Questionnaire (Quantitative) =700;  
Qualitative (interviews) = 20 
Source: Field Survey, 2015 
3.5 RELIABILITY OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
In order to ensure that the scales used for this study are reliable, a scale reliability check was 
performed on the scales to be sure that the scale‘s internal consistency was very reliable. Thus, 
one of the most commonly used indicators of internal consistency, Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient, 
was adopted to establish the reliability of the survey instrument used. The table below represents 
a number of pieces of information concerning the scale used for this study. 
 
Table 3.3: Reliability Statistics 
 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.876 24 
Source: Field Survey, 2015 
The Alpha value, Cronbach‘s Alpha Coefficient, is .88. Because this value is above .7, the scale 
can be considered as reliable. Normally, the range of coefficient varies from 0 to 1, such that a 
research instrument with low or no reliability will have a score of zero (0) or close to zero (0), 
while a research instrument with high reliability will tend towards one (1). In the current study 
the Cronbach alpha coefficient was approximately .88. 
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3.6 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
Data was collected using both quantitative and qualitative instruments. For the quantitative 
method, self-administered questionnaire was employed while in-depth interviews were 
conducted through face-to-face and telephone conversation with respondents. The study utilized 
a combination of the quantitative and qualitative methods of research. In the qualitative aspect of 
the study, in-depth and telephone interviews were conducted with purposively selected 
respondents who have adequate knowledge of the topics and situations under study.     
The survey design was adopted for this study. The explorative and explanatory nature of this 
study makes the survey design most appropriate for this work (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The forms 
of interviews adopted were face-to-face interview and telephone interviews.  
3.7 SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION 
This study engaged both primary and secondary data sources.  Primary data were collected first-
hand and directly from the sampled population through the use of structured questionnaire and 
interviews (telephone and face-to-face). For the secondary sources of data, information useful for 
this study was collected from published printed sources (books, journals/periodicals, official 
records, research publications, press statements, magazines, newspapers, court documents, and 
other scholarly literature) and published electronic sources (e-journals, websites, and internet). 
The data collected from secondary sources were both quantitative and qualitative.  
3.8 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS FOR DATA COLLECTION  
The self-administered questionnaire and interviews (in-depth and telephone interviews) were 
utilized to get information from delegate voters and key political stakeholders in Nigeria‘s 
democracy.  
i. SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire consisted of five (5) sessions and contained 32 items for which responses were 
required. Except for Section A of the questionnaire, which contained questions on the socio-
demographic characteristics of respondents, the other sections of the questionnaire (Sections B-
E) adopted the Likert-scale, requiring respondents to choose from the stated options of Strongly 
Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree and Strongly Disagree. The thematic issues surveyed included 
the role of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democracy (Section B), factors that make demagoguery 
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thrive in Nigeria‘s democratic politics (Section C), how demagoguery manifests in the practice 
of democracy in Nigeria (Section D), and the implications of demagoguery on democracy in 
Nigeria (Section E) (See Appendix A).  
ii. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
With regard to the interviews, a basic checklist was prepared to ensure that all relevant themes of 
the study as contained in the objectives and research questions were covered to enable the 
interviewer to keep the interview within the parameters traced out by the aim and objectives of 
the study. Data were collected by the researcher in the form of field notes and audio-taped 
interviews. 
The politicians and stakeholders interviewed were purposively selected. Specifically, those that 
have had experiences of demagoguery or with demagogues and those who are knowledgeable on 
Nigeria‘s democratic conundrums by virtue of their positions in the political parties were 
interviewed because they represent a major source of eliciting information on demagogic 
operations and demagogues, and the consequences that they pose to democracy and national 
development (See Appendix B). They included party chieftains, youth leaders of political parties, 
INEC officials, security agents and elected public office holders. 
Some of the face-to-face in-depth interview sessions took place at the venues recommended by 
the respondents as most conducive for the interview.   
In the second form of interviews conducted (i.e., telephone interviews), the respondents were 
contacted and interviewed over the phone, based on a random selection of INEC resident 
electoral officers from a telephone directory of the ―Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) Information Kit for 2015 General Elections‖ as respondents. 
 
3.9 METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
In analyzing the data for this study, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods of 
analyses was carried out. Descriptive statistical tool was used in the analysis of the socio-
demographics of respondents and other relevant variable relationships. For the quantitative data 
emanating from the self-administered questionnaire, the returned and properly filled 
questionnaires were appropriately sorted, coded, and analyzed with the aid of the Statistical 
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Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, version 15.0) to ascertain the frequency distribution and 
percentages, as well as perform other statistical analyses and tests, including cross tabulations, 
multiple regression and Chi-Square tests.  
The interviews conducted (both in-depth and telephone) were transcribed and analyzed using 
content analysis to either confirm or refute the findings from the quantitative data analyzed.  
3.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
The study was carried out with adherence to the ethical principles in the course of interacting 
with respondents, including voluntary participation in the research, informed consent, and 
confidentiality and anonymity where appropriate. Specifically, the ethical standards of American 
Psychological Association (APA) and Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Practitioners 
Association (NASA) were observed fastidiously.  
 
3.11 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
While carrying out this study, there were some identifiable potential weaknesses of the study and 
the scope of the research.  
Limitations: this involved external conditions that restricted or constrained the scope of this 
study which may have affected the outcome. In this study, the incessant defection of delegates of 
political parties in the 2015 elections to new parties created a scenario where delegates of PDP 
had changed party prior to filling the questionnaire or doing so while the questionnaire was yet to 
be returned. What this means is that there were delegates who felt aggrieved with their parties 
before defecting to other parties, and this may affect the reality of the responses provided. Also, 
political parties did not provide the required cooperation in releasing data requested from them in 
the form of sample frame.  Finally, the electoral body, INEC, does not have the lists of authentic 
delegates for primary elections from political parties, as the powers of INEC to supervise and 
authenticate party primaries have been made ceremonial by the 2010 amended Electoral Act. 
Thus, in some cases, factions within a party have different lists of delegates, with the Courts 
having to rule on the authentic delegate lists. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
This study set out to investigate the influence of demagoguery on democratic practice in 
Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic. The participants in this study have provided some detailed accounts 
of their experiences and understanding of democracy and how demagoguery operates in the 
democratic politics of Nigeria and the consequences that they engender in Nigeria‘s politics. 
Although the data collected using Likert scale are ordinal, they yielded nominal categories. Thus, 
because a Likert scale yields nominal categories, frequency distribution was considered 
appropriate for the analysis of the quantitative data, in the first instance. However, in the later 
part of the analysis, the Likert scale responses were trichotomised (divided into three categories) 
by combining ―strongly agree‖ and ―agree‖ responses, ―Strongly disagree‖ and ―disagree‖ 
responses, and ―Neutral‖ responses to create three categories of responses from the Likert scale 
(See Appendix K). Afterwards, the non-parametric analysis was adopted in which chi-square test 
was utilized. In analyzing the Likert scale responses, using numbers to code was not adopted as 
changing the response format to numbers does not change the meaning of the scale, and it may 
be misleading to code a response of ―neutral‖ as 3 and a response of ―strongly disagree‖ as 1 
because the numbers are comparable only in terms of relative magnitude, not actual magnitude. 
 
4.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS (FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION): SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 
The following tables contain the presentation and analyses of data based on the items in the self-
administered questionnaire. 
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Table 4.1.1 Distribution of Respondents by Socio-demographic Characteristics 
Variables Frequency Percent (%) 
Gender   
Male 472 72 
Female 186 28 
Total 658 100 
Age   
18-29 87 13 
30-39 195 30 
40-49 208 32 
50-59 112 17 
60 and Above 53 8 
Total 655 100 
   
Religion   
Christianity 392 61 
Islam 233 36 
Other 18 3 
Total 643 100 
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Variables Frequency Percent (%) 
Marital Status   
Single 148 23 
Married 436 68 
Separated/ Divorced/ 
Widowed 
57 9 
Total 641 100 
Educational 
Background 
  
Primary/ Secondary 184 30 
Tertiary 438 70 
Total 622 100 
Occupation   
Unemployed/ Retired 107 16 
Self Employed 354 55 
Government Services 165 26 
Private Services 17 3 
Total 643 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
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Age: Table 4.1.1 shows that 72% out of the total respondents are male while 28% are female. 
Thus, the male gender constitutes the majority of respondents in the study. This further confirms 
the positions of previous studies and statements that women are marginalized or under-
represented in the politics of Nigeria in all aspects (Adeleke, 2015; European Union Report on 
the 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria). A critical observation of table 4.1 shows that the age 
bracket of majority of the respondents in the study was between <30 to 49 years. This is highly 
suggestive of the participation of youths and young adults at not just the general elections, but in 
the primary elections of political parties before the candidates are nominated for the general 
elections.  
Importantly also, the involvement of young people in party politics, as shown in this study, is 
encouraging and supports the argument of Abbani (2015) that the Nigerian youths have played 
prominent roles in the emergence and sustenance of democracy in Nigeria. The result of this 
study and Abbani‘s work totally contradict the harsh conclusion of Ajidahun (2015) that 
Nigerian youths‘ participation in the politics of Nigeria has been in the context of thuggery and 
political violence.  
Religion: Table 4.1.1 shows that 61% of the respondents were Christians while 36% were 
Muslims, the two religions constituting 96% of the all respondents. Again, the point is that the 
two religions which teach against any form of cheating or malpractices produce members as 
politicians. More importantly, the information from responses of research participants and 
literature suggest that religion plays little or no role in restraining Nigerian politicians from 
engaging in undemocratic political behaviour. If anything, religion serves as a tool of 
demagoguery to deceive gullible voters. 
Marital Status: The table shows that 68% of the respondents were married, 23% were single, 
and 9% were either separated, divorced or widowed. Thus, the marital status of the respondents 
were majorly married and single. From the marriage status of the respondents, it can be deduced 
that the Nigerian political environment attaches significance to marriage, perhaps as a 
demonstration of responsibility on the part of political participants. 
 
Education: Table 4.1.1 shows the educational level of the respondents. 70% of the respondents 
possess tertiary educational qualification and 30% have either primary or secondary educational 
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qualification. What is instructive here is that most of the respondents are highly educated. But 
how does the level of education of the respondents help the sanctity of democratic practice in 
Nigeria? This question will be addressed by relevant data in the relevant sections of this study. 
This is even more interesting because there are no regulations on educational level as 
requirements for participating in primary elections, as the case is with general elections. 
Occupation: Table 4.1.1 further shows that 55% of the respondents were self-employed; 16% 
were either unemployed or retired; 26% were in government organizations and 3% were engaged 
by private organizations.  
 
Table 4.1.2: Distribution of Respondents by Political Party 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 PDP 320 49 
 APC 338 51 
 Total 658 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
As shown in Table 4.1.2, the party memberships of the respondents are 49% for the Peoples 
Democratic Party and 51% for the All Progressives Congress (APC). This represents a fair share 
of the representation of the two main political parties used for this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table 4.1.3: Distribution of Respondents by State 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Adamawa 100 15 
 Kaduna 82 13 
 Kogi 93 14 
 Enugu 86 13 
 Ondo 100 15 
 Edo 97 15 
 FCT 100 15 
 Total 658 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.3 shows the number and percentage of participation of respondents from the States 
surveyed. The Table shows that 15% of the respondents are from Adamawa; 13% from Kaduna; 
14% are from Kogi; 13% are from Enugu; 15% are from Ondo; 15% are from Edo; and 15% are 
from the Federal Capital Territory. It must be noted that the state here refers to the states where 
the respondents registered as a voters as reflected in the voters cards of the respondents. It does 
not necessarily mean the state of origin of the respondents. 
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Table 4.1.4: Votes Influenced by Money and Material Inducements 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 211 32 
 Agree 267 41 
 Neutral 48 7 
 Disagree 84 13 
 Strongly Disagree 48 7 
 Total 658 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.4 shows the respondents‘ views on how votes are influenced by monetary and material 
inducements. Here, 73% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that money was offered 
to voters for their votes in the 2015 primary elections, compared to only 20% who either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that money was used to influence votes.  This scenario 
corroborates the response of a PDP youth leader and a delegate at the 2015 governorship primary 
election in his State. He noted that: 
Money is what makes participating for elective position in Nigeria possible. This 
is because you cannot initiate or sustain your political ambition without having 
plenty of money that you are ready to part with. You can as well forget politics 
without money. 
The view of the respondent which corroborates the experiences or opinions of the delegates can 
further be substantiated by the very high cost of nomination forms for elective positions, 
especially those of Presidential, Governorship and National Assembly positions. Table 4.1.5 
shows a comparative figure of price tags on party tickets by political parties.  
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Table 4.1.5: Political Parties and Cost of Nomination and Expression of Interest Forms in 
the 2015 General Elections 
Political Party Presidential Gubernatorial Senatorial House of 
Representatives 
All Progressives Congress 
(APC) 
27.5 Million 16.5 Million 5.5 Million 2.2 Million 
Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP) 
22 Million 11 Million 5.5 Million 2.2 Million 
Source: Freedom writers, 2014. 
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Fig 4.1: Cost of Nomination Forms 
 
Source: Freedom writers, 2014 
Also, the current president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, had shown disdain for the high cost 
of purchasing party tickets for elective positions when he reacted to his party‘s presidential ticket 
cost thus: 
It is a pity that I could not influence this amount that has to be paid like it was 
done for the ladies who are trying to participate and for the disabled. I looked left 
and right and could not read sympathy on anybody‘s face and so I kept my trap 
shut and felt heavily sorry for myself.                                           (ThisDay, 2014).                                
Also, the Labour Party issued a statement to condemn the monetization of party tickets by the 
APC and PDP warning that it could derail democratic values in Nigeria.  
The high cost of nomination forms will turn politics into business. The party 
believes that to ask for high fees for nomination forms is a creation of foundation 
of corruption.                                                     (Alliance for Democracy, 2014) 
From the foregoing, therefore, the data strongly suggest that monetary baits as a form of 
demagoguery plays a crucial role in the democratic politics of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic, so 
that qualified and willing Nigerians who have much to contribute to public service at the level of 
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politics are artificially stopped or forced to jettison the idea because of the lack of money. This 
finding confirms the observations of Fund (2008) and Simmel (1907) that some of the malady 
that makes fraud and foul-ups in election counts possible seems to be built into the system by 
design to serve the interests of the benefiting political class.  
Table 4.1.6: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Leaders/ 
Mentors 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 142 22 
 Agree 296 47 
 Neutral 50 8 
 Disagree 106 16 
 Strongly Disagree 43 7 
 Total 637 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.6 shows that 69% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that votes cast by 
delegates were influenced by their political leaders and mentors. Only 23% either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that the votes were influenced by their political leaders/mentors. This brings 
to the fore the ever-present argument in the politics of Nigeria about the overbearing influence of 
political leaders, often referred to as godfathers, in determining those who emerge as not just flag 
bearers of political parties but the eventual ‗winners‘ of the main elections through the roles of 
the godfathers. The data substantiate the argument of Walker (1966) that in democratic 
situations, politicians have imposed themselves as politically significant reference groups that 
arrogate to themselves major influence on the political behaviour the average citizens regardless 
of his own satisfaction or resentment.  
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Table 4.1.7: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes Influenced by Threats 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 90 14 
 Agree 190 29 
 Neutral 112 17 
 Disagree 140 21 
 Strongly Disagree 125 19 
 Total 657 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.7 shows that 43% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that threats were 
employed in influencing votes. However, 40% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed on whether or not their votes were influenced by threats, with 17% deciding to stay 
neutral about the use of threats to influence votes.  
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Table 4.1.8: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by a 
Combination of Inducement and Threats 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 152 24 
 Agree 194 30 
 Neutral 58 9 
 Disagree 154 24 
 Strongly Disagree 86 13 
 Total 644 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.8 shows that there is a high rate incidence of inducement and threats in influencing 
votes. As shown above, 54% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that votes were 
influenced by a combination of both inducement and threats. This corroborates the findings of 
Ogunbodede and Lawal (2015) that where inducement fails to achieve its aim of subverting the 
democratic process, it could be mixed with some level of threats and/or violence to force through 
the antidemocratic stratagems.   
The results above substantiate the report of the Human Rights Watch that Nigeria‘s elections 
were subject to threats and all forms of intimidations such that victory was largely facilitated by 
threats to the lives and properties of opponents and their supporters (See Appendix J). 
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Table 4.1.9: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Voting process was Influenced by 
Intimidation/ Fraud 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 133 20 
 Agree 202 31 
 Neutral 80 12 
 Disagree 145 22 
 Strongly Disagree 95 15 
 Total 655 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.9 shows that 51% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that voting 
process was characterized by intimidation and fraud. This point was corroborated by the 
following narrative of a respondent who reported that she was a victim of fraud in the senatorial 
election primary where she was an aspirant. 
A former governor of my State bought about 100 ballots from the National 
executives of my political party which was smuggled into the box of his preferred 
aspirant. When other aspirants noticed this, they resisted it which led to the fracas 
that terminated the voting process. Unfortunately, the aspirant that was the 
anointed aspirant of a former National Chairman of our party was announced as 
the winner of the election as against the reality of what transpired at the primary 
election.    (Senatorial Aspirant of PDP in the 2015 primary elections in a North-
Central State). 
Whether it is at the primary elections or the general elections it has always been a subject of 
accusations and counter-accusations that fraud and intimidations have always characterized 
elections in the politics of Nigeria, particularly in the Fourth Republic.  
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The data also supports the position of Arowolo (2015) that entrenched electoral fraud in Nigeria 
is a major threat to the survival and growth of democracy in Nigeria.  
 
 
Table 4.1.10: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Voting Process Violated Democratic 
Rules or Principles 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 168 26 
 Agree 189 29 
 Neutral 79 12 
 Disagree 146 22 
 Strongly Disagree 73 11 
 Total 655 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015. 
Table 4.1.10 clearly shows that the violation of democratic rules and principles is very high. 
From the Table, 55% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that there were violations 
of democratic values or principles in the conduct of elections by politicians and other 
stakeholders, while 33% either disagreed or strongly disagreed.  
This very high number reflects the current danger that Nigeria‘s democracy faces. This danger 
does not necessarily have to include a military coup or truncating of Nigeria‘s democracy, but an 
indictment of Nigeria‘s democratic values, for which many lives have been lost to bring the 
nation to what it is today, democratically.  
This finding also confirms the assertion by Ake (2008) that democracy in Nigeria has 
continuously failed to reflect the minimum democratic values that are well crested in relevant 
laws, including the Electoral Act and the Constitution.  
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Table 4.1.11: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Poverty is Responsible for the 
Inability of Delegates and Voters to Choose Candidates Independently of What Their 
Leaders Tell Them  
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 275 42 
 Agree 239 36 
 Neutral 38 6 
 Disagree 68 10 
 Strongly Disagree 38 6 
 Total 658 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.11 shows that the high level of poverty and economic dependence of delegates and 
voters on the very rich political class is a crucial reason why voters have little or no 
independence in voting aspirants or candidates independently of the will of their leaders. From 
the table, a whopping 78% of the respondents either ―strongly agreed‖ or ―agreed‖ that poverty 
was a factor responsible for voters‘ decision to always vote candidates that reflected the choices 
of political leaders. Only a handful of 16% either ―disagreed‖ or ―strongly disagreed‖ that 
poverty was responsible.  
This position was corroborated by a respondent during the in-depth interview, when he narrated 
that in the last primary election of his party to pick a governorship candidate, the party leaders 
were the people responsible in writing the names of ‗loyal party members‘ for the exercise, with 
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promise of huge monetary reward. He reflected on the exercise thus: 
Initially my name was included in the delegate list for the governorship primary, 
but it was later removed by a party leader in my ward on the allegation that I was 
going to vote a candidate that the party leaders were not supporting. I protested 
my removal until I was reconsidered after series of assurances to our leaders that I 
would vote for the candidate that was favoured by the party leadership. And of 
course, the favoured aspirant was the incumbent governor. That was the person I 
voted for.  
(Delegate from North-Central Nigeria). 
The struggle to become a delegate is as fierce as the struggle to become a candidate of a party. 
The reason for this struggle is because of the monetary reward that normally comes to the 
delegates. 
Table 4.1.12: Distribution of Respondents by Whether were Votes Influenced by Monetary 
Inducement Only 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 209 32 
 Agree 279 43 
 Neutral 41 6 
 Disagree 73 11 
 Strongly Disagree 51 8 
 Total 653 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.12 shows that 75% of the respondents either ―strongly agreed‖ or ―agreed‖ that 
monetary inducement took place at the elections to influence voting, while 19% either 
―disagreed‖ or ―strongly disagreed‖ that money was used to influence voting.  
In an in-depth interview carried out with a delegate, he narrated how money was used to induce 
delegates thus: 
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Each of the delegates was given four hundred thousand naira (400,000) as 
inducement. Although, 50% of the money (i.e., 200,000 naira) must be paid to the 
party at the ward level to enable the settlement of those party leaders or influential 
members whose names were not included in the delegate list. So, I was left with 
200,000 naira, from which I still have to settle so many people on a voluntary 
note. 
(Delegate, 2015 Gov. Primary). 
This again emphasizes the highly deterministic role of demagoguery, as represented here by 
monetary inducement, in the democratic politics of Nigeria, particularly in the Fourth Republic.  
Table 4.1.13: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Religious 
Sentiments 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 136 21 
 Agree 205 31 
 Neutral 89 14 
 Disagree 111 17 
 Strongly Disagree 110 17 
 Total 651 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.13 shows that 52% either ―strongly agreed‖ or ―agreed‖ that votes were influenced by 
religious sentiments, while 34% either ―disagreed‖ or ―strongly disagreed‖ that votes were as a 
result of religious sentiment.  
According to Ake (1998, 2008), there are strong indications that Nigeria‘s politics cannot be 
totally said to be free from religious sentiments, even though this factor has been structurally 
addressed, to a large extent, by political parties in ensuring that when a candidate for an elective 
position is a Christian, the Deputy or Vice necessarily becomes a Muslim, and vice-versa. This 
Nigerian solution to the potential tension of religious sentiments also played out during the 
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military regimes, except the Buhari military administration between 1983 and 1985 where both 
the Head of State and the ‗Vice‘ practiced same religion.  
However, it must be noted that the political elites continue to use religious sentiment as a 
demagogic tool to engender sentiments for purely political reasons, and not for the advancement 
of the religion per se.   
Table 4.1.14: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Ethnic 
Sentiments 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 140 22 
 Agree 283 44 
 Neutral 86 13 
 Disagree 86 13 
 Strongly Disagree 54 8 
 Total 649 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.14 shows that 66% of the respondents either ―strongly agreed‖ or ―agreed‖ that ethnic 
sentiments influenced votes cast, while only 21% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
ethnic sentiments influenced votes. This is expected in a country where ethnicity plays a very 
significant role in its political affairs. In fact, the idea of Federal Character which is enshrined in 
the constitution and rotational presidency (and other elective and appointive offices) contained in 
the constitution and other documents of political parties all give credence to the significance of 
ethnicity as an indispensable factor in the politics of Nigeria. The significance of ethnic 
sentiment highlighted here corroborates the finding of Ikporukpo and Ogroh (2015) that the 
electoral victories recorded by political parties in Nigeria since the Fourth republic have reflected 
ethnic sentimentalities. 
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Taking advantage of the role of ethnicity in the politics of Nigeria, politicians engage in acts of 
demagoguery to accuse political opponents of ethnic marginalization with the aim achieving 
political purposes. For example, in the run-up to the 2015 Presidential elections, supporters of 
the former (then incumbent) President, Goodluck Jonathan, echoed the need to allow the ―Ijaw 
man‖ complete two tenures as required by the constitution for ―peace to reign.‖ Other ethnic 
jingoist like the ex-militant leader, Asari Dokubo, an Ijaw man also, threatened to lead a revolt 
against the Nigerian nation if his kinsman, President Jonathan, was not re-elected as the 
President of Nigeria (Niger Delta watch, c.2014).  In fact, all ethnic groups in Nigeria are 
sentimental and politicians use these ethnic and tribal sentiments to advance their political 
ambitions, not necessarily to promote the welfare of the ethnic groups they claim to champion 
their causes. 
Table 4.1.15: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Use of 
Force 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 79 12 
 Agree 172 27 
 Neutral 99 15 
 Disagree 178 28 
 Strongly Disagree 118 18 
 Total 646 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.15 shows that 39% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that votes was 
influenced by the use of force, while 46% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that voters were 
forced to vote against their will. 
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Table 4.1.16: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by 
Intimidation 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 91 14 
 Agree 201 31 
 Neutral 91 14 
 Disagree 183 28 
 Strongly Disagree 89 13 
 Total 655 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.16 shows that 45% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that 
intimidation was employed in ensuring that voters voted for particular candidates, irrespective of 
who they actually wanted on their own. However, 41% of respondents either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that intimidation was employed in the voting process.  
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Table 4.1.17: Distribution of Respondents on the Use of Thugs to Intimidate Voters 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 82 12 
 Agree 116 18 
 Neutral 123 19 
 Disagree 227 35 
 Strongly Disagree 104 16 
 Total 652 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.17 shows that 30% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that thugs were 
used to intimidate voters, while 51% disagreed or strongly disagreed that thugs were used to 
intimidate voters. 
While thuggery at primary elections can be curtailed to a reasonable extent, the narrative is 
different in general elections where youths operate as political thugs to undermine the will of the 
people (Ajidahun, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
Table 4.1.18: Distribution of Respondents on the Use of Security Agencies to Intimidate 
Delegates 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 111 17 
 Agree 154 24 
 Neutral 127 19 
 Disagree 177 27 
 Strongly Disagree 86 13 
 Total 655 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.18 shows that 41% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that security 
agencies were used to intimidate voters, while 40% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
security agencies intimidated voters. The use of security agencies to intimidate voters has always 
generated controversies in the Nigerian political space. For example, in the 2014 governorship 
elections in Ekiti State, Captain Sogir, a military intelligence officer revealed how the military 
and other security agencies worked with a political party on the orders of the presidency to rig 
the governorship election in favour of a particular candidate and political party (Premium Times, 
2015). 
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Table 4.1.19: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Party Leaders Opposed to 
Imposition of Candidates Were Subjected to Harassment 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 136 21 
 Agree 206 31 
 Neutral 121 19 
 Disagree 114 17 
 Strongly Disagree 78 12 
 Total 655 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.19 shows that 52% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that political 
and/or party leaders who refused to accept the imposition of candidates were subjected to 
harassment or political persecution. However, 29% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
party leaders opposed to imposition were harassed or persecuted. 
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Table 4.1.20: Election Did Not Follow Due Process and Rule of Law 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 94 15 
 Agree 216 34 
 Neutral 69 11 
 Disagree 172 27 
 Strongly Disagree 80 13 
 Total 631 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.20 shows that 49% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that the primary 
elections failed to adhere to due process and the rule of law in the manner they were conducted. 
However, 40% either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the elections did not 
follow due process and rule of law. 
The reality is that neither of the parties can be exonerated from acts of electoral irregularities or 
demagoguery. However, the degree of violations and impunity differ, where PDP, from available 
data, leads all other parties. The obvious reason for the high level of impunity of the PDP was 
because it was the ruling party between 1999 and 2015, and so the battle to become the candidate 
of the ruling party was so ferocious, as being the candidate almost amounted to winning the 
election, not unmindful of the notoriety of using the Federal might to influence electoral victory.  
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Table 4.1.21: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Candidates Produced By 
Primary Elections May Not Be Based on Merit or Leadership Qualities of Candidates” 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 151 23 
 Agree 211 32 
 Neutral 54 8 
 Disagree 141 22 
 Strongly Disagree 94 14 
 Total 651 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.21 shows that 55% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that the 
candidates produced by the elections conducted were neither based on merit nor the leadership 
qualities that the candidates possessed. In other words, there were candidates that may have 
better leadership qualities who failed to emerge as the candidates of the parties because the 
demagoguery that played out at the elections. However, 36% of respondents either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that candidates produced were not based on merits or perceived leadership 
qualities of the candidates.  
The quantum number of election cases at the courts challenging the merit of the candidates of 
political parties for general elections and the judgments that have nullified the candidacy of some 
elected candidates validate the findings of this study. 
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Table 4.1.22: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Poor Leadership Can Result 
From Imposition of Candidates on the People” 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 306 47.3 
 Agree 247 38.2 
 Neutral 45 7.0 
 Disagree 31 4.8 
 Strongly Disagree 18 2.8 
 Total 647 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.22 shows that 85% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that when 
candidates are imposed on the people, the possibility of ineffective leadership would be very 
high. This shows that there is a high displeasure at the imposition of candidates on the people, 
even at the level of primary elections. Just a mere 8% either disagreed or strongly disagreement 
that imposition of candidates could result in poor or ineffective leadership.  
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Table 4.1.23: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Political Leaders Undermine 
Democracy through Imposition of Candidates and Rigging of Elections” 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 304 46.7 
 Agree 275 42.2 
 Neutral 48 7.4 
 Disagree 16 2.5 
 Strongly Disagree 8 1.2 
 Total 651 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.23 shows that 89% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that imposition 
of candidates and rigging of elections at all levels of our democracy by politicians undermine 
democracy. Only 4% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that political 
leaders undermine democracy through imposition of candidates and rigging of elections. 
Unfortunately, however, whereas politicians and other stakeholders of democracy agree that 
electoral fraud contravenes democratic principles and values, the weak democratic institutions 
and political culture of the country encourages, rather than deter, people to engage or promote 
acts of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s political scenery.  
This was the view of a respondent in one of the in-depth interviews conducted. The respondent 
explained thus: 
Some of the tricks we use in rigging elections are provided by the officials of the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Once they have been settled, they tell 
us how we can manipulate the elections successfully.  
(Party agent of a major political party in Nigeria’s general elections). 
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Table 4.1.24: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Election Rigging Is As a 
Result of Fielding Imposed Candidates for Elections” 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 226 34.9 
 Agree 267 41.2 
 Neutral 91 14.0 
 Disagree 29 4.5 
 Strongly Disagree 35 5.4 
 Total 648 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.24 shows that 76% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that when delegates 
emerge through acts of demagoguery, such as the imposition of candidates, it gives rise to the 
propensity to rig elections. This means that when candidates are fielded through flawed primary 
elections by political parties, the political parties and the beneficiaries of such election fraud will 
likely engage in more fraud or demagoguery to ensure the fielded candidates emerge as election 
winners at all costs. Only 10% of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that election 
rigging could be as a result of fielding imposed candidates for elections. 
The views of a former governorship candidate and a party leader of a major political party 
confirm the assertion that election rigging starts from the imposition of candidates. According to 
him: 
There is so much impunity in the politics of Nigeria. This is why candidates, 
irrespective of their political popularity, are imposed on the party and the people 
by politicians, believing that the votes of the people will not be the ultimate 
decider of a winner of an election, but the manipulative ability of politicians on 
the field.  
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Table 4.1.25: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Nigeria's Democracy Will Not 
Grow If There Is Imposition of Candidates and Other Forms of Electoral Malpractices” 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 397 61.5 
 Agree 189 29.3 
 Neutral 38 5.9 
 Disagree 11 1.7 
 Strongly Disagree 11 1.7 
 Total 646 100.0 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.25 shows that 91% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that election 
fraud at all levels inhibits the deepening and growth of Nigeria‘s democracy, while only 3% 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed that imposition of candidates or manipulation of elections 
would inhibit the deepening  and growth of democracy in Nigeria. This view was very well 
supported by the responses of politicians that were interviewed in the in-depth interview session. 
A politician from a North-Central state who admitted to have been involved in some of the 
undemocratic practices in elections since the advent of the Fourth Republic responded thus: 
What we are doing in Nigeria is not democracy. All that is required to win 
election is to undermine the rules of democracy using money to compromise 
voters, INEC, security agencies and other party agents who will help to rig 
elections in your favour. Every politician, except a few people like Buhari, is 
involved in this undemocratic practices. But all politicians like to benefit from it. 
They only complain when they are not the beneficiaries of the democratic 
maneuverings                          (Nigerian politician from a North-Central state). 
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Table 4.1.26: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “The Greatest Challenge to 
Democracy in Nigeria is the Abuse of Power and Disregard for Due Process and the Rule of 
Law in Democratic Activities” 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 353 54.1 
 Agree 256 39.2 
 Neutral 30 4.6 
 Disagree 10 1.5 
 Strongly Disagree 4 .6 
 Total 653 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.26 shows that a whopping 93% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that 
Nigeria‘s democracy is besieged by the undemocratic behaviour of the political class, as they 
circumvent and undermine due process and the rule of law in pursuit of their political ambitions.  
However, an insignificant number of respondents, 2%, either disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
the abuse of power and other undemocratic behaviour of the political class posed serious 
challenges to democracy in Nigeria.  
The letter written by Chief Audu Ogbeh, a former Chairman of PDP and then-ruling party to 
President Obasanjo, on the political crises generated by the activities of the political class in 
Anambra State and the failure of the President to act highlights the dangers that abuse of power 
by politicians posed and still poses to democratic survival in Nigeria (See Appendix F). 
Similarly, Obasanjo‘s resentful reply to the Chairman demonstrated his knowledge (and probably 
his approval) about the realities of unconstitutional and undemocratic political practices inherent 
in the Nigerian political context (See Appendix G).  
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The in-depth interviews conducted with respondents also confirm the results in Table 4.1.26, as 
the interviewees emphasized the high rate of impunity in the practice of democracy in Nigeria. 
For example, a respondent stated thus: 
The failure of the political class and voters to play by the rule is a great challenge 
to our democracy. It is a culture that thrives because voters demand and are 
willing to sell their votes to politicians; politicians are willing to do anything to 
emerge victorious at the polls because of the way political office affords them 
massive riches and power; underfunding of INEC makes them solicit financial 
assistance from politicians or public officers to do their work and in the process 
are compromised                                                         
(INEC electoral officer). 
 
Respondents also gave insight into how in many rural areas in Nigeria the secret ballot is often 
violated in favour of the open voting so as to facilitate the clandestine objectives of buying votes 
and the coercion of voters.  
Table 4.1.27: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Qualified and Willing 
Nigerians Avoid Politics Because of the Dangers and Maneuverings Associated with 
Democratic Politics in Nigeria” 
Responses Frequency Percent (%) 
 Strongly Agree 302 46.2 
 Agree 282 43.2 
 Neutral 32 4.9 
 Disagree 16 2.5 
 Strongly Disagree 21 3.2 
 Total 653 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4.1.27 shows that 89% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that qualified 
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and willing Nigerians stay away from politics because of the dangerous and dirty-nature of 
politics in Nigeria‘s democracy, especially in the Fourth Republic. Only 6% of the respondents 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed that there are qualified and willing Nigerians who stay 
away from politics because of the dangerous and dirty-nature of democratic politics in Nigeria.  
Responses from the in-depth interview conducted with stakeholders confirm the view that there 
are qualified and willing Nigerians who avoid politics because they consider the political terrain 
as too hazardous and unhallowed for honest people to venture into.  
 
4.2 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS (CROSS TABULATION) 
Table 4.3.1 Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Party Leaders Opposed to 
Imposition of Candidates Were Harassed” 
 
   Sex 
 Responses Male Female 
N= 655  Strongly Agree 20.6% 21.1% 
  Agree 34.0% 24.9% 
  Neutral 18.5% 18.4% 
  Disagree 14.5% 24.9% 
  Strongly Disagree 12.3% 10.8% 
Total  100.0% 100.0% 
The cross tabulation (Table 4.2.1) shows that of 655 respondents, by sex distribution, 55% male 
either strongly agreed or agreed that party leaders who opposed imposition of candidates were 
subject to harassment; 18% male were neutral and 27% male either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. However, in the case of the female, 26% either strongly agreed or agreed; 18% neutral 
and 36% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that party leaders who opposed imposition of 
candidates were subject to harassment.  
The calculated value of Chi-Square (X
2
) = 12; df = 4; p<0.05 at 0.017. This implies that there is 
a significant difference between male and female respondents regarding their views on whether 
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or not party leaders who opposed imposition were harassed by the powerful political forces. This 
is understandable from the fact that cultural factors limit the extent to which women are harassed 
when compared to men in the context of political defiance to party leadership. For instance, in 
the run-up to the 2015 general elections, even though both female and male politicians staged a 
walk out from the National Congress of the Peoples Democratic Party, majority of the 
allegations of political persecution, harassment and intimidation proceeded from the male 
politicians (Premium Times, c.2014). 
Also, age, party, and state of respondents are significantly related to views on harassment of 
party leaders opposed to imposition of candidates in a cross tabulation analysis with P-Values at 
0.002, 0.001 and .000 respectively (See Appendix K).  However, religion, marital status, 
educational level and occupation of respondents were not significant predictors of views on 
harassment of party leaders opposed to imposition of candidates in a cross tabulation analysis 
with P-Values at .104, .198, .201 and .817 respectively.  
Appendix K shows that religion, marital status, educational level, party, and state of respondents 
are significantly related to views that primary elections conducted violated due process and the 
rule of law in a cross tabulation analysis with P-Values at 0.02, 0.03, 0.002, 0.000 and 0.000 
respectively. However, age, sex and occupation of respondents were not significantly related to 
views that primary elections conducted violated due process and the rule of law.  
Appendix K shows that irrespective of the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, 
majority of the respondents believed that elections were conducted under an atmosphere of 
demagoguery ranging from intimidation, bribery, thuggery, imposition of candidates, application 
of threats and other forms of anti-democratic tendencies that undermine the integrity of 
democratic tradition.   
 
4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSES 
In order to explore and explain the relationship between a dependent variable and a number of 
independent variables or predictors, the study used the linear/standard multiple regression to 
address a variety of research questions. Multiple regression provided information about the 
model as a whole (all subscales), and the relative contribution of each of the variables that make 
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up the model (individual subscales). Thus, each independent variable was evaluated in terms of 
its predictive power, over and above that offered by all the other independent variables.  
Multicollinearity: From the standard regression analysis table (See Appendix L in the Table 
labeled ―Correlations‖), the independent variables show some appreciable relationship (above 
.3) with the dependent variable (election outcome) except for the independent variables of 
―Votes influenced by religious sentiments‖ and ―Use of security agencies to intimidate 
delegates‖ that do not correlate substantially with the outcome of primary elections (.27 and .29 
respectively). But because they are still somewhat correlated at .27 and .29, the variables are still 
retained along the other independent variables.  
Residuals Statistics: In the residual statistics table (see Appendix L), Cook‘s Distance statistical 
test was determined to check whether the possible presence of any strange case had any undue 
influence on the results of the model as a whole. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), 
cases with values larger than 1 are a potential problem. From the data, the maximum value for 
Cook‘s Distance is .018, approximately .02, suggesting no major problems. 
 
Table 4.3.1 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .481(a) .232 .223 1.240 
As shown in Table 4.4.1, the R Square is .232. Expressed as a percentage (multiply by 100, by 
shifting the decimal point two places to the right), it means that the independent variables (Use 
of security agencies to intimidate delegates, Votes influenced by religious sentiments, Votes 
influenced by leaders/mentors, Votes influenced by money, Voting process influenced by 
intimidation/fraud, Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments, Votes influenced by a combination of 
Inducement and threats) explains 23.2% of the variance election outcomes of the primaries of 
PDP and APC. The statistical significance of this result is reported in Table labeled 4.3.2. 
Table 4.3.2: ANOVA 
 
Model  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 276.348 7 39.478 25.664 .000(a) 
Residual 916.811 596 1.538   
Total 1193.159 603    
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This tests the null hypothesis that multiple R in the population equals 0. The model in this 
example reaches statistical significance (Sig = .000, this really means p<.0005). Hence, the 
independent variables significantly predict the outcome of the model. 
Table 4.3.3 tells the extent to which each of the independent variables included in the model 
contributed to the prediction of the dependent variable (election Victory). This can be deduced 
from the column labelled Beta under Standardised Coefficients. Because the goal is to compare 
the contribution of each independent variable, the beta values will be used. ‗Standardized‘ means 
that these values for each of the different variables have been converted to the same scale so that 
they can be compared. 
In this case the largest beta coefficient is .174, which is for Votes influenced by a combination of 
Inducement and threats. This means that this variable makes the strongest unique contribution to 
explaining the dependent variable, when the variance explained by all other variables in the 
model is controlled for. The Beta value for voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud was 
the next strongest (.130). Conversely, Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments and religious 
sentiments had the least Beta values (0.65 and 0.67 respectively), indicating that they made 
least of contributions. 
Table 4.3.3: Coefficients 
 
Model  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) .732 .166  4.395 .000 
Votes influenced by 
money .085 .053 .074 1.602 .110 
Votes influenced by 
leaders/ mentors .097 .053 .082 1.841 .066 
Votes influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement and threats 
.178 .050 .174 3.582 .000 
Voting process influenced 
by intimidation/ fraud .133 .048 .130 2.775 .006 
Votes influenced by 
religious seniments .068 .045 .067 1.526 .128 
Votes influenced by 
ethnic sentiments .077 .055 .065 1.415 .158 
Use of security agencies 
to intimidate delegates .107 .044 .098 2.452 .014 
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The implication of this result shows that elections outcomes, particularly for primary elections, 
are the result of a combination of acts of demagoguery. However, the degree of influence is 
highest in cases where inducements or bribes were complemented by threats to voters or where 
threats to voters were complemented by inducements. The result answers the first research 
question in this study that sought to ascertain the role that demagoguery play in the democratic 
politics of Nigeria. It is clear from the results above that to win elections in Nigeria, a 
combination of undemocratic practices, including (but not limited to) intimidation, monetary 
inducement, threats and election frauds are all instrumental features. 
Also, the results addressed the first research question and objective of this study. From the result 
above, it is obvious that demagoguery manifests through monetization of politics, inducements 
or bribery of voters and election officials, misuse of security agencies for political advantage, 
intimidation and fraud, ethnic and religious sentiments. However, the extent to which each (and 
even a combination of some) of the factors contribute to outcomes of elections vary.  
4.4 TESTING OF HYPOTHESES 
The following hypotheses were tested in this study: 
HYPOTHESIS ONE 
Alternative Hypothesis (HA): The outcome of elections in democratic contestations in Nigeria 
depends on acts of demagoguery including monetary inducement, intimidation and election fraud 
HYPOTHESIS TWO 
Alternative Hypothesis (HA): Money is the most significant factor in determining the outcome 
of elections in Nigeria 
In the light of the regression analyses performed above, the following decisions about the 
hypotheses are made. 
Hypothesis 1: The null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis accepted (retained) 
because the Sig = .000. This means that the statement that outcome of elections in democratic 
contestations in Nigeria depends on acts of demagoguery including monetary inducement, 
intimidation and election fraud is true. 
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Hypothesis 2: The null hypothesis is accepted (retained) and the alternative hypothesis rejected 
as the t-test shows a p value of .110 which is not significant at the 5% level. It may be correct, 
therefore, that money is not the most significant factor in determining the outcome of elections in 
Nigeria. 
4.5 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Demagoguery as exemplified by intimidation of candidates and voters, vote buying, bribery, 
thuggery, and other antidemocratic practices have symbolic value as part of Nigeria‘s routine 
political activities. Hence, demagogic practices are enacted democratic essentials that tend to 
reconcile the grievances of the electorates against the political class. In this sense, all the 
interviewees pointed to the situation in Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic where the electorates, having 
failed to derive the benefits of democracy from the political class in terms of improved economic 
condition for the populace and other democratic dividends that have subsequently been promised 
by politicians, see election periods as the time to demand for their own share of the national cake 
by demanding that the politicians pay for the votes they desperately seek for during elections, 
either by offering them money or other material inducements. That 73% of respondents (Table 
4.1.4) believed that money and material inducements were used for the elections substantiate the 
prominence of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democratic practice in the Fourth Republic. In fact, an 
INEC official interviewed noted that it is at the period of elections that the citizens demand for 
and can get the dividends of democracy from politicians in the form of payment for votes. 
Thus, while elections in Nigeria provide occasions for electorates to demand for their share of 
the national cake, it also provides politicians the inescapable platform to ‗surrender‘ part of their 
loots to the people that have been denied the chance to benefit from the gains of democracy 
through the profligacy of self-centred political class. A delegate, who is also a youth leader, 
emphasized that the only time politicians are ready to bring out part of their loots is at election 
periods, and so voters are mindful of that reality and thus must demand that the politicians pay 
for the votes they have to get to win elections.   
Demagoguery thus emerged at the point where there was a disconnect between the electorates 
and the political class in agreeing on the objectives and goal of democracy such that the 
electorates see political leaders, and not the populace, as the real beneficiaries of democracy, and 
politicians, seeing the hopelessness of the people towards democracy and political leaders, no 
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longer have to depend on the electorates through credible elections for the ―people‖ to elect them 
into power. While the option of monetary and material inducements is very common, there are 
cases where a combination of inducements and threats has to be used to ‗win‘ elections (Table 
4.1.8). Consequently, on one hand, the people demand for bribe, engage in all sorts of deceptions 
to gain material benefits from politicians while promising their ―one‖ vote to all the candidates 
and parties that seek their support and, on the other hand, politicians engage in all forms of 
manipulations including intimidation of voters and opponents, use of security agencies to rig 
elections or gain undue advantage over their opponents, use of thugs to foment violence and all 
sorts of election fraud to gain or retain power by foul means. These scenarios are captured in the 
responses of respondents such that 69% of respondents believed that delegates casted their votes 
on the basis of pressure and instructions from party leaders; 43% believed that threats were used 
to get votes; 51% believed that intimidation and fraud characterized the voting process; 55% 
believed that elections conducted violated democratic rules and principles; 75% believed that 
monetary inducement characterized the election. 
The role of poverty in making the citizens vulnerable to demagoguery in Nigeria‘s politics was 
also noted. Thus, 78% of respondents were of the view that poverty undermines democratic 
norms and values, as delegates seldom resist the temptation to either demand or accept bribes 
before they can cast their votes for candidates. This situation was substantiated by one of the 
interviewees who narrated his experiences when it became a struggle to make the delegate list. 
He confessed that he was in dire need of money to pay for his children‘s school fees and to feed 
his family when the delegates list for the governorship primaries was composed. He eventually 
survived the huddles and emerged as a delegate, and that the money (₦450,000) he made from 
the primary elections was what he used for the payment of his children‘s school fees. The 
demand for bribe by the electorates because of poverty and the willingness of politicians to bribe 
voters so they can win elections clearly explain the desirability of demagoguery among 
Nigerians and why the phenomenon of demagoguery seems tolerable in the Nigerian democratic 
context. It explains the social construction of demagoguery as a political reality of Nigeria‘s 
democracy, where demagoguery becomes the creation (shared knowledge and understanding 
brought into play) by the symbolic interaction between Nigeria‘s electorates and the political 
class. Hence, demagoguery as a political behaviour is guided largely by forces such as roles, 
norms and shared expectations between the general public and the political class.  
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Furthermore, democratic principles, culture and values that encourage credible, free and fair 
elections, rule of law, equality and liberty, and popular sovereignty exist as ―front regions‖ in 
which politicians act out formal roles that befit democracy and leadership. Front regions refer to 
the aspects of social life, encounters and occasions in which individuals act to demonstrate 
commitment to formal and acceptable roles or practices (Goffman, 1950). For instance, the 
average Nigerian politician engages ―on stage performances‖ by campaigning against political 
violence, vote buying, election fraud, and calls for free and fair elections on the basis of ―one-
man-one-vote.‖ Maintaining such front stage disposition by politicians shows the knowledge of 
the existence and expression of democratic ethos and values, even though politicians are not 
willing to leave their political destiny to the people based on established and globally acceptable 
democratic ethos. Hence, politicians resort to the ―back regions‖ (condemnable practices and 
encounters that must be off public knowledge or view) where they can undermine the ethos, 
norms and values of democracy to achieve their political ambition, such that whereas they 
publicly condemn acts of demagoguery and speak against antidemocratic tendencies and 
practices such as intimidation, bribery, violence and election fraud (front region tactics), they 
actually are the culprit of sponsoring and engaging in all sorts of anti-democratic practices 
(demagoguery) to ensure they either gain or retain power or political advantage by all means 
(even when the people do not want them). 
This study has explored how democracy in Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic has been subjected to 
various acts of duplicitous and fraudulent practices (demagoguery) that undermine the principles 
and values of democracy. These acts of demagoguery, whether it is blackmail of political 
opponents, phony voter registrations, illegal voting, ballot box stuffing, intimidation of voters, 
bribery, et cetera, occur in every part of Nigeria. Unfortunately, the study shows that 
demagoguery is part of the political culture of Nigeria and Nigerians, especially as candidates 
and voters have come to accept the political culture. This study reveals that demagoguery in 
Nigeria‘s democratic politics has been embraced by the Nigerian people as a political culture. 
Thus, the attitudes and habits of the average Nigerian citizens, not just the political actors, 
consider politics as a venture that requires little or no moral uprightness. Thus, bribery, thuguery, 
intimidation of voters, election rigging, and all sorts of anti-democratic behaviours are necessary 
evils that politicians and even voters subscribe to in the course of participating in politics. These 
political realities of democratic practices in Nigeria make it difficult for the deepening of 
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democratic values and practices. 
A major finding of this study is the observation that election outcomes are not reflections of free, 
fair and credible elections or democratic process, but are the outcome of a constellation of 
demagogic factors such as monetary inducement, intimidation, the use of security agencies and 
thugs to disrupt or manipulate democratic processes or outcomes, and election fraud. That is to 
say, no single variable or factor can be said to be solely responsible for the democratic 
irregularities; instead, politicians have to engage in two or more forms of demagoguery for any 
hope of succeeding at the polls. Even incumbency factor must be complemented by inducements 
or bribery, intimidation, et cetera for any chance of electoral victory to be guaranteed. For the 
contestants who may not have access to the coercive force of the State (security agencies), and 
may have reasoned that the democratic process was compromised, with fraudulent outcomes, 
they may react to such irregularities with violence. This possibly explains the incidences of 
election violence experienced in Nigeria before, during and after elections, as candidates and 
political parties normally call on their supporters and followers to ―defend their votes‖, ―defend 
yourself‖, ―fight for your rights‖, ―resist rigging‖ among other violence-implied instructions to 
their supporters 
Contrary to the idea that money determines electoral success in Nigeria, the study established 
that although money is a necessary factor, it is not a sufficient factor for electoral success. That 
is, money cannot do much in isolation of other variables or factors such as intimidation, use of 
security agencies to aid election rigging and deliberate actions of thugs and security agencies to 
disenfranchise the citizens and thereby subject elections to fraud and fictitious figures. Whereas 
it is difficult for a politician to actualize his or her political ambition without being rich, which 
probably explains the fact that political battles are only open to the rich in the Nigerian society, 
those who lose elections or are rigged out in election contests are also very rich people. For 
example, Atiku Abubakar who was the former Vice-President of Nigeria had all the money to 
prosecute both the primary election in the PDP and the main election in the Action Congress in 
the 2007 presidential elections. But he was intimidated and finally expelled from the PDP by his 
principal, Olusegun Obasanjo both in PDP and in the general elections where elections were 
massively rigged using State agencies (National Democratic Institute, 2007). 
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From this study, it becomes clear that while the religious and ethnic affiliations of candidates 
may be crucial at the primary elections of the political parties, they do not constitute important 
factors in the general elections. Thus, the political elites have adopted the principle of ―power 
rotation‖ among ethnic groups and religious affiliations to address the potential tensions that 
ethnicity and religion can generate in Nigeria‘s political affairs. The fact that President Goodluck 
Jonathan, a Christian from a minority tribe, won the 2011 presidential election substantiates this 
view. The same reason can be adduced for the elections of Olusegun Obasanjo and Umaru 
Yar‘dua, where votes defied ethnic and religious sentiments. However, politicians use religious 
and ethnic chauvinisms as tools to undermine democratic tenets, and in some cases incite 
political crises.  
In terms of locality, the study shows that while election fraud is mostly experienced in the rural 
areas of Nigeria due to little or no media coverage and absence of independent election 
observers, more technical and sophisticated frauds are obtainable in urban areas where the 
independent and international election observers are represented. This situation is the reverse in 
the United States of America where it has been noted that election fraud is most found in urban 
areas (Fund, 2008). 
Political parties, apparently controlled by the political class, stage-manage and authorize 
guidelines that disenfranchise qualified Nigerians and party members from participating in the 
democratic process or limit the possibilities of members to exercise their democratic rights. 
Hence, the high cost of nomination forms for aspirants, the charade of disqualification of 
aspirants by political parties on flimsy and unsubstantiated allegations of ―party disloyalty‖ 
represent demagoguery activities aimed at artificially preventing qualified Nigerians from 
exercising their democratic rights and constitutional rights.  This practice violates the code of 
conduct signed by political parties in Nigeria (See Appendix C) that says ―every political party 
shall provide equal opportunity to qualified persons to participate in electoral activities.‖ 
The transaction that happens between the political class and the people in the form of cash-for-
votes, intimidation of and violence against political opponents, the bribery of electoral officers, 
and the compromise of security agencies are some of the acts of demagoguery that are common 
features that undermine the sanctity of democratic principles and practices in Nigeria.  
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 The political class, taking advantage of a papaurized citizens and their political paraphenalia, 
undermines and bully the rules of democracy and consequently assume an undue amount of 
power over democratic institutions and the people.  The Speaker of Nigeria‘s House of 
representatives put it thus: ―The greatest problem why democracy is facing serious threat in 
Africa is because of poverty. The poor man does not engage in democracy, he doesn‘t have the 
tools and so is excluded from the joys of democracy‖ (Saturday Telegraph, 28th Nov. 2015, p.7). 
Importantly also, the study provides an understanding of the ‗game of deceit‘ between the 
political class and the electorates. While the political or ruling elites engage in bogus and 
unrealistic campaign promises to deceive the electorates, the electorates insist on being given 
money or material inducements for votes. The demand for bribe by the electorates is extended to 
all ‗vote seekers‘ (candidates for elections) whether or not they actually would vote for the 
candidate(s). For them, this is one way of benefiting from the politicians who after winning 
elections characterstically disappear from the people and the community until the next election 
when they will return seeking the votes of the people once more. What this means is that: 
demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democratic politics is not exclusive to the ruling class but also a 
pheomenon that is attribute-able to the electorates.  
4.5.1 WAYS IN WHICH DEMAGOGUERY MANIFESTS IN NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY 
The study investigated the various types of conduct and acts of demagoguery which adversely 
affect the practice of democracy in Nigeria and how they manifest.  The findings show that 
demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democracy manifests in the following ways. 
Imposition of Candidates: it remains a common practice in Nigeria‘s democracy for powerful 
politician(s) to impose candidates on political parties as flag bearers in the general elections, with 
little or no recourse to internal party democratic procedures. Hence, the study clearly reveals that 
imposition of candidates was a pervasive phenomenon among the political parties, although the 
figures from respondents show that it was more pronounced in the PDP than in the APC. For 
instance, a PDP stalwart and former spokesperson to late President Yar‘Adua confirms this fact 
when he noted that: 
Obasanjo practically made Yar‘Adua president of Nigeria—from foisting him on 
the party to running the campaign almost all by himself 
 (Adeniyi Olusegun, 2011) 
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Vote buying: this involves the practice whereby candidates for elections and their sponsors pay 
voters to register to vote or to participate in elections. The findings of this study show that there 
is a demand and supply relationship between voters and candidates standing for elections where 
voters demand for monetary inducement from candidates who want to get their votes. In some 
cases, the candidates exchange their voters‘ cards for money paid by the candidates or their 
supporters so the cards can be kept in the custody of the buyers until the day of the elections 
when they will be returned to the card owners to vote as agreed on the basis of the transactions.   
A respondent in an in-depth interview session who was an official the electoral body (INEC) 
explained his experience at the 2015 polls in a South Western State thus: 
In the 2015 governorship election, due to low turnout of voters, there were many ballot 
papers that were left. The political party agents agreed that the ballot papers be shared 
among the political parties. After that was done, the smaller political party agents sold their 
share of the ballot papers to the highest bidder from the two major contenders in the 
election (that is, PDP and APC). 
Voter intimidation/Violence: this consists of actions aimed at preventing a voter or voters from 
participating in an election or compelling a voter to participate in such an election through 
psychological and/or physical threats or other forms of coercion or hostility. This study shows 
that voter intimidation is a major way that demagoguery manifests in the democratic politics of 
Nigeria (see Appendix M).  
Voter registration fraud: this undemocratic act of demagoguery can take several forms, 
including: giving false information concerning a person‘s age, name or address in order to 
establish that person‘s eligibility to register or to vote in an election; cloning of voters‘ cards and 
production of fake ballot papers; submitting fictitious names on voters registration rolls thus 
qualifying ostensive voters to vote in an election; double or multiple registration by voters; et 
cetera.  
Ballot box stuffing and illegal voting: according to Dosanto (2008), illegal voting involves the 
practice of voting in an election on behalf of individuals who do not personally participate in, 
and assent to, the act of voting attributed to them. Also, ballot box stuffing, which consists of the 
practice of diluting valid ballots with fake or invalid ballots, has been identified as one of the 
ways demagoguery plays out in Nigeria‘s democracy. This study shows that illegal voting and 
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ballot box stuffing are prominent features in elections in Nigeria such that Election Tribunal 
judgments from across the states of the country have established cases of illegal voting and ballot 
stuffing by persons and political parties. In the 2003 and 2007 elections involving Anambra, 
Edo, Ekiti, Ondo and Osun States, the Tribunals and Courts have had to resort to mathematical 
appraisals to return victories to candidates that had been declared losers in the elections that they 
were the actual winners (Ofeimun, 2010).  
For example, a soldier who serves in Lagos, but was deployed to a South-South state for election 
duties narrated how they were induced and instructed to thumb-print ballot papers in favour a 
political party. This was how he put it. 
We were taken to a place where we saw so many ballot papers. Soldiers protected 
the place from any civilian intruder. We thumb-printed the ballot papers until we 
became tired, but we had to finish the job. That was how the candidates we 
worked for won their elections.  
Some of the more common ways these irregularities and crimes are committed includes the use 
of fictitious names on the voter registers, migratory voting schemes, casting of bogus votes as a 
way of making up for absentee voters, deliberate and forceful invalidation of validly casted 
votes, signature fraud and falsification of vote counts.  
4.5.2 FACTORS THAT MAKE DEMAGOGUERY THRIVE IN THE DEMOCRATIC 
POLITICS OF NIGERIA 
From the data provided, it is clear that the factors that give rise to acts of demagoguery or make 
engaging in various acts of demagoguery by political actors thrive include: high level of poverty 
which makes the political class to bribe voters and induce security agencies to intimidate 
uncompromising voters; the notion that demagoguery is part of the game makes it tolerable to all 
stakeholders in the democratic theatre; the slow nature of addressing electoral flaws in political 
and electoral disputes and the low rate of prosecution of electoral offenders are some key reasons 
adduced for the attractiveness of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democracy, particularly in the Fourth 
Republic. 
Poverty makes voters to sell their votes for money. Typically, voters are provided with sachet 
(‗pure‘) water and snacks to eat with the promise to be paid between ―₦500 and₦1000‖ as 
reward for voting a candidate. The findings of the study show that it is an explicably pervasive 
practice by politicians such that the practice is considered as ―part of the game‖ especially that 
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the voters demand for it. Thus, poverty makes the average Nigerian voter to see elections as 
means of making money from politicians whom they rightly consider as self-serving individuals, 
who after winning elections, turn their backs at the electorates until another election period. The 
finding that huge monetary inducement was a prominent practice at political parties‘ primary 
elections was confirmed by the report from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) which reveals how the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) paid the sum of 
ten billion naira (N10b) to politicians to facilitate the bribery of delegate for the 2015 
presidential primary election of the PDP. This information was also contained in the following 
charges brought against the suspects in the Court.  
That you Col. Mohammed Sambo Dasuki whilst being National Security Adviser and 
Shaibu Salisu, whilst being the Director of Finance and Administration in the Office of the 
National Security Adviser and Hon. Waripamowei Dudafa (now at large) whilst bring 
Senior Special Assistant, Domestic Affairs to the President on or about 27th November 
within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court entrusted with dominion over certain 
properties to wit: the sum of N10billion being part of the funds in the account of the 
National Security Adviser with the CBN, the equivalent of which sum you received from 
the CBN in foreign currencies to wit: $47million and €5.6million Euros committed 
criminal breach of trust in respect of the said property when you claimed to have 
distributed same to the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Presidential Primary Election 
delegates and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 315 of the Penal 
Code Act, Cap 532, Vol.4, LFN 2004. (The Nation, December 11, 2015). 
Ignorance and lack of education were also identified as reasons that make demagoguery thrive in 
Nigeria. The voters do not care about who emerges as their leaders in so far as they are offered 
bribes for votes. The candidates or politicians generally take advantage of this situation to 
engage in all sorts of irregularities to gain or retain power during elections. Thus, the democratic 
rights of voters are either ignorantly sacrificed at the altar of pecuniary gains or misplaced due to 
lack of sufficient knowledge on how to insist on their democratic and constitutional rights. Also, 
voters are sometimes kept in the dark as regard vital information that would enable them perform 
their constitutional rights. For example, in the 2007 National Democratic Institute report on 
elections in Nigeria, it was clearly noted that: 
INEC did not begin publicizing details of how polling would be organized until 
April 8. Prior to this, INEC officials made contradictory statements about whether 
voting would be a day-long process or would follow the “June 12 formula,” with 
initial accreditation and returning to vote at a specific, limited time. INEC initially 
stated that results would be relayed electronically from the individual polling 
stations to three points simultaneously: the ward level, the constituency level and 
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INEC’s national headquarters in Abuja. However, as results would not be 
compiled by local government area or state, observers worried about how to 
independently confirm that gubernatorial and presidential candidates received the 
geographical spread of votes required by Nigeria’s legal framework (NDI, 2007). 
The judicial system in Nigeria seems to treat election irregularities or malpractices with kids‘ 
glove. For example, out of the 36 States that elections were conducted in 2007, 5 States‘ 
elections were successfully upturned by the Tribunals and Courts. However, no one was 
prosecuted or jailed for such heinous crime of stealing the votes of the people and foisting 
‗leaders‘ that were not the choices of the people on them. So, obviously, there exist little or no 
strict sanctions that will deter politicians and voters from engaging in all sorts of electoral 
irregularities or demagoguery (See Appendixes D, E and M).  
4.5.3 THE ROLE OF DEMAGOGUERY IN NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY  
One of the objectives of this study was to examine the role of demagoguery in Nigeria‘s 
democracy in the Fourth Republic. The results and findings emanating from the study and 
available literature clearly show that demagoguery plays a major role in Nigeria‘s democracy. 
The role played by demagoguery includes disenfranchisement of eligible contestants and voters 
from participating in the democratic process; corruption of the election process and election 
fraud, and fraudulent declaration of winners of elections. It is important to note that these 
findings substantiate the narratives of Donald Duke, a former governor of Cross Rivers State, on 
how politicians connive with INEC to rig elections in Nigeria. It tells of the fact that the Nigerian 
political culture is such that the political stakeholders not only accept pecuniary incentives for 
their political actions and decisions, they indeed consider pecuniary demands as a transactional 
feature of political behaviour. 
Precisely in July 2010, Donald Duke, a former governor of a state from the South-South 
geopolitical zone of Nigeria, provided a detailed account of how powerful politicians, 
particularly governors, rig elections (Cpafrica, 2010). This was what he said: 
After the courtesy call, the Resident Electoral Commissioner now moves in for one-on-one 
with the governor and he says: ‗Your Excellency, since I came, I‘ve been staying in this 
hotel, there is no accommodation for me and even my vehicle is broken down and the last 
commissioner didn‘t leave the vehicle; so help me to settle down quickly.‘ And the 
governor says, ‗Chief of Staff, where is the Chief of Staff? And the Chief of Staff appears. 
Governor says: ―Please ensure that the REC is accommodated; put him in the presidential 
lodge, allot two cars to him. I give you seven days to get this done. Then the relationship 
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has started. The governor now turns round and says: ‗call me the party chairman.‘ The 
party chairman appears and the governor says: ‗INEC requires 50,000 people for the 
conduct of the elections. See to it that we meet their needs.‘ The chairman goes and airs in 
the evening on radio and television: ‗There will be an urgent meeting of all local 
government chairmen and secretaries of XYZ party at the headquarters. They should report 
promptly at 10am because matters of urgent interest will be discussed.‘ End of 
announcement. Now we have texts messages, so it‘s easier, in no time everybody is here.‖ 
―There is not a polling booth that is more than 500. So only 200 people appear here, 300 
there, 100 there, 50 there, 400 there. At the end of elections what happens? The presiding 
officer sits down and calls a few guys and says, ‗hey, there are a few hundred papers here, 
let‘s thumb print. This is the real election. Well, this is not a PDP thing. I am not here to 
castigate the PDP; it‘s a Nigerian thing. This process may sound comical and jovial, it 
happens throughout the country. Whether it‘s Action Congress or All Progressives Grand 
Alliance (APGA), it‘s the same thing. We are all the same. They start thumb printing. 
Some are overzealous. So, at the end of the day, you find that votes are more than the 
number of people that were registered to vote (ThisDay, 2010). 
This study establishes that acts of demagoguery are commonplace in Nigeria‘s democracy. 
Politicians recognize, but violate, relevant laws that guide democratic practice. This is because, 
the perception of the average politician in Nigeria is that, to be successful in politics one must 
subscribe to the Machiavellian rules of politics that understand political success as the ‗end 
justifies the means‘. This Machiavellian politics, intolerant opposition, leads to a situation IN 
which opposition as an important feature of democracy cowed using all tools of demagoguery to 
intimidate and denigrate its members. This corroborates the views of Onyeonoru and Kester 
(2007) that Nigerian democratic leaders have failed to appreciate the role of opposing views, and 
thus react to opposition with hostility.  
Furthermore, success in the politics of Nigeria substantially depends on the willingness and 
ability of contestants to outwit one another in the series of political schemes in all the processes 
involved before, during and after elections. These include the willingness to ―settle‖ or bribe 
stakeholders for endorsements (and possibly engineer the exclusion of capable opponents 
through suspension, disqualification or expulsion), manufacturing of fictitious allegations with 
the goal of intimidating, harassing and orchestrating the arrest of formidable political opponents, 
ability to compromise security agencies to intimidate, harass and arrest perceived enemies or 
those opposed to their political ambition, ability to compromise election officials to act in their 
favour against the acceptable standard contained in the electoral act, use of thugs and security 
agencies to disrupt voting in areas considered to be their opponents‘ stronghold, falsification of 
election votes to award phantom victories, application of force on election officials to declare 
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falsified results, et cetera.  
The findings of the study revealed that even the politicians who may publicly appeal to their 
followers and supporters to shun acts of demagoguery and other vices that comprise the 
credibility of democracy secretly encourage and/or fund the acts of criminalities because they 
believe that their electoral victories largely depend on demagoguery. This finding substantiate 
the argument of Bottomore (1993) that in some democracies around the world, political actors 
who control the ultimate power of direct physical coercion have the utmost influence and 
chances of success at political contestations.  
4.5.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEMAGOGUERY ON DEMOCRACY AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 
This study has revealed certain implications that demagoguery has on democracy and good 
governance in Nigeria. These implications are discussed as follows. 
i. Trickery: the findings of the study show that both the political elites and the people of 
Nigeria engage in reciprocal deception in the country‘s democratic politics. Thus, during 
electioneering campaigns, while the political elites and/or contending candidates appeal 
to the electorates for votes with ―unrealistic‖ campaign promises, the people or 
electorates demand for inducements as a precondition for casting their votes for 
candidates for elections. The people believed that politicians were not sincere in fulfilling 
their campaign promises and that they seek political power for personal gains as against 
public service, and as such should ‗pay‘ for the votes they seek for. They collect money 
from all the contestants, even though they can only vote for a single candidate for an 
office, as they consider such act as the only way to benefit from politicians and the 
country‘s democracy. The consequence is that political deceit as a tool of demagoguery is 
not only employed by the political elites and election contestants, but also adopted by the 
electorates and the Nigerian people as a means of getting back at politicians and 
benefiting from politics. Individuals and groups pledge support and allegiance to election 
contestants with a view to extorting money from politicians rather than commitment to 
the ideas and competence of the contestants. 
ii. Election fraud: whether it is at the level of party primary elections or the general 
elections, the data available from this study highlight the pervasiveness of election fraud. 
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The absence of level playing ground for contestants, intimidation of voters and 
candidates, illegal voting, compromise and partisanship of electoral officers, delay or 
denial of justice at the election tribunals and courts, and all other forms of demagoguery 
result in the failure of elections to reflect the will of the people. This finding confirms the 
conclusion by Adebayo (2015) that fear and perceived election malpractices were a major 
reason for voter apathy in Nigeria‘s democracy. For instance, in the report of the EU 
Election observation Mission for the 2007 general elections, headed by Max van den 
Berg, the reality of elections in Nigeria was reported thus: 
―The elections were marred by very poor organization; lack of essential 
transparency, widespread and procedural irregularities, substantial evidence of 
fraud; widespread voter disenfranchisement; lack of equal conditions for political 
parties and candidates; and numerous incidents of violence.‖ 
 
Despite this submission by the reputable election monitoring and observer body and the 
admittance by the chief beneficiary of the election (that is, Yar‘Adua), the supreme court, in its 
characteristic manner since the advent of the Fourth Republic, upheld the 2007 election. 
iii. Lack of Confidence in Democracy: the failure of political stakeholders in Nigeria to 
strictly adhere to due process and the rule of law in the pursuit and support of political 
ambitions have made the people to view democratic government and governance in 
Nigeria as a mere political nomenclature and a façade that has only rebranded 
dictatorship. This situation is worsened by the generally held belief by Nigerians that 
democratic governance in Nigeria has failed to improve the livelihood of the common 
people (Ake, 2008; Achebe, 2012; Gberevbie, 2014; Egharevba and Chiazor, 2013). 
iv. Disenfranchisements: as a result of the monetization of politics and the discrimination of 
political parties towards its members, the political terrain and behaviour prevent qualified 
and willing Nigerians from participating in politics in Nigeria. The result is that politics 
becomes the exclusive business of the rich elites and the unprincipled members of the 
society (Simbine, 2004; Ofeimun, 2010; Urim, Imhonopi and Ojukwu, 2013). For 
instance, the extremely outrageous cost of nomination forms by the major political parties 
in Nigeria is a testament to the idea that to be involved in political contestations in 
Nigeria, aspirants must be very rich. Similarly, the pervasive realities of intimidation, 
fraud, bribery, and the harassment of political opponents make the democratic landscape 
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unapproachable for principled, honest and qualified Nigerians who would have been part 
of the democratic politics of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic. 
v. Democracy as theatre of war: as the study shows, the pervasive demagoguery that 
characterizes democratic practice in Nigeria has made campaigns, electioneering 
processes and elections as periods of violent rivalries among political opponents where 
political thugs, arm-wielding security agencies and voters engage one another in clashes, 
leading to various degrees of injuries and in some cases, deaths of innocent citizens (See 
Appendix M). This fact also confirms the position of General Muhammadu Buhari on the 
2007 general elections (See Appendix H) that: 
In general, money and other inducements were unashamedly used to influence 
voter behaviour in areas where the elections had taken place, while thugs and 
elements in the security forces were employed to intimidate, maim or even kill 
voters. 
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), after carrying out an extensively detailed 
investigation based on petitions from individuals and groups about the rate of violence, killings 
and other forms of demagoguery being perpetrated by politicians and their supporters prior to the 
2015 general elections, confirmed the allegations in the commission‘s report with evidence of 58 
deaths recorded from pre-election cases (Ibeh, 2015). 
This situation poses great threats to Nigeria‘s democracy because genuine democracy, wherever 
they exist, emphasizes ―real competition and effective participation‖ that allow qualified citizens 
to exercise their political and democratic rights without artificial barriers resulting from such 
factors as intimidation and repression (Dahl, 1971; Diouf, 1998).  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the conclusion emerging from the study in the light of the research 
questions and the objectives that informed the study. Consequent upon the findings of the study, 
some recommendations are made to address critical issues raised in the study.   
5.1 CONCLUSION 
The main findings of this study are that Nigeria‘s political leaders in the democratic dispensation 
in the Fourth Republic are not the making of the ―people‖ as they do not emerge from 
established and acceptable democratic processes and practices, and that election outcomes do not 
reflect free, fair and credible elections, but are the outcome of a constellation of acts of 
demagoguery including monetary and material inducements, intimidation, violence, use of 
security agencies and thugs to manipulate election outcomes and election fraud. Consequently, 
the acts of demagoguery that take place in the Nigerian democratic space are a socio-political 
reality that the political class and the electorates have come to accept as a political norm. That is 
to say, because of the high level of poverty and the failure of political leaders to serve the interest 
of the populace, there is an equilibrium situation in which the demand and supply for monetary 
and material inducements are equal, such that while politicians deploy every resource at their 
disposal to undermine the electoral process and election outcomes, the Nigerian electorates also 
demand for such resources as inducements before they can cast their votes for politicians of their 
choice. Therefore, as politicians envision their political success in their ability to circumvent or 
muscle democratic rules to their favour, the electorates and members of the society are willing 
tools ready to serve the interest of the politicians in reciprocal (give-and-take) relationship. This 
relationship means that the legitimacy of acquiring political power is secondary to the reality of 
its trappings and the spoils of ‗victory‘.  Democratic politics in Nigeria is tailored to the 
‗Nigerian culture.‘ This culture involves monetized and belligerent politics. It embraces the 
Machiavellian model of politics where the end justifies the means.  To be a success in 
democratic politics of Nigeria, one need not be so educated; need not be eloquent; need not be 
knowledgeable about the issues that trouble the Nigerian people; need not be godly or goodly; he 
or she necessarily has to be rich and/or ruthless.  It will require ‗goodluck‘ or more to achieve 
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success politically in Nigeria‘s fourth republic without being ‗cultured‘ the Nigerian way 
politically.  
The demagoguery in Nigerian democracy can best be described by the theory of symbolic 
interactionism. Symbolic interactionism emphasizes the idea that every society is nothing more 
than the shared reality that folks construct as they interact with one another. This approach sees 
people interacting in countless settings using symbolic communications to accomplish the tasks 
at hand, including electing or selecting their leaders.  
With regard to elections in Nigeria, the findings of this study show that Nigerian electorates, 
politicians and every Nigerian seem to understand that bribery, thuggery, blackmail, and all sorts 
of antidemocratic activities are against the constitution and other relevant laws of Nigeria but 
they identify and most times engage in these practices as political norms that are unavoidable in 
the theatre of Nigerian politics.  Thus, the behaviour of politicians and voters is based on what 
they believe, arising from the interactions of political actors, rather than what the relevant laws 
of the country stipulate about politics and politicking. Thus, for the political class and the 
electorates, demagoguery is mastery of politics so that the politician who masters the acts of 
demagoguery and succeeds politically is revered by the Nigerian people. Thus, we have political 
demagogues that have earned the nicknames of ―Mr. Fix IT!‖, ―Mr. Sabi‖, ―Iroko‖, ―godfather‖, 
etc., etc. all implying praises for politicians who have, at one point or the other, undermined 
democratic tenets in either imposing themselves or their cronies on the people.  
The consequence of this is that the symbolic meaning of demagoguery or demagogic activities in 
the democratic politics of Nigeria overrides the actual facts regarding demagoguery and all the 
risks associated with it as contained in the constitution, the electoral act and other relevant laws 
of the country that discourage, prohibit and punish undemocratic or demagogic actions of 
political actors. Also, electoral malpractices have become collective experience that is so 
endemic for which ―all efforts to combat it are superficial compared with the real interests that 
sustain it.‖ (Smith, 2007: 228). This fact was confirmed by no other than the immediate past 
Chairman of Nigeria‘s electoral body, Professor Attahiru Jega, when he stressed that the only 
reason the card reader (a technology intended to curb electoral malpractice of double voting) 
would not work in Nigeria is because of the interest and roles of politicians to frustrate the 
process (Jumoke, 2014).  
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This study thus shows that demagoguery represents some very fundamental aspects of 
politicians‘ social experiences and political identities which can be understood through the lens 
of symbolic interactionism. The high rate of violence, thuggery, bribery and intimidations 
associated with electoral campaigns and contests, coupled with the high rate of subscription to 
these undemocratic practices by majority, if not all, the political actors reveal the significance of 
demagoguery as a prerequisite for democratic politics in Nigeria‘s fourth republic. This finding 
gives credence to Schedler‘s conclusion about democracy that: 
Democratic norms are not perfectly realized anywhere, even in advanced 
democracies. Access to the electoral arena always has a cost and is ever perfectly 
equal; the scopes and jurisdiction of elective offices are everywhere limited; 
electoral institutions invariably discriminate against somebody inside or outside 
the party system; and democratic politics is never quite sovereign but always 
subject to societal as well as constitutional constraints…There is much room for 
nuance and ambivalence …[and] bending and circumventing the rules may 
sometimes be considered ―part of the game                                  (Schedler, 2002). 
 
This study also confirms that the fact that because demagoguery or manipulating the democratic 
process has become an acceptable part of the game of politics, it is seldom the case that culprits 
of election fraud or antidemocratic practices are seriously sanctioned. This position concurs with 
the findings of Smith (2007) on why the fight against corruption in Nigeria is normally subject to 
political interpretation. He explained that because corruption is a popular practice or culture in 
the way most Nigerian politicians function, it becomes normally alarming to see selective 
victimization, when in fact both the prosecutors and the prosecuted and the judges are all not 
excusable from corrupt practices. He sums it up thus: 
When politicians and government officials benefit so handsomely from 
corruption, it is small wonder that their anticorruption initiative have little 
bite…people accused of spectacular scams frequently remain in office with no 
obvious consequences (Smith, 2007: 228). 
Bailey (2008: 89) also affirmed that politicians and their supporters base the decision to engage 
in demagoguery or election fraud on a cost-benefit analysis, such that ―in order for fraud to be 
worthwhile, its expected benefit must exceed its expected cost.‖ This explains why demagoguery 
thrives in Nigeria‘s democracy, as there are little or no harsh sanctions for individuals who 
subvert the rules and ideals of democracy.   
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Also, there is the possibility and inevitable responsibility of all stakeholders in the democratic 
project of Nigeria to build strong democratic institutions that will make it nearly impossible for 
demagoguery to survive, dominate and thrive in the country. These democratic institutions 
include the Judiciary, Independent Electoral Commission, free press/media, constitutional 
government, among others.   
 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this study inform the following recommendations that highlight the importance 
of addressing the problem of poverty, voter education, strict and impartial implementation of 
sanctions against offenders and the need for constitutional amendment to protect the democratic 
rights of citizens against the impunity of democratic institutions, including political parties, the 
courts and the media. 
For democracy to thrive in Nigeria, the political leaders must engender creative ideas and robust 
strategies that will address poverty by generating employment for the masses of Nigerians who 
are currently the agents or tools of demagoguery as well as vulnerable to inducements because of 
the poverty they experience in their daily lives. Also, there has to be a massive, nationwide 
education of the Nigerian people about the essence of democracy and the disadvantages or 
destabilizing roles of normalizing practices that imply aberration to democracy. This is vital 
because, for an average Nigerian politician and voter, electoral offences are understandably 
normal and expected such that ―everyone‖ and ―all politicians‖ engage in it in one way or the 
other. Thus, the attitudes of actors (politicians and their supporters) reflect those of the survival 
of the fittest in the battle of wits, indeed demagoguery. Nigerian politicians and electorates must 
learn and appreciate the mores of democracy by a deliberate national programme of civic 
education in both formal and non-formal educational institutions.  
Political parties must evolve objective procedures for selecting candidates that will be open, 
transparent and democratic by allowing INEC to have legal responsibility to supervise and 
authenticate primaries of political parties to ensure that aspirants seeking nominations do not use 
bribery, intimidation, threat or violence to gain nomination.  
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The need to strictly apply relevant sanctions as prescribed by relevant laws including those of the 
electoral act to deal with violators of the electoral act and other forms of malpractices cannot be 
over-emphasized. The security agencies should arrest and prosecute offenders without fear or 
favour. Nigerians do not fear the law because the law is weak in sanctions! The law surrenders to 
might, the might of the demagogues.  
As shown in this study, politicians as well as the electorates consider demagoguery (i.e., all 
forms of aberrations relating to democratic politics) as part of the game, nay, a necessary evil 
that will not attract serious sanctions. Hence, a major recommendation is that offenders, 
irrespective of their status in society, must be speedily prosecuted and dealt with according to the 
relevant laws of the country. This is how to deter demagoguery in the democratic politics of 
Nigeria.  
Also, in order to safeguard the democratic rights of party members, it is highly recommended 
that there should be a constitutional amendment that clearly states the conditions under which a 
member of a political party can be disqualified from exercising his or her democratic rights of 
aspiring to be a candidate of his party for an election. This will prevent the current trend in which 
the political parties are used as tools to scuttle the political ambitions of constitutionally qualified 
Nigerians from contesting elections as the case was with Ararume versus the Peoples Democratic 
Party in 2007, in which case, the candidate confirmed by the court as the authentic PDP flag 
bearer was dropped by the party on the basis that Ararume was disloyal to the party leadership 
by not accepting to be substituted for the defeated, but preferred, candidate of the party 
leadership.   
Finally, because of the reprehensible roles of political parties and their leaders in 
disenfranchising aspirants or candidates and serving as available tools of demagogues‘ 
imposition of candidates, it is suggested that the current electoral act that empowers political 
parties to present the names of their candidates either through primary election or party 
nomination must be repealed in favour of credible, INEC-monitored primary elections. 
Democracy can be free of demagoguery and thus grow to full maturity in the context of popular 
sovereignty, free, fair and credible elections, liberty, respect for human rights, accountability of 
political leadership and strong democratic institutions when the citizens of Nigeria, the leaders 
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and followers, imbibe democratic cultures and mores, while individually and collectively 
resisting the lures of inducements to circumvent democratic values and standards. 
 
5.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This study has contributed to the body of knowledge in the area of democracy with particular 
focus on the role of demagoguery in the practice of democracy in Nigeria. Specifically, the study 
has contributed to knowledge in the following ways: 
1. Demagoguery is a major problem that undermines and threatens democratic practice in 
Nigeria‘s Fourth Republic. 
2. The impact of demagoguery on democracy is massive and quite significant in 
determining the outcome of democratic elections in Nigeria. 
3. Engaging in demagoguery in Nigeria‘s democratic politics is pervasive and considered as 
a political norm, making it possible for political stakeholders to engage in one form or the 
other without fear of being sanctioned; especially that electoral victory depends on such 
practices (bribery, threats, intimidation, manipulation/falsification of election results, 
ballot snatching, et cetera), and all political parties are involved, although in varied 
degrees. 
4. The study presents Nigerian-specific types of demagoguery as different from what may 
be applicable in other political climes and advances reasons why some qualified and 
willing citizens avoid politics in Nigeria. 
 
5.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study opens up new areas for further research. Importantly, studies need to be carried 
out to ascertain the role and impact of demagoguery on Nigeria‘s democratic institutions 
generally, and Security agencies and the Judiciary, particularly. This will help enlighten 
relevant democratic stakeholders on the constraints that impede the performances of the 
institutions and consequences for democratic survival, deepening and sustainability.  
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APPENDIX A 
STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF 2015 
GOVERNORSHIP/PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 
 
 
                                                         Department of Sociology 
                                                                                      College of Business and Social    Sciences 
                                                           Covenant University, Ota 
                                     Ogun State. 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am a PhD student of Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State. I am undertaking a research titled: 
A Sociological Study of Demagoguery in the Democratic Governance of Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic. Kindly answer the following questions honestly. Information given will be treated 
with utmost confidentiality and will only be used for academic purposes. 
(The term demagoguery refers to the use of resources and political might to act 
unconstitutionally and/or illegally to undermine democratic norms, principles and culture 
in the quest to either attain power or gain political advantage.) 
 
 SECTION A: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1. Sex: Male (  )           Female (  ) 
2. Age: ………………………………. 
3. Religion: Christianity ( ) Islam (  )  Traditional (  ) Other (please specify)…………………..  
4. Marital status: Single (  )   Married (  )  Separated (  )  Divorced (  )    Widowed (  ) 
5. Educational Background: Primary () Secondary (  )  Tertiary ( ) Other (please specify)……... 
6. Occupation: Unemployed (  ) Self-employed (  ) 4. Government services (  ) Private services 
(  )  Other (Please specify)…………………….. 
7. Political Party Membership:   PDP ( ) APC ( ) 
8. State (as shown on your Voter‘s card): ………………………….. 
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Please select the option that best corresponds to your opinion on each of the following 
statements. 
(SA=Strongly Agree, A= Agree, N=Neutral, D= Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree) 
 
SECTION B: THE ROLE PLAYED BY DEMAGOGUERY IN NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY 
S/N STATEMENTS SA A N D SD 
9 Delegates voted for the aspirant(s) that offered money or material 
inducement to them. 
     
10 Delegates voted for the candidates that they wanted on their own.      
11 Delegates voted for the aspirant that their leader(s) or mentor(s) asked 
them to vote for. 
     
 
  SA A N D SD 
12 Delegates were threatened to vote for a particular aspirant.      
13 Delegates would not have voted for the aspirant that won if there was 
no inducement or threat from the leader(s) or contestant(s). 
     
14 There was intimidation or fraud in the voting process.      
15 The process that produced the delegate was not really democratic.      
 SECTION C: FACTORS THAT GIVE RISE TO 
DEMAGOGUERY IN NIGERIA  
SA A N D SD 
16 Poverty is responsible for the inability of delegates and voters to 
choose candidates independently of what their leaders tell them. 
     
17 Delegates were offered money for votes.      
18 Religious sentiment was involved in voting for the favoured 
candidate. 
     
19 Ethnic sentiment was involved in voting for the favoured candidate.      
20 Delegates were forced to vote for a particular aspirant.      
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 SECTION D: MANIFESTATIONS OF DEMAGOUERY IN 
NIGERIA’S DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE 
SA A N D SD 
21 Delegates were intimidated to vote for a particular aspirant.      
22 Thugs were used to intimidate and harass of delegates.      
23 Security agencies were used to intimidate and harass  of delegates by 
‗powerful‘ politicians. 
     
24 In some cases, security agencies harassed party members/leaders that 
were against imposition by ‗powerful‘ politicians. 
     
25 Due process and the rule of law was not followed in the election 
process. 
     
 SECTION E: IMPLICATIONS OF DEMAGOGUERY ON 
DEMOCRACY 
SA A N D SD 
26 Delegates had no freewill to choose the aspirant(s) they felt was the 
best to provide leadership for the people. 
     
27 Poor leadership can result from imposition of candidates on the 
people. 
     
28  Interference in elections or imposition of candidates from political 
leaders is a problem. 
     
29 Election rigging is as a result of fielding an imposed candidate for 
elections. 
     
30 Nigeria‘s democracy will not grow if there is imposition of 
candidates.  
     
31 The greatest challenge to democracy in Nigeria is the abuse of power 
and the failure of the political class to follow due process and the rule 
of law in democratic activities. 
     
32 The dangers (intimidation, violence, corruption ,etc.) associated with 
democratic politics in Nigeria makes it hard for decent, willing and 
qualified Nigerians to go into politics. 
     
157 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Good day Sir/Ma. My name is Suleiman Barnabas, a PhD candidate of the Department of 
Sociology, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State. I am undertaking a research titled: A 
Sociological Study of Demagoguery in the Democratic Governance of Nigeria‘s Fourth 
Republic. 
This interview is being conducted to get your input about the political happenings in Nigeria‘s 
democracy as well as the behaviour of some political elites (demagogues), and the consequences 
of these actions on the development of Nigeria‘s democracy which you have been involved in. I 
am especially interested in any problems you have identified or faced or are aware of that bother 
on the undemocratic political conduct that can derail the nation‘s democracy and 
recommendations you can make to strengthen democratic governance in Nigeria.  
Kindly answer the following questions honestly. Information given will be treated with utmost 
confidentiality and will only be used for academic purposes. 
Note: The term demagoguery refers to the use of resources and political might to act 
unconstitutionally and/or illegally to undermine democratic norms, principles and culture in the 
quest to either attain power or gain political advantage. 
If it is okay with you, I will be tape recording our conversation. The purpose of this is so that I 
can get all the details, but at the same time be able to carry on an attentive conversation with you. 
I assure you that all your comments will remain confidential. I will be compiling a report which 
will contain all interviewees‘ comments without any reference to individuals. If you agree to this 
interview and the tape recording, please sign this consent form. 
I'm now going to ask you some questions that I would like you to answer to the best of your 
ability. If you do not know the answer, please say so. 
1. I'd like to start by having you briefly describe your responsibilities and involvement thus 
far with Nigeria‘s democratic Project. (I may have to probe to gather the information I need). 
 
2. Are you aware of any problems OR challenges confronting democratic governance in 
Nigeria? (If so, probe - What have the problems been? Do you know why these problems are 
occurring? Do you have any suggestions on how to minimize or eliminate these problems? 
 
3. How has money politics, ethnicity, religion, etc. affected how politics is played in 
Nigeria‘s democracy since 1999? What roles do demagogues play in these? 
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4. What‘s your view on politicians who undermine democratic structure and culture in 
pursuance of their political ambition? How do democratic actors behave to undermine 
democracy in Nigeria? 
 
5. How do you recommend that demagoguery or undemocratic political behaviour be 
stopped from Nigeria‘s democracy in order for the rules or principle of democracy to operate?  
 
6. How can democratic institutions be strengthened and supported in Nigeria to ensure their 
stability and genuine independence? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
 
CODE OF CONDUCT 
 
2013  
 
NIGERIA 
 
 
1. PREAMBLE 
 
We the registered political parties of Nigeria. 
 
Cognizant of the roles of political parties in consolidating and deepening our democracy, 
ensuring an environment conductive for successful elections, political stability, enduring 
democracy and overall wellbeing of Nigerians; 
 
Realise the need to be more democratic in the conduct of our activities in ensuring peace, unity, 
understanding, respect for each other, transparency and credibility of the electoral processes; 
 
Mindful of the experiences and opinions of Nigerians with previous elections and the need for all 
political parties, in and outside of government, to work harmoniously towards the entrenchment 
and defence of democracy in Nigeria, and 
 
Committed to respecting the legal framework guiding the electoral process in Nigeria, 
particularly the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the 
Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), do hereby resolve to give to ourselves the following Code of 
Conduct which shall be binding. 
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2. RULE OF LAW 
 
1. All political parties, their leaders, members and supporters and candidates shall 
adhere to all existing laws, and regulations pertaining to elections, and the conduct of political 
parties, especially the elections guidelines established by INEC through the authority of the 
Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), and the Constitution of the Federal Republic  of Nigeria, 1999 
(as amended) and shall do nothing whatsoever; individually or collectively to undermine, flout, 
disrespect or circumvent them. 
 
 2. Every political party shall provide equal opportunity to qualified persons to 
participate in electoral activities.   
 
 3. Political parties have the right and freedom to put forward their views to the 
electorate without hindrance.  
 
 4. All political parties are enjoined at all times to hold the rights and freedom of the 
Nigerian people, as guaranteed by law.  
 
 5. All political parties shall ensure, and practice internal party democracy by 
adhering strictly to the provisions of their Party‘s Constitution. 
 
 6. No political party shall engage in violent activities of any kind, as a way of 
demonstrating its strength.  All political parties shall publicly condemn any form of political 
violence. 
 
 7. Political parties shall ensure strict compliance with this Code of Conduct and 
assist the security agencies and electoral officials in apprehending and sanctioning their members 
who attempt to, or flout the provision of the Code, the Electoral Act and or INEC electoral 
guidelines.   
 
 8. Political parties shall co-operate with other stakeholders in developing further 
compliance and monitoring mechanisms to give the full effect of this code. 
 
 9. Every political party shall ensure the promotion of active participation of women, 
youth and the physically challenged in the electoral processes.  Consequently, every political 
party shall:- 
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(a) Respect the rights of women, youth and physically challenged to communicate 
freely with parties and candidates; 
 
(b) Facilitate the full and equal participation of women, youth and physically 
challenged in political activities; 
 
(c) Ensure the free access of women, youth and physically challenged to all public 
political meetings, marches, demonstrations, rallies and other public political 
events; and 
 
(d) Shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that women, youth and physically 
challenged are free to engage in any political activities. 
10 Every Political Party shall (through the Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) or 
its; (recognized agencies). 
 
(a) Recognise the authority of the Commission (INEC) in the conduct of an election; 
 
(b) Work together with the Commission to promote transparency, impartiality and 
confidence in the electoral process; 
 
(c) Obey any lawful direction, instruction or order of the Commission, or a member, 
employee or officer of the Commission; 
 
(d) Establish and maintain effective lines of communication with – 
(i)The Commission; and 
(ii)Other registered parties contesting the election. 
 
(e) Facilitate the access of the Commission or any person authorized by the 
Commission to their meetings, marches, demonstrations, rallies, fund raisers and 
other public political events of that party or candidate; 
 
 (f) Co-operate in any lawful investigation by the Commission; 
 
 (g) Take all reasonable steps to ensure – 
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(i) The safety of members, employees and officers of the Commission, and 
the Chief Electoral Officer, in the exercise of its powers or the 
performance of any duty assigned by the Electoral Act; 
 
(ii) That persons referred to in subparagraph (i) are treated with utmost respect 
and not  subjected to insult, hazard or threat by any representatives or 
supporters of that party or their candidate; and 
 
(iii) That representatives of that party or their candidate attend meetings of any 
party liaison committee or other forum convened by the Commission. 
 
(iv) No political party shall keep, use or employ a private security organization 
or any other group to provide, security or assist in that regard during 
meetings, campaigns, rallies, processions or election, except as permitted 
by law. 
 
3. CAMPAIGN ISSUES 
 
(1) All political parties, their candidates, officials and agents shall work towards 
ensuring an environment conducive for successful, peaceful, free and fair election 
campaign:- 
 
(2) All political parties shall assist INEC in ensuring that all their members and 
Nigerians of voting age are encouraged to fully participate in the voter registration 
exercise. 
 
(3) Political parties shall ensure that their agents and officials are sufficiently trained 
for voter registration and other election related activities. 
 
(4) Political parties shall ensure that the processes of nomination of their candidates 
for any elections comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). 
 
(5) Substitution of Nomination process shall be transparent, democratic, and non-
violent. 
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(6) Political parties must ensure that nomination and/or substitution of nominated 
candidates are done democratically within the stipulated INEC period, to ensure 
the certainty of candidates for the elections. 
 
(7) No political party or its candidate shall during campaign resort to the use of 
inflammatory language, provocative actions, images, or manifestation  that incite 
violence, hatred, contempt or intimidation against another party or candidate or 
any person or group of persons on grounds of ethnicity, gender or for any other 
reasons.   
(8) No political party or its candidate shall make indic statements through broadcast 
press statement, handbills, pamphlets, leaflets or other publications. 
 
(9) All parties shall file with the Commission details of their public rallies and 
meetings in any particular area prior to such meeting. 
 
(10) All political parties shall take all necessary steps to coordinate their campaign 
activities in such a way as to avoid holding rallies, meetings, marches or 
demonstrations close to one another at the same time. 
 
(11) Where there is a clash in the date, venue or timing of any such activities of 
different political parties, their representatives shall meet, in the presence of law 
enforcement agencies, to resolve the issue amicably, without resort to 
intimidation, force or violence. 
 
(12) No political parties shall sponsor or allow the wearing of uniforms and emblems 
depicting militant activities or allow the carrying of offensive weapons during 
rallies and marches, and at polling and registration centres or at any political 
event. 
 
(13) All political parties shall have equal/equitable access to public owned print and 
electronic media, as guaranteed by law. 
 
(14) Political parties, their agents or their candidates shall not protect, or exercise 
undue influence for the release of persons arrested for carrying offensive 
weapons, violation of any electoral law, regulations and guidelines of INEC‘s and 
the provision of this Code of Conduct. 
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(15) All political parties shall consistently educate and emphasize to their supporters 
and to all voters that their vote will be secret and that no person will know how 
any individual has voted. 
 
 
(16) No political party or their candidates shall prevent other parties or their candidates 
from pasting their posters or distributing their leaflets, handbills and other 
publicity materials in authorized public places.  Furthermore, all parties and their 
candidates shall give directives to their members and supporters not to remove or 
destroy the posters and other campaign materials of other parties or their 
candidates.  All parties, their members and supporters shall ensure that all their 
party posters, leaflets and other election campaign materials are removed from 
public places as soon as practicable when the campaign period ends. 
 
(17) All parties shall discourage their members in government from using their power 
of incumbency to the disadvantage of other parties or their candidates during 
campaign. 
 
4. ELECTION DAY ISSUES 
 
(1) Political parties, their candidates and agents shall respect the law restricting 
access of unauthorized persons to polling stations, collation centres, and 
discourage undue interference with the voting process. 
 
(2) Every party shall instruct its members and supporters that no weapons or any 
object that can be used to cause injury shall be brought to the polling station, and 
that no party attire;  colours, symbols, emblems or other insignia shall be worn to 
a polling station on Election Day. 
 
(3) Political parties shall recognize and acknowledge the rights of accredited 
observers and monitors at polling stations for the purpose of observing the 
conduct of elections and shall grant full lawful access to party activities to such 
observers. 
 
(4) All political parties and their candidates shall ensure that their Polling Agents and 
officials are sufficiently trained to monitor the voting exercise to ensure free and 
fair elections. 
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(5) Political parties, their candidates and members shall cooperate fully with law 
enforcement agents to ensure the safety and security of election materials, election 
officials, party agents, and the electorates on Election Day. 
 
(6) Political parties shall refrain from fraudulently procuring results and votes by 
invasion and forcible occupation of polling and collation centre, the manipulation 
of ballot boxes, result sheets or by any other unlawful means. 
 
(7) Political parties and their agents shall not engage in any of the following corrupt 
practices: 
 
(a) Forcible occupation or invasion of a polling station, collation centre or 
INEC office; 
 
(b) Destroy any electoral material or INEC property; 
 
(c) Encouraging any supporter(s) to cast more than one vote  
 
(d) Encouraging any supporter(s) to vote in the name of another person, 
living, dead or fictitious 
 
(e) Buying votes or offering any bribe, gift, reward, gratification or any other 
monetary or materials consideration of allurement to voters and electoral 
officials; 
 
(f) Canvassing for votes within the vicinity of a polling station on polling day 
 
(g) Any other form of cheating or any act considered to be a malpractice 
under the electoral laws and regulations. 
 
(h) Political parties, their candidates and their agents shall not obstruct, harass 
or intimidate journalists in the course of their duties. 
 
(8) All political parties, their candidates and their agents party members and 
supporters shall accept the official election results as certified by INEC as free 
and fair, or challenge the results in Court. 
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5. POST ELECTION ISSUES 
 
(1) Political parties shall not intimidate, harass or cajole any polling agent of a 
political party to sign election result, if in the judgment of such an agent the 
election in the polling station was not free and fair.  
 
(2) No political party, their candidates or agents shall procure election results 
fraudulently or manipulate collation sheets, ballot boxes or cause to be published 
or displayed by the electronic and print media such unofficial or fraudulent 
results, except those published or announced by INEC. 
 
(3) Political parties and their candidates shall endeavour to send congratulatory 
messages to their opponents who are announced as duly elected. 
 
(4) All political parties and their candidates shall refrain from the use of violent or 
extra judicial means in expressing their non-acceptance of election results.   
 
(5) Political parties and their candidates shall ensure strict adherence to provisions of 
the law in seeking redress against perceived electoral irregularities. 
 
6. PARTY FINANCE 
 
(1) All political parties shall at all times maintain a record of their sources and 
application of funds for all of their activities, including elections and campaigns. 
 
(2) All political parties shall endeavour to submit their audited account and reports to 
INEC as required by law. 
 
(3) Every political party and their candidates shall strive at all times to adhere strictly 
to election and campaign expenses limit as contained in the relevant provisions of 
the law. 
 
(4) No political party shall unlawfully acquire property or assets for itself or members 
or any other person outside approved sources, or allow unlawful contributions to 
its funds by organizations within and outside Nigeria. 
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7. IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
There shall be a standing Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) whose objective is to promote 
interparty dialogue among all registered political parties with a view to contributing to violence 
free, fair, credible and transparent electoral process in Nigeria; and ensuring the adherence to the 
provisions of the Political Parties Code of Conduct including the consideration of any breach of 
the provisions of this code.  Hence, political parties shall to all intent and purposes subscribe to 
its role as platform for interparty dialogue and adjudication of deputed. 
 
 
 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-PARTY ADVISORY COUNCIL (IPAC) 
 
(a) The instrument of authority establishing the IPAC is the political parties Code of 
Conduct, 2013  
 
(b) IPAC will continue functioning at the national level, while those of the states and 
the local governments are expected to evolve immediately. 
 
2 MEMBERSHIP 
 
(a) IPAC will be constituted by one representative per political party who should also 
be member of his/her Party‘s National Working Committee (NWC); and 
 
(b) A representative of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
 
 
3 STRUCTURE 
 
(A) General Body 
 
The IPAC general body shall comprise a representative from each of the registered political 
parties and a representative from INEC.  It shall serve as the General Assembly of IPAC and 
shall be chaired by the elected IPAC Chairperson.   The functions of the IPAC general body shall 
include:- 
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(i) Under the supervision of INEC, elect the seven (7) member Executive Committee 
of IPAC for a one year term renewable for an additional one year based on merit 
and commitment; 
 
(ii) In accordance with the relevant provisions of this code of conduct, nominate and 
elect the Executive, Technical and Standing Committee members for a period of 
one year. 
(iii) Receive periodic reports from the Chairperson and all the Committees; and take 
the necessary action as required. 
 
(iv) Approve the working documents of IPAC. 
 
 (v) Nominate and approve an Electoral Committee to conduct the election of IPAC 
Executives at least one month to the expiration of the tenure of incumbents. 
 
(vi) From time to time engage in dialogues on inter and intra party  
issues. 
 
(B) Executive Committee 
 
(1) COMPOSITION/FUNCTIONS 
The Executive Committee shall comprise of seven (7) members with the 
following specific designations:  Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, 
Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Treasurer, Financial Secretary and Publicity 
Secretary with the following functions: 
  
i) Carry out the decisions and instructions of the  
General body. 
 
ii) Ensure that all organs of IPAC function democratically. 
 
iii) In consultation with the other Committees, initiate issues for inter and 
intra party dialogue. 
 
iv) Review all reports before presentation to the General Body. 
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v) Initiate and recommend policies and programs to the General Body. 
 
 (2)  RESPONSIBILITIES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
 
(a) Chairperson 
 
(i) Summon and preside over All IPAC meetings; 
 
(ii) Direct the activities of IPAC under the over all supervision of the 
Executive Committee; 
 
(iii) Assign specific functions to any member or Officer of IPAC; 
 
(iv) Ensure strict compliance with the provisions of the Political Parties 
Code of Conduct; 
 
(v) Be a signatory ‗A‘ to all Bank Accounts operated by IPAC; 
 
(vi) Approve all public statements by and on behalf of IPAC; 
 
(vii) Approve expenditures and financial commitments on behalf of 
IPAC 
 
(b) Deputy Chairperson 
 
(i) Assist the Chairperson in the discharge of his/her duties; 
 
(ii) Deputise for the Chairperson in his/her absence; and 
 
(iii) Carryout ad-hoc duties as may be approved by IPAC Executive 
Committee. 
  (c) Secretary 
 
(i) Serve as Chief Administrative Officer of IPAC; 
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(ii) Be the custodian of all IPAC documents and materials; 
 
(iii) Conduct and direct the conduct of Correspondences between IPAC and the 
other bodies; 
 
(iv) Keep all records of proceedings of IPAC meetings; 
 
(v) Ensure the implementation of IPAC decisions and commitments in 
collaboration with IPAC Chairman; 
 
(vi) Render written annual report of activities of IPAC; and 
 
(vii) Give notice of IPAC meetings in consultation with Chairman, IPAC 
 
(viii) Be  signatory ‗B‘ to all Bank Accounts operator by IPAC 
 
(d) Deputy Secretary 
 
(i) Assist the Secretary in the discharge of his/her duties; 
 
(ii) Deputise for the Secretary in his/her absence; and 
 
(iii) Carry out ad-hoc duties as may be approved by IPAC Executive 
Committee. 
 
(e) Treasurer 
 
(i) Receive and pay into the Bank Accounts of IPAC all funds and payments 
for and on behalf of IPAC within forty-eight hours (48 hrs) 
 
(ii) Keep and maintain all cheque books and other financial and security 
documents of IPAC; 
(iii) Pay monies duly approved by IPAC Chairman; 
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(iv) Prepare and submit annual statements of account and quarterly reports to 
the IPAC Executive Committee; and 
 
(v) Be  signatory ‗B‘ to all Bank Accounts operated by IPAC 
 
  (f) Financial Secretary 
 
(i) Receive and maintain records of all donations, grants and subventions paid 
to IPAC; 
 
(ii) Recommend proposals and means of raising funds to finance the 
programmes and activities of IPAC; 
 
(iii) Prepare and monitor the implementation of IPAC annual budget; 
 
(iv) Implement internal control measures to protect the assets of IPAC; and 
 
(v) Any other duties assigned by IPAC Executive Committee 
 
 
 (g) Publicity Secretary 
 
(i) Manage and Project positively the image of IPAC; 
 
(ii) Co-ordinate the flow of information and the public/media relations of 
IPAC;  
 
(iii) Publicize the decisions and programmes of IPAC with the approval of 
Chairman, IPAC; and 
 
(iv) Advise IPAC on Media Relations. 
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(C) Technical Working Committee 
 
25% of IPAC members shall constitute a Technical Working Committee to be elected by the 
General Body based on merit and commitment for a period of one year to run concurrently with 
the tenure of the Executive Committee.  The Technical Committee will have the following 
functions:- 
i. Observe and monitor the implementation of the Code of Conduct of IPAC and 
provide periodic written report to the General Assembly; 
 
ii. Identify and investigate violations of the code of conduct by any political party 
and propose sanctions to the general assembly in accordance with the existing 
laws of IPAC. 
iii. Receive complaints and investigate the veracity of the claims, and propose to the 
General Assembly the imposition of appropriate sanctions in accordance with 
existing laws of IPAC. 
 
iv. Resolve disputes between two or more political parties arising from 
misunderstanding and/or breach of the code of conduct. 
 
v. Prepare recommendations on remedies to INEC on actions taken on (iv) above for 
endorsement and submission by the general assembly.  
 
 
(D) STANDING STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF IPAC 
 
There shall be a Standing Strategic Committee comprising of all parties with representation in 
the National Assembly as permanent members and additional five (5) non-permanent members 
from other parties to be elected by the General Body whose tenure shall run concurrently with 
that of the Executive Committee. 
 
The functions of the Standing Strategy Committee include: 
 
i. Develop and recommend proposals that will enhance capacity of political parties 
to the IPAC general Assembly for onward submission to the Commission; 
 
ii. Serve as a platform for engagements on topical issues of national importance on 
non-partisan basis and present these issues to the General Assembly. 
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iii. Identify issues during the electoral process that require dialogue with INEC, and 
make proposals for the General Assembly. 
 
vi. Facilitate the interest of political parties in the preparation and passage of 
electoral legislation. 
 
v. And any other function(s) assigned to it by the General 
Assembly/IPAC/Commission 
 
8. REMOVAL FROM OFFICE/COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP 
 
 An elected IPAC Executive or Committee Member may be removed from office by a 
vote of at least 2/3 of Members of IPAC General Body for any of the following offences:- 
 
a) Financial misappropriation that is verified by a disciplinary committee to be 
appointed at an IPAC general meeting; 
 
b) Failure to comply with the provisions of the Political Parties Code of Conduct as 
may be determined by a Committee to be appointed at an IPAC general meeting. 
 
c) Where such as member resigns, decamps or cross-carpet from the political party 
he/she represents. 
 
9. FUNDING 
 
(1) Political parties shall contribute funds (based on criteria/formula to be determined 
by the General Body for running the activities of IPAC). 
 
(2) INEC shall provide subvention to IPAC from time to time. 
 
(3) The Executive Committee shall device strategies to generate additional revenues 
to fund its program of activities. 
 
(4) IPAC funds shall be maintained and administered through a bank account with the 
Chairman and Treasurer or Financial Secretary as signatories (as the case may 
be). 
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10. COMMITMENTS 
 
(1) Every political party in collaboration with INEC and other relevant agencies shall 
ensure that this code is well publicized and fully observed by its members and 
supporters.  Political parties shall further publicize this code, and sensitize the 
general public, by all lawful means available. 
 
(2) Political parties, having freely subscribed to this code shall:- 
 
(a) be bound by this code; 
 
(b) take decisive steps to prohibit leaders, officials, candidates and members 
from infringing this code; 
 
(c) take all reasonable steps to discourage any type of conduct by their 
supporters which would, if undertaken by a party official, candidate or 
member, be in breach of this code; and 
 
(d) not abuse the right to complain about the violation(s) of this code, nor 
make false, frivolous or vexatious complaints. 
 
(3) Any political party adversely affected by a breach of any of the provisions of this 
code shall report the breach to the offending party and seek an amicable 
resolution of the dispute. 
 
(4) Any dispute which cannot be resolved between parties shall be reported to the 
IPAC which shall give it a fair and expeditious hearing/s.  The IPAC is 
empowered to recommend to INEC appropriate sanctions on erring political 
party, this is without prejudice to the right of parties and their candidates, or 
agents to pursue other legal actions. 
 
 11. MEETING 
 
(1) A quorum for meeting shall be formed by fifty percent membership of IPAC; 
 
(2) They shall meet quarterly and at any other time as may be necessary. 
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12. DECLARATION 
 
This document comes into effect and is binding on all registered political parties upon its 
acceptance by at least 50% of the registered political parties in Nigeria. 
 
DATED 16
TH
 JULY, 2013 
 
 
12. ENDORSEMENT/SIGNATURES 
S/NO NAME OF PARTY  NAME & DESIGNATION SIGNATURE DATE 
1. Accord (A) 
 
   
2. Action Alliance (AA) 
 
   
3. Action Congress of Nigeria 
(ACN) 
 
   
4. Advanced Congress of Democrats 
(ACD) 
 
   
5. Allied Congress Party of Nigeria 
(ACPN) 
 
   
6. Alliance of Democracy (AD) 
 
   
7. African Democratic Congress 
(ADC) 
 
   
8. All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) 
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9. African Peoples Alliance (APA) 
 
   
10. All Progressive Grand Alliance 
(APGA) 
 
   
11. Congress for Progressive Change 
(CPC) 
 
   
12. Citizens Popular Party (CPP) 
 
   
13. Democratic Peoples Party (DPP) 
 
   
14. Kowa Party (KP) 
 
   
15. Labour Party (LP) 
 
   
16. Mega Progressive Peoples Party 
(MPPP) 
 
   
17. National Conscience Party (NCP) 
 
   
18. New Nigeria Peoples Party 
(NNPP) 
 
   
19. People for Democratic Change 
(PDC) 
 
   
20. Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 
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21. Progressive Peoples Alliance 
(PPA) 
 
   
22. Peoples Party of Nigeria (PPN) 
 
   
23. Social Democratic  Party (SDP) 
 
   
24. United Democratic Party (UDP) 
 
   
25. United Progressive Party (UPP) 
 
   
 
 
13. INTERPRETATION 
 
In this Code: 
 
* Electoral Commission‘ means the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). 
 
* Political Party‘ means any association lawfully registered by INEC as such 
 
* ‗IPAC‘ means the Inter-Party Advisory Committee 
 
* ‗IPC‘ means the Inter- Party Committee formed by representatives 
 of all registered political parties in Nigeria with the mandate of draft  
 this Code. 
 
* ‗BOT‘ means Board of Trustees of each political party 
 
* ‗NWC‘ means National Working Committees of each party. 
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APPENDIX D 
PROSECUTION OF ELECTORAL OFFENDERS 
CPS, 
Pls find forwarded update on prosecution of Electoral Offences. 
1. INEC vs. ZAKARIYA BUHARI 
The accused person was charged to Magistrate Court in Kebbi State for incising 
public disturbance at election station and being in possession of ballot paper. 
The Court found him guilty, convicted him and sentenced him to 6 months 
imprisonment or a fine of N 40,000.00 
2. INEC vs. (1) ABUBAKAR HANAFI 
(2) MOHAMMED RUWA 
(3) SALE MUSA 
(4) RUWA BAKO 
(5) ALH. ABU NA ABU 
The accused persons were charged to Magistrate Court in Kebbi State for causingbreach of peace 
by snatching and destroying a ballot box and ballot papers whiledepriving voters from 
voting.The Case was terminated for want of prosecution and accused persons discharged. 
3. INEC vs. MUHAMMADU DAN – GUDALE 
The accused person was charged to Magistrate Court Kebbi State for criminal 
conspiracy, inciting disturbance and committing electoral offences. 
The Court found the accused person not guilty and discharged him. 
4. INEC vs. (1) CHARLES TOLOFARI 
(2) JUSTIN ADAM 
(3) CHRISTOPHER OKON 
The accused persons were charged to Magistrate Court in Rivers State for unlawful 
possession of more than one voters card.The Court found them guilty, convicted them and 
sentences each to 3 monthsimprisonment or fine of N 600.00 
5. INEC vs. GODSPOWER AZOBO 
The accused was charged to Magistrate Court in Rivers State for the offence ofunlawful 
possession of more than one voters card. The accused was found guilty,convicted and sentenced 
to 1month imprisonment or a fine of N 100,000.00. 
T. M. INUWA ESQ. 
ASST. DIR. CRI. PR. 
22nd August 2013 
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APPENDIX E 
 
INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
NUMBER OF ELECTORAL OFFENCES AND PROGRESS MADE SO FAR 
LIST OF ELECTORAL OFFENCES DETERMINED AND PENDING 
S/N STATE 
NO. OF 
CASES 
FILED 
NO. OF 
ELECTORAL 
OFFENCES 
DETERMINED/ 
STRUCK OUT 
NO OF 
CONVICTIONS 
NO.  OF 
ELECT
ORAL 
OFFEN
CES 
PENDIN
G 
REMARKS 
1 ABIA  3 3 0 0  
2 ADAMAWA  5 4 4 1  
3 AKWA IBOM 0 0 0 0  
4 ANAMBRA 24 17 0 7  
5 BAUCHI 35 6 - 29  
6 BAYELSA  2 -   2  
7 BENUE 16 0 0 16  
8 BORNO 21 - - 21  
9 CROSS RIVER 14 7 0 7  
10 DELTA 21 - - 21  
11 EBONYI   0 0 0   0  
12 EDO 12 - - 12  
13 ENUGU 17 5 0 12  
 14 EKITI 16 8 0 8  
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15 GOMBE 3 - -   3  
16 IMO 9 8 0   1   
17 JIGAWA 31 6 7 25  
18 KADUNA 15 15 0 0  
19 KANO 25 22 4   3  
20 KATSINA 16 15 0 1  
21 KEBBI 19 8 5 11  
22 KWARA 0 0 0   0  
23 LAGOS 17 14 0  3  
24 KOGI   4 2 0   2  
25 NASARAWA 11 8 0   3  
26 NIGER  2 0 0   2  
27 OGUN 28 2 0  26  
28 ONDO 32 4 1 28  
29 OYO 30 2 0 28  
30 OSUN  4 1 0   3  
31 PLATEAU 20 7 0 13  
32 RIVERS 12 0 0 12  
33 SOKOTO 2 0 0   2  
34 TARABA 0 0 0   0  
35 YOBE  0 0 0   0  
36 ZAMFARA 16 3 3 13  
37 FCT 0 0 0   0  
 TOTAL 482 167 24 315  
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APPENDIX F 
 
PDP Chairman Chief Audu Ogbeh’s letter to President Olusegun Obasanjo 
 
December 6, 2004  
 
His Excellency,  
 
The President, Commander-In-Chief,  
 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja  
 
RE: ANAMBRA AND RELATED MATTERS  
 
About a month ago, the nation woke up to the shocking news of a devastating attack on Anambra 
State resulting in the burning down of radio and television stations, hotels, vehicles, assembly 
quarters, the residence of the state Chief Judge and finally, Government House, Awka. Dynamite 
was even applied in the exercise and all or nearly most of these in the full glare of our own police 
force as shown on NTA for the world to see. The operation lasted three days.  
 
That week, in all churches and mosques, we, our party, and you as Head of Government and 
Leader of this Nation came under the most scathing and blithering attacks. We were singly and 
severally accused of connivance in action and so forth. Public anger reached its peak.  
 
Recommendation  
 
You set up a reconciliation committee headed by Ebonyi State Governor, Dr. Sam Egwu, and we 
all thought this would help calm nerves and perhaps bring about some respite. But quite clearly 
things are nowhere near getting better.  
 
While the reconciliation team attempted to inspect damaged sites in Anambra, they were scared 
away by gun fire, further heightening public anger and disdain for us.  
 
Bomb explosion in government house, Awka  
 
On Tuesday, the 30th day of November, 2004, another shocking development – a reported bomb 
explosion in Government House Awka. Since then, the media, public discourse within and even 
outside of our borders, have been dominated by the most heinous and hateful of expletives 
against our party and your person and government. It would appear that the perpetrators of these 
acts are determined to stop at nothing since there has not been any visible sign of reproach from 
law enforcement agencies. I am now convinced that the rumours and speculations making the 
rounds that they are determined to kill Dr. Chris Ngige may not be unfounded.  
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The question now is, what would be the consequences of such a development? How do we 
exonerate ourselves from culpability, and worse still, how do we even hope to survive it? Mr. 
President, I was part of the second republic and we fell. Memories of that fall are a miserable 
litany of woes we suffered, escaping death only by God‘s supreme mercy. Then we were 
suspected to have stolen all of Nigeria‘s wealth. After several months in prison, some of us were 
freed to come back to life penniless and wretched. Many have gone to their early graves un-
mourned because the public saw us all as renegades.  
 
I am afraid we are drifting in the same direction again. In life, perception is reality and today, we 
are perceived in the worst light by an angry, scornful Nigerian Public for reasons which are 
absolutely unnecessary.  
 
Mr. President, if I write in this vein, it is because I am deeply troubled and I can tell you that an 
overwhelming percentage of our party members feel the same way though many may never be 
able to say this to you for a variety of reasons.  
 
But the back stops at your table and in my position, not only as Chairman but also as an old 
friend and loyal defender of your development programmes which I have never stopped 
defending, I dare to think that we can, either by omission or commission allow ourselves to crash 
and bring to early grief, this beautiful edifice called democracy.  
 
On behalf of the peoples Democratic Party, I call on you to act now and bring any, and all 
criminal, even treasonable, activity to a halt. You and you alone, have the means. Do not 
hesitate. We do not have too much time to waste.  
 
A.I. Ogbeh, OFR  
 
National Chairman  
 
cc: Vice President  
 
Chairman, Board of Trustees  
 
Speaker, House of Representatives  
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APPENDIX G 
OBASANJO’S REPLY LETTER TO PDP CHAIRMAN, AUDU OGBEH 
 
I am amused and not surprised by your letter of December 6, 2004 because after playing hide and 
seek games over a period of time, you have finally, at least in writing, decided to unmask and 
show your true colour.  
 
Having made this introductory point, let us go over systematically and, in some detail, through 
the whole episode of the Anambra saga. I must add that I have expressed sadness and 
condemned the wanton destruction of properties that took place in Anambra recently. 
When it turned out that, Governor Mbadinuju was an unmitigated failure in Anambra, as PDP 
governor in our first term, I made it clear to you that I would not go to Anambra to campaign if 
Governor Mbadinuju was being sponsored as PDP gubernatorial candidate in spite of his 
calamitous failure. You did not tell me that you were sending a discrete investigation team to 
Anambra to find out the situation on the ground. 
 
You never said yes or no but I determined that, in good conscience, I could not go to Anambra to 
campaign for support and seek endorsement for Governor Mbadinuju. 
About six weeks later, you came to report to me that you have sent two people discretely to 
ascertain on the ground whether people wanted Mbadinuju or not and you had received report 
that 66 2/3 of the people of Anambra did not want Mbadinuju.  
 
For me, what we knew about Mbadinuju in terms of failure to pay salaries in some cases for over 
7 months which led to school children not being able to take the WASCE did not need any 
discrete investigation.  
However, your discrete investigation convinced you that I was right and you brought Mbadinuju 
to me, for you and I to tell him that he could not be a gubernatorial candidate of the PDP in 
Anambra.  
 
You rightly, I believe, requested that I should work with you to give him a soft landing and we 
agreed to make him an ambassador after the election and we even agreed on which mission 
abroad, subject to our success in the elections.  
Mbadinuju asked for a letter from me and I refused because I said that my word was my bond 
but that you were free to write him one. A few weeks after that meeting, Mbadinuju decamped 
from our party to the AD and sought election as governor of Anambra on the platform of the AD. 
 
When the members of our party started jostling for nomination, as normal with me, I refused to 
endorse a candidate; it is only after the primaries that the party's candidate becomes my own 
candidate. 
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And in the case of Anambra, if I had wanted to support anybody at all, it would have been Jerry 
Ugokwe because he was one man I knew but, of course, I was consistent on my policy. And 
when Ngige emerged as the candidate of the PDP from the primaries, he was brought to be 
introduced to me and, of course, he became not only the party's candidate but also mine.  
 
After enquiries about the situation in Anambra and about Ngige himself, I made a point to him 
that he should go and reconcile himself with his father with whom he was not on talking terms as 
I believed it was an abomination for an African son to be in a state of enmity with his father to 
the point of absolute non-communication. I advised Ngige to reconcile with his father and the 
rest of his family and he reported to me that he did. 
 
The election took place and Ngige was declared the winner. I congratulated him along with other 
victorious candidates. Realizing that Ngige would need some assistance to help him through the 
teething problem of his administration, I invited him to consider having a non-partisan honorary 
committee of elders of the state and he agreed.  
I talked to Igwe Nwokedi, Chief Mbasulike Amechi and the Anglican Bishop of Awka to get two 
more people with them to act as such honourary non-partisan advisory committee of elders for 
the governor.  
 
For them to maintain their independence, I said that any transportation or administrative funds 
that they might require would be provided from the presidency rather than the state. 
After two months, Igwe Nwokedi, who was supposed to be the chairman, reported that the 
governor was impossible to advise or to work with and that was the end of that effort. Mr. 
Chairman, I reported that effort to you. 
 
When on one occasion, Chris Uba came to report that things appeared to be going wrong 
between him and the governor in the presence of Chief Amechi, I asked the latter to go and sort 
it out for them in his capacity as an elder of the state and veteran politician. I requested Chief 
Amechi to report back to me. The truth is that as far as Anambra was concerned, I considered it 
my duty to work with all stakeholders in the area of avoiding conflict and on that ground I 
promised to act on any report or advice from Chief Mbasulike Amechi. 
I never had warning that things were going sour in the state any more until I was in Maputo, 
Mozambique on July 9, 2003 when I received report that the governor had resigned. I did what 
normally I do not do except in an emergency by using government facility for strictly non-
governmental purpose. I instructed that an airplane from the presidential fleet be made available 
to a team to rush to Anambra to investigate what was happening. That team went on Friday 
morning while I was still in Mozam-bique and returned on Friday evening.  
 
You will recall that the team reported to you and I that what was happening in Ananm-bra 
required urgent party action to resolve it as a family affair. 
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A Senate Panel that followed in the same vein re-opened something similar. Mr. Chairman, the 
following Sunday, you received and opened a brown envelope in my residence in Abuja that 
contained three different letters of resignation and a video of announcement of resignation of 
Governor Ngige. You were as shocked as I was and you promised to do something about it that 
night. You left with copies of the documents and the next thing you did after that was to 
insinuate that Ngige's problems were caused by me.  
 
Unfortunately, as in many other instances, you failed to do what you should have done as the 
chief executive of the party and rather prefer to insult me not only as the President of the nation 
but also as the leader of the party which you seem never to recognize or acknowledge. From that 
point on, I only did my job as a President by investigating. 
 
What the police did or did not do and dishing out punishment to be confirmed by the Police 
Service Commission which in its own report asked for a complete investigation of the matter. 
That investigation was carried out by the Attorney General and his report was acted upon. After 
that, I deliberately remained aloof about political events in Anambra except whatever may affect 
security and loss of life and property. 
 
I, in fact, asked both Ngige and Chris Uba never to come to my office or to my residence and 
you know this. As far as I could remember, a childhood friend of yours came with you to discuss 
the issue of Anambra between you and I on one occasion. 
 
Soon after, I briefed the party caucus in detail on my role, on what I saw and did and the party 
caucus endorsed every action that had been taken by the executive arm of government in respect 
with Anambra. A few months later, two members of your Working Committee -Olisa Metu (an 
Ex-Officio member) and Farouk (the youth leader) -came to appeal to me to specially intervene 
in reconciling Ngige and Chris Uba, I refused initially because I believed it was really the 
responsibility of the party. But since you had shirked your responsibility as party chairman, I 
conceded and asked the two members of the NWC to bring Ngige and Chris Uba to me. That 
was the only time, after several months, that I allowed them to enter my residence.  
 
I was shocked that a man in the position of aspirant or one elected as governor could actually 
resign on three different occasions in writing and on one occasion, the resignation was on 
videotape. I, also, was of the opinion that for Ngige to have allowed that to happen, there must 
have been some extra-legal motivation. There has been accusation and counter-accusation as 
reasons for such ungainly behaviour. When the two of them came to see me, the two young men 
who had brokered the opportunity for Ngige and Chris Uba to see me wanted to leave. I refused 
and insisted that they had to be at the meeting because I wanted them as witnesses. 
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After almost two hours of talk, we dismissed hoping that fences would be mended and 
reconciliation wou1d be fully established. They left and waited on the corridors for a while. 
Olisa Metu came back and requested that I should meet with Ngige and Chris Uba alone without 
witnesses for them to feel free to unwind. Again, I did and that was when I got the real shock of 
my life when Chris Uba looked Ngige straight in the face and said, "You know you did not win 
the election" and Ngige answered "Yes, I know I did not win."Chris Uba went further to say to 
Ngige, "You don't know in detail how it was done." I was horrified and told both of them to 
leave my residence. 
 
This incident was reported to you because although constitutionally, Ngige had been declared 
winner, for me and, I believe, for you there remains a moral burden and dilemma both as leaders 
in Nigeria and leaders of our party. You did not consider it important enough to do anything or 
talk about it. I told Ngige that the only way I could live with this moral dilemma since he had 
been constitutionally declared as governor is that I will continue to deal with him in his capacity 
as the governor of a State in Nigeria purely and strictly on formal basis either until he runs out 
his term, he decides to follow the path of honour or until any competent authority declares 
otherwise. That remains my position to date. 
 
That notwithstanding, immediately after the Court of Appeal overturned Justice Nnaji's order, 
the Police promptly obeyed. That is what rule of law is all about. Furthermore, based on all that I 
had heard, I told Chris Uba and Ngige that their case was like the case of two armed robbers that 
conspired to loot a house and after bringing out the loot, one decided to do the other in and the 
issue of fair play even among robbers became a factor. The two robbers must be condemned for 
robbery in the first instance and the greedy one must be specially pointed out for condemnation 
to do justice among the robbers. To me, the determination of the greedy one is also a problem, 
maybe they are both equally greedy. Justice, fairness and equity are always the basis of peace 
and harmony in any human organisation or relationship.  
 
Anambra issue is essentially a human organizational and human relationship issue. 
 
I was on a tour of five countries in five days going from the UK through Finland and Sweden 
with a stop-over in Libya to Tanzania last November when the recent issue of violence broke 
out. The Inspector General of Police who claimed that the crowd was overwhelming for the 
police strength was instructed to double the number of mobile police unit by bringing additional 
men and women from the adjoining states. He did so and he reported that 19 looters and 
destroyers were arrested and charged to court with some vehicles seized. NTA coverage of that 
unfortunate incidents is not the issue, wars are watched like theatrical plays in the contemporary 
world.  
 
The issue is whether or not the police performed or did not perform their duties. 
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Mr. Chairman, obviously you do not expect me to do less than I have done. I even went out to do 
more because since you failed to either resolve the political issues that are intra-party matters and 
they have been spread to engulf the entire state or decisively punish any offender, I decided in 
consultation with Governor Ngige, to set up a fact-finding and reconciliation committee under 
the Governor of Ebonyi State to put an end to the violence, create a conducive atmosphere for 
the Governor to return to his station and to ensure permanent peace, security through 
reconciliation of the known warring party members - Chris Ngige and Chris Uba - and their 
supporters. And this was after I had a meeting with both the PDP state chairman and the 
governor. Since the Governor of Ebonyi, whom I have asked to keep you fully posted on his 
findings and progress of his committee has not yet reported to me, and since I have taken every 
necessary step to ensure a resolution of the political problem in Anambra which you have failed 
to confront, I consider your letter opportunistic, and only a smokescreen and I believe I should 
answer it in some reasonable detail as I have done. I also took every reasonable step to beef up 
security to deal with the situation. 
 
On Tuesday, December 7, 2004, after the party meeting on the crisis in Kogi State, you told me 
that you had written me a letter on threat to Ngige's life and you indicated to me, which you did 
not do in the letter, that one Honourable Chuma Nzeribe was the culprit. As I will not dilly-dally 
on an issue of security, even before I received your letter, I directed the Director-General of the 
State Security Service to look into the matter. It may interest you that almost on daily basis 
letters are received in my office of people alleging that other people want to assassinate them. 
All such allegations are forwarded to security people for investigation. None has been 
substantiated yet. But we will not take any issue of security lightly no matter who claims to be in 
danger. 
 
And contrary to your belief and insinuation, just today, December 9, the governor of Anambra 
came to me to seek my opinion and advice on whether or not to constitute a commission of 
enquiry into what happened in the state. I did not hesitate to advise and encourage him to do so 
in order that all the facts would be exposed and verifiable truth established rather than trading in 
rumours. 
Let me end on this note: whatever may be your reason for the ambivalent disposition and 
handling of the party problem in Anambra like you have done in other places and the ulterior 
motive for your letter, if and when in my capacity as President of Nigeria duty calls on me to act, 
I will not shirk my responsibility and we will at the end of the day be at the bar of the public both 
at the party level and national level. Let me also say that it is, indeed, unfortunate that you make 
so many unnecessary and unwarranted insinuations in your letter about our great country. I have 
taken judicial note of the ominous comparisons you made between a government in which you 
participated that was overthrown in a coup d'etat and this present administration. 
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I wonder if that is your wish since you may not now go out penniless. But whatever agenda you 
may be working at God is always in charge and in control. Warped perception must be 
differentiated from reality.Perception created and manipulated for a sinister purpose cannot be 
reality. The greatest danger to any country is putting truth out of favour; extolling evils of lies, 
deceit, treachery, disloyalty, unpatriotism, corruption and unconstitutionally. That is my greatest 
fear for Nigeria and it should be yours and that of any right-thinking Nigerian. Not too long ago, 
I challenged you to think beyond the ordinary, the expected and the self, I still put that challenge 
on the table.  
 
Let it be on record that I do believe that I have invested the totality of my life in what I may call 
"Enterprise Nigeria" and if it means that in the process of repositioning our dear country for 
sustainable greatness, what is dearest to me would have to be sacrificed, I will in good 
conscience, not hesitate to do so.  
 
And if that will enhance Nigeria's development, it is a sacrifice that I will be glad to make. I have 
reached a stage in life that I have passed the state of being intimidated or being flattered.  
I can stand before God and man and in clear conscience to defend every measure that I have 
taken everywhere in Nigeria since I became the President and will continue to act without fear or 
favour or inducement. And it does not matter to me what is sponsored in the Nigerian media, in 
particular, the print media. I believe that our vindication will come through the truth, which is the 
only thing that can uplift a nation and make an honest man and a sincere believer in God free.  
 
May I crave your indulgence to copy this letter to all those to whom your letter to me was 
copied. In addition, I am copying the President of the Senate, the number three man in the 
present hierarchy of this government and a party leader in his own right, whom you deliberately 
left out of the distribution list of your letter for reason best known to you. One thing I will never 
stop doing is praying for Nigeria in general and Anambra in particular.  
 
May God continue to bless and prosper Nigeria. In spite of the malevolence of some Nigerians, 
Nigeria is moving to the cruising level and cruising speed. That is the work of God and what all 
Nigerians and friends of Nigeria should do is to join hands in hastening the work of God in 
Nigeria at this juncture. 
May God help us to help ourselves. 
 
I wish you well.  
 
Signed President Olusegun Obasanjo 
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APPENDIX H 
 
TEXT OF PRESS BRIEFINGS BY  
MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMADU BUHARI, GCFR 
FOLLOWING DELIVERY OF JUDGEMENT BY  
THE COURT OF APPEAL 
DECEMBER 21, 2004 
 
Chairman and Members of the Board of Trustees 
 
My Colleagues in the All Nigeria Peoples Party 
 
Gentlemen of the Press 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen 
 
Good Morning. 
 
 
We are hereby giving our intention to appeal to the Supreme Court early next year, having 
listened to yesterday's judgment by the Court of Appeal with profound shock and disbelief. It is 
our considered opinion that this was a judgement delivered against overwhelming weight of 
evidence.  
 
Ours has been the most painstaking litigation in the history of elections in Nigeria. The ANPP 
and myself diligently dug out all the major malpractices committed by INEC and other 
government agencies during the so-called elections of 19th April 2003. Our legal team put up the 
most comprehensive, most professional presentation ever in election petitions in Nigeria.  
Nobody was in any doubt about the gross violations of the Electoral Act 2002 committed by 
INEC, by the police and other law-enforcement agencies of the Federal Government. And 
nobody can forget so easily the unprovoked violence visited on ordinary law-abiding voters. 
 
The CNPP, our party, the ANPP, and myself painstakingly pursued our case in the sure belief 
that we were taking this action on behalf of the Nigerian voters who were robbed of their choice 
and denied their electoral victory in the presidential ballot. We prosecuted our case in the belief 
that the judiciary would examine this case on its merit and hand down a judgement based on 
facts presented in court; facts which proved that there were no elections or no properly 
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conducted elections in a majority of states. We pursued this case at great expense, at great risk to 
life and limb, at great inconvenience to so many supporters. We pursued this case in the sure 
knowledge and belief that there was no proper distribution of materials in a majority of states, 
there was no collation in a majority of states: in short there were no properly conducted elections 
in a majority of states as stipulated in the Electoral Act, 2002. 
 
This was the opinion of the general public, of all the political parties apart from PDP, of the 
credible national and international observers, of the immediate past House of Representatives 
and the press.  
In the course of the hearings we subpoenaed INEC to produce the EC (8) forms on which the 
grand total of "results" they announced were "collated". Their failure to produce the Forms 
represents either contempt of court which is bad, or that the collations could not be tendered in 
court on account of internal inconsistencies which is worse. In either case, failure or refusal to 
tender the final "collated" figures rendered the elections null and void according to the law. The 
Court of Appeal should on this score alone have nullified the elections and ordered fresh polls. 
 
We have no doubt at all that we have made our case. We have established cases of electoral 
malpractices in states across the country. As we have all witnessed, in several states, especially 
in the South East and South-South zones, results were declared even though elections had not 
taken place there. In some of the states where elections were allowed to hold, especially in the 
South-West zone, ballot boxes were already stuffed with thumb-printed ballot papers before the 
elections. 
 
In several other states, especially in areas considered our stronghold, ballot papers and other 
electoral materials were not supplied at all. In addition, across the length and breadth of the 
country various kinds of electoral malpractices were observed and recorded. 
 
In general, money and other inducements were unashamedly used to influence voter behaviour in 
areas where the elections had taken place, while thugs and elements in the security forces were 
employed to intimidate, maim or even kill voters. The atmosphere immediately before, during, 
and even right after the elections couldn't have been conducive to free and fair elections, and 
much of what happened then shouldn't have been considered acceptable polls. At least that much 
had been established and attested to by both domestic and foreign election observers. 
 
Clearly, if our new democracy could be so brazenly raped this way, and our civil society groups 
and other oversight institutions of the democratic system were too weak and fledgling to get us 
remedy, our only hope lay in the nation's judiciary. And that was why we decided to challenge 
the result of the presidential election at the Court of Appeal. 
 
No doubt, it has taken us a long time to reach this stage, but we are certainly not in the least 
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worried about the length of time. We are ready to be patient and wait, and sit it out, no matter 
how long it takes; because, we are not looking for quick fixes. By deciding to pursue this matter 
to its logical conclusion, we certainly hope to uncover the truth of the result of the presidential 
election.  
 
But even more importantly, we hope to, in the process, make example to the nation to commit 
and rededicate itself to the democratic process - a free and fair electoral way of choosing its 
leadership, and an independent judicial system for setting the anomalies and distortions of the 
electoral process right. 
 
This is the bigger picture of our struggle and the ultimate goal of our case. If we were to 
terminate the struggle at this stage or at some earlier stage, what could we have said to those 
killed or maimed in this struggle to defend their right to electoral freedom and free choice? And 
what can we say to the millions who had their votes stolen? 
 
No, we would never abandon this struggle; we would pursue it to a successful end. And, in any 
case, it had never been in our character to abandon matters half-way through. Luckily, even with 
respect to the last polls, we have had precedents.  
 
The ANPP had already set the example by going to the very end in the cases of gubernatorial 
election petitions in Borno, Sokoto, Adamawa, Anambra, Benue, Enugu Plateau, Kaduna, 
Katsina, Rivers and Yobe states. It should therefore be clear that even in this case, it is the 
intention of the party to exhaust every available constitutional remedy provided, to ensure that 
the people's sacred mandate is secured and protected. 
 
And ultimately we shall overcome, because our cause is right and just; and we have full 
confidence in the ability and neutrality of the Supreme Court to find a just and equitable solution 
to the matter of the rigged elections. This belief is based on what we have so far observed; and 
this is in spite of our very bitter experiences at the hands of tribunals and other courts in at least 
ten states with respect to our petitions in gubernatorial elections and elections into both Federal 
and State legislatures. Even yesterday's judgment has not reduced the level of our confidence in 
the judicial system. 
 
That is indeed why we have now decided to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the highest court in the land and the final arbiter in the case. As earlier said, it is 
our belief that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case was given against overwhelming 
weight of evidence and short of legitimately expectable conclusions on clear findings of the 
Honourable Court. This, however, would in no way dim our belief that the courts have the final 
right and competence to interpret our laws and decide the merit of this case. 
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This judicial process, protracted though it has turned out to be for the country, is as necessary to 
the electoral process and the development of democracy as the actual voting itself.  
 
 
 
This court case that the party and I instituted and the appeal, whose notice we now give, must, 
therefore, be seen for what they are - an integral part of the electoral process that has been 
constitutionally provided for.  
 
It is true that initially I didn't want to go to court over the matter; and I was only persuaded - 
almost coerced - into it by the party and the force of wounded public opinion and the insistence 
of our supporters. I only reluctantly consented to commence litigation because I genuinely 
believed that that was the only path in which salvation lay; and, obviously, the people who had 
given their all to this democratic process, must not be allowed to totally lose hope. 
 
And, with an atmosphere charged with all the emotion and the painful sense of loss felt by the 
people, we feared that unless the path to court was taken, a situation of near anarchy might have 
developed to engulf us all. This was what we have tried to avoid. 
 
In several other ways, too, we had gone out of our way to restrain our supporters from taking the 
law into their hands. And, instead, we had tried to sensitise and orient them into accepting the 
principles and spirit of democratic contest, and make them accept the superiority of democracy 
over all the available alternatives.  
The fact that there has been no general insurrection in spite of people's bitter feelings suggests 
that we have succeeded in calming public anger. We are satisfied with what we have done in and 
out of court. 
 
Let me therefore seize the opportunity first and foremost to congratulate and express our 
gratitude to Chief Mike Ahamba, SAN, and his team of lawyers for a masterly performance in 
court, often done under difficult circumstances. I would also like to seize this opportunity to 
thank our millions of supporters all over the country and abroad for their continued support and 
concern, and, above all, for their patience. I must also thank our party for its untiring support 
throughout the ordeal. In the same vein, I would like to thank the international community for the 
interest and understanding it has demonstrated in this case. 
 
Let me also seize this opportunity to reassure Nigerians and the international community that so 
long as I am alive, I will never abandon this struggle. And I will never tire in the pursuit of any 
right that belongs to the people of Nigeria. No doubt, Nigeria deserves more than what we 
witnessed in 2003. 
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Let me once again call on all Nigerians to unite and face the future with determination. Despite 
differences in party affiliation, we must remain united in our vision for the greatness of this 
country, and remain united in our desire to work and sacrifice to attain that greatness. 
 
We all know the solution to the problems that we ourselves have created. We only need to 
believe in ourselves; and with the right leadership we have in the past shown that we are capable 
of doing that. So may God be with us as we go to the Supreme Court. 
 
Long live the All Nigeria People's Party, ANPP. 
 
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
 
 
Major General Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH COMMISSION (NHRWC) REPORT ON 
THE 2015 PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE 
―The run-up to Nigeria‘s 2015 Presidential election has been characterized by bellicose rhetoric, 
a rise in hate speech, and a worrisome footprint of election-related violence.‖ 
―The Report and Advisory itemized scores of incidents of pre-election killings and violence 
affecting 22 states of the federation. In the six weeks since then, the footprint of pre-election 
violence has spread beyond the 22 states and election-related violence in some form has been 
reported in nearly all the states of Nigeria. ‖During that period also, the number of complaints 
lodged with the commission concerning election-related violence has grown by over 200 
percent.‖  The report released by the NHRC summarized the nature, perpetrators and targets of 
demagoguery in the run up to the 2015 general elections as follows. 
(i) Militias and gangs: It‘s clear that there are gangs, cults and militias that have been cultivated 
and to whom the leading political parties or people claiming to act on their behalf have 
somewhat ―outsourced‖ election violence. This has made election-related both transactional and 
casual. In some of the states, well known militia leaders have become candidates in the elections, 
guaranteeing that the violence is part of the election and campaign narrative. 
(ii) Small arms and light weapons (SALW): In the three main locations in particular, small arms 
and light weapons are present in very worrying quantities in the hands of cults, gangs, militias 
and unlawful hands. The calibre of ordnance in private hands in Rivers State, in particular, goes 
beyond anything that can be licensed for private use and, indeed, beyond what is legitimate or 
even for lawful law enforcement purposes. 
(iii) Substance abuse and psychotropic substances: In nearly all cases, there was evidence to 
correlate (perhaps indeed even of causation) high pre-disposition to election violence with 
evidence of an illicit supply network for psychotropic substances to the militias involved. 
(iv) Campaign billboard wars: In most States, the two leading parties and their supporters have 
launched mutual attacks on the billboards of opposite parties. Campaign billboards are gouged 
out, defaced, painted over or destroyed as if they have injured anyone. In some of the states, 
there were allegations that state assets had been used to procure or condone such destruction. 
(v) Hate speech: All the institutions, entities and communities whom we consulted with affirmed 
that hate speech was at unprecedented levels and nearly all warned that the level of such hate 
now presents a clear threat to national cohesion irrespective of the outcome of the elections. 
(vi) Effect of closure of courts: In Rivers and Kaduna, the courts are closed, creating a major 
crisis of lack of access to remedies for election-related violence. The Police complain that they 
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suffer interference from politicians in policing election violence. They also say they have no 
courts to charge arrested persons to and are now short of cell space for detainees. Parties in some 
cases allege their supporters are being held interminably under opaque rules or ―orders from 
above‖. 
Serial and repeated bomb attacks on courts in Rivers are the immediate cause of the court 
closures there and have not attracted the right form of reprobation from the authorities. Judges 
need to be secured ahead of contentious election disputes. In Kaduna, we also heard allegations 
of interference with lower bench dealing with violence. These fuel a growing narrative of 
election vigilantism and ―self defence‖. 
(vii) The self-defence narrative: Two common expressions we heard in all the places visited were 
―we will not be intimidated‖ and ―we will defend ourselves‖. From political leaders this is worse 
than disappointing. It‘s a confession of both desperation and leadership failure. 
(viii) Discrepancies in casualty count between parties & police: There are clear discrepancies in 
casualty count between the parties, communities and police. This is most evident in Kaduna as 
well as Rivers, suggesting that categories are not clear or mutually dissonant or there is under-
reporting of the incidents and consequences of violence. Communities and parties have a 
responsibility to keep law enforcement fully informed of incidents of violence, especially where 
human beings are killed or injured. Law enforcement agencies also have a responsibility to keep 
accurate records of the reports received. 
(ix) Governors alleging coercion: In all Kaduna, Lagos and Rivers States, the state governments 
made allegations of the use of violence or threats of violence as an instrument of coercion by the 
opposition party in the State. 
(x) PVC discrepancies: In Rivers and Kaduna, in particular, we received very credible 
indications that PVCS may have been ―bought wholesale‖ by politicians or communities and 
indications that the practice of ―community voting‖ could seriously endanger both plans for 
credible elections and the safety of staff engaged to organize or administer them. These are on a 
level that must be taken seriously by both INEC and the security agencies. 
(xi) Allegations or perceptions of law enforcement uneven-handedness: We received allegations 
of lack of even handedness in law enforcement and security provisioning affecting campaigns 
and supporters were both rampant and too serious to ignore. Yet in all cases, the campaigns on 
all sides and officers making them enjoyed the protection of security agencies. Such allegations 
are not to be taken lightly but it is also important that political organizations should refrain from 
seeking to tarnish security agencies merely for the purpose of scoring political points. 
(xii) Breakdown of Accord on Non-Violence: In all the locations, the parties suggest that the 
accords signed between the parties to promote issued-based campaigning and refrain from 
violence had broken down almost irretrievably. There is mutual suspicion and lack of good faith 
between the parties. 
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(xiii) Imperative of protecting internal migrants and minorities: It‘s clear that around these 
elections populations of internal migrants and minorities in many parts of Nigeria live in mortal 
fear of significant election-related violence. Many fled before 14 Feb. Others re-located their 
families to places of origin. We have received reports of fatal accidents involving women and 
children fleeing in this way are many. Many children have missed an entire term of school as a 
result. In some states, internal migrants have also re-located to ‗squat‘ near military barracks or 
beside security establishments. 
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APPENDIX J 
CASE STUDY C: RIVERS STATE 
They buy guns for our youths; destroy our schools and our amenities, and our communities. They 
ask our youths to kill one another and do others of their biddings…Most of these youths that the 
state had turned into cultists, hostage-takers, armed robbers, assassins, prostitutes and thugs 
would have been great and meaningful to this society, but today their future is rocked with 
violence and evil. 
—Patrick Naagbanton, Port Harcourt journalist and activist.279 
Rivers State is the unofficial capital of Nigeria‘s booming oil industry and its state government is 
the wealthiest in Nigeria, with a budget of $1.4 billion in 2007.
280
 Unfortunately Rivers state‘s 
relative wealth has exacerbated rather than solved its many problems. Not least, the state‘s 
wealth has led to high-stakes political competition and a resulting level of political violence that 
considerably exceeds even the nationwide norm.  
Sowing the seeds of Violence: The 2003 Elections in Rivers 
Since 1999, the PDP has maintained a virtual monopoly on elective office in Rivers State and 
throughout the Niger Delta through rigged elections. The 2003 elections in Rivers were both 
more violent and more brazenly rigged than in most other parts of the country. One local civil 
society group compared the 2003 electoral period to a ―low-intensity armed struggle.‖281 Despite 
a widespread lack of voting, massive voter turnout was reported and the PDP swept elective 
offices across the state in landslide victories.
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Human Rights Watch interviewed more than a dozen people, including gang leaders, cultists and 
low-level thugs, who acknowledged having organized or carried out acts of paid violence on 
behalf of the PDP in order to rig the 2003 elections in Rivers. All of them said that they worked 
on behalf of the state government or PDP candidates for office to intimidate voters, attack their 
sponsors‘ opponents or rig the voting directly in favor of then-Governor Peter Odili and the 
PDP.
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The PDP‘s primary instruments in using violence to rig the 2003 polls in Rivers were two gangs 
that have since been at the forefront of violent crimes and ―militant‖ activity throughout the 
state: the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Asari Dukobo, and the Niger 
Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom. State government officials have vehemently denied 
their sponsorship of these groups, but the activities of some officials have been documented by 
Human Rights Watch, Nigerian civil society groups and journalists.
284
 Ateke Tom himself 
acknowledged the role he played in the 2003 elections, telling Human Rights Watch that then-
Governor Odili had promised cash and jobs in great quantities for himself and his ‗boys‘ and that 
in return, ―Any place Odili sent me, I conquer[ed] for him. I conquer[ed] everywhere.‖285 
Governor Odili has consistently denied any relationship with Ateke, Asari, or any other gang 
leader. 
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The Legacy of the 2003 Polls in Rivers 
Much of the compensation that PDP politicians promised to the groups they helped finance and 
arm during the 2003 elections never materialized. Specifically, many youth recruited by 
politicians to carry out electoral violence complain that they were promised additional cash 
payments and, more importantly, government jobs after the elections. Many gang members 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch point to poverty and unemployment as the sole factors 
motivating them to participate in political violence and crime.
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There are widespread complaints among these youth and their leaders that rather than fulfill 
these promises, their sponsors including then-Governor Peter Odili simply ―dumped‖ them once 
comfortably ensconced in office. As one civil society activist who works to discourage youth 
from participating in cult activities explained to Human Rights Watch, ―The armed groups, 
particularly the youth, felt betrayed by the kind of contracts they made with the politicians in 
2003. They felt that having participated in rigging the election, they deserved a stake.‖287 
The result of these broken promises was a rapid deterioration of relations between many armed 
groups and their former sponsors. Rivers State has been awash with guns since the 2003 polls, 
when politicians sparked the ongoing influx of arms into the region to arm their proxy gangs.
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Many groups subsequently moved into using their weaponry to spark an ongoing wave of violent 
crime, providing protection for or asserting control over oil bunkering operations and other 
criminal activities to make up for their loss of lucrative political sponsors.
289
 Local civil society 
groups, along with many current and former Rivers state government interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch, are unanimous in pointing to the mobilization by politicians of gangs—most of 
them linked to cult groups—to rig the 2003 elections as the beginning of the state‘s current 
epidemic of violent crime and proliferation of unaccountable armed gangs.
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The trend towards armed criminality sparked by the emergence and political sponsorship of 
armed groups during the 2003 elections has now spiraled out of control in Rivers. Militias and 
gangs have proliferated, maintaining camps of fighters in the creeks that engage in oil bunkering 
and stage bank robberies and street battles in Port Harcourt. Some of these groups have turned 
kidnappings for ransom of expatriate oil workers, wealthy Nigerians and their family members 
into a profitable business. Kidnappings have become commonplace since the beginning of 2006 
and armed gangs seized more than one hundred oil workers in the first six months of 2007 
alone.
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 In early 2007 the kidnapping epidemic took an even more disturbing new turn with the 
seizure of several young children for ransom by armed attackers.
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Turf Wars, Extortion and Impunity 
Aside from overtly political violence in the months surrounding elections, insecurity for the 
residents of Rivers State has been worst when armed groups have turned against one another. 
This infighting is linked to claims on political patronage, competition over territory, oil 
bunkering networks, or other sources of revenue and influence.  
Beginning in late 2003, a drawn-out armed conflict between the PDP‘s erstwhile agents—Asari‘s 
NDPVF and Ateke‘s NDV—plunged parts of Port Harcourt and surrounding communities into a 
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state of terror. Dozens of local people were killed along with hundreds of fighters, tens of 
thousands fled their homes and riverine communities along the creeks were devastated. Human 
Rights Watch documented the human rights impact of that conflict in detail in a 2004 report.
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That violence is generally acknowledged to have been sparked by a power play on the part of the 
state government. Having fallen out with former ally Asari Dukobo after Asari helped rig the 
2003 elections, the Odili administration sponsored Ateke Tom in a failed and bloody attempt to 
crush Asari‘s group.294 
The spiral of violence that followed the 2003 elections repeated itself after the 2007 polls. In 
May 2007 gang members linked to another prominent militant, Soboma George, murdered armed 
group leader Price Igodo and as many as a dozen others. Numerous sources indicated told 
Human Rights Watch that Soboma was paid to carry out the attack by supporters of current 
Governor Celestine Omehia partly in response to concerns that Igodo was planning to disrupt the 
new government‘s May 29 inauguration.295 
Soboma and his Outlaws gang were reportedly hired by the PDP to help rig the 2007 elections in 
Rivers.
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 One cult member described a meeting in Government House in Port Harcourt just 
prior to the April 14 polls during which he saw government officials hand out between N5 
million and N10 million ($38,500 to $77,000) to several different cult groups in return for their 
assisting or simply accepting the PDP‘s plans to rig the polls.297 Several other sources confirmed 
the substance of the meeting.
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In August 2007, Port Harcourt descended into chaos, with armed gangs waging ongoing battles 
in the streets of the city and wreaking devastation on the surrounding communities. Civil society 
activists in Port Harcourt described this fighting as being linked to struggles between various 
gangs to assert claims on political patronage including money and oil bunkering routes from the 
state government and anger on the part of some gangs at Soboma George‘s preeminent role in 
securing such patronage. As one prominent activist put it, ―It‘s the same old story—people who 
were used for elections on April 14 and 21, having won the election are trying to establish 
supremacy against the other groups in the state.‖299 And indeed the fighting bore a grim 
resemblance to the events that followed the 2003 elections in Rivers—not least because one of 
its central belligerents was none other than Ateke Tom. 
After weeks of violence, the Nigerian military‘s Joint Task Force (JTF) intervened, engaging in a 
bloody battle with the gangs in Port Harcourt. The JTF is comprised of forces drawn from 
different branches of the Nigerian military and is currently under the command of Army 
Brigadier General Yaki Sakin Bello. A tenuous calm was quickly restored after a street battle 
that reportedly saw dozens of gang members killed, including many killed by attack helicopter. 
The toll in lives exacted by the fighting was heavy: local civil society groups reported that 
dozens of innocent bystanders were killed or wounded along with unknown numbers of gang 
members. One MSF-run trauma center in Port Harcourt reported treating 72 gunshot wounds in 
July 2007—then its worst month on record—followed by 71 further gunshot victims during the 
first two weeks of August alone.
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Most of the wounded treated at the MSF trauma center were suffering from high-velocity 
gunshot wounds and most reported having been fired on at random by marauding gang members 
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or caught in the crossfire between rival gangs.
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 Days after the MSF‘s numbers above were 
compiled, the military intervened in fighting that yielded still further casualties.
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 Local 
newspapers reported roughly 40 dead during a day of heavy fighting between gangs and military 
forces in the densely populated confines of Port Harcourt.
303
 Local civil society activists 
estimated that the true number was significantly higher.
304
 A military spokesperson told Human 
Rights Watch that he could not offer any estimate of casualties on any side.
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Box 6: A Gang Leader Discusses his Role in Politics 
The following is drawn from the testimony of a gang leader in Port Harcourt who was 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch on the eve of the 2007 elections. He, along with other 
youth who told HRW that they had worked to rig the 2003 elections, blamed broken 
promises on the part of the state government for much of the violence in which they had 
been involved: 
In 1999 and 2003, [Governor] Odili called us and told us we should work for him. He 
called other faction leaders of different groups in Port Harcourt. He worked through Asari 
[Dukobo of the NDPVF]…They gave some groups N5 million, 3 million, 10 million…We 
disrupted the election in favor of our governor and his candidates—we stood at the election 
ground so people would not come. There was no election.  
After 1999, we waited and waited and there was nothing. In 2003 they called us again and 
said we should work for them and again they broke their promises. They promised us 
opportunities, empowerment. Instead [after the elections] they started chasing us and 
calling us cultists…They declared me ―wanted‖ on radio and television.  
After 2003 they went and called Ateke Tom and said he should chase us and kill the 
members of our group. We were chased out of our areas by Ateke who was working with 
law enforcement groups. They killed many of my boys.  
We went for a peace parlay with Ateke in Abuja. They government promised us 
employment, empowerment… They then said we should refund our guns to them. We did. 
But we kept some for ourselves because we knew we could not trust them. We have not 
had to acquire new weapons–we had enough arsenal.  
The government people approached me to mobilize my boys for the elections [in 2007] but 
they are not sincere. They destroyed my house and killed many of my members with JTF 
[the Joint Task Force of security agencies deployed to combat unrest in the Delta]. They 
now approached us again and asked us to work for them but we said no, because they are 
not sincere.  
There won‘t be any problems here if they work with us. The message we are going to give 
them is, they should create employment, job opportunities and social amenities for the 
youth of the Niger Delta…In this area we have oil and gas in abundance but we are not 
being carried along.
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Impunity for Violence 
Recent clashes with the military aside, for the most part armed groups in Rivers State have been 
left to operate with near-total impunity, even where they have evolved almost entirely into purely 
criminal organizations willing to work for the highest bidder or simply carry out violent crime on 
their own. Ateke Tom and his NDV is the most glaring example.  
Human Rights Watch met with Ateke Tom along with several journalists the day before the first 
round of voting in the 2007 polls. On paper, Ateke has been a wanted man for several years, as 
he has been implicated in numerous murders and bank robberies, but the camp where the 
meeting took place was hidden in plain view just off a major waterway and a short boat ride 
away from Port Harcourt.
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 Scores of armed men dressed mostly in plastic sandals and ragged 
but colorful t-shirts loitered about the camp, not bothering to seek cover even when a helicopter 
buzzed almost directly overhead.  
Asked by Human Rights Watch to explain his primary aims, Ateke demanded that the 
government provide jobs to him and his ―boys‖ and that he be repaid for property he alleged the 
Nigerian military had destroyed during a previous military operation to break the power of his 
armed group. ―The weapons that are with us, we can use them for any fight,‖ he said.308 Several 
of the armed men present in Ateke‘s camp openly bragged that they would travel to Port 
Harcourt the next day, the day of the gubernatorial elections, to ―destroy.‖309 
The night before the April 14 elections, Ateke‘s men attacked two police stations in Port 
Harcourt, murdering several officers and burning the police stations to the ground.
310
 The 
attackers reportedly locked one policeman inside a Hilux pickup and then tossed in a stick of 
locally-made ―dynamite‖ that killed him and set the truck ablaze.311 In one press interview after 
the attack, Ateke said that he had no regrets for ordering the attack. ―If you are fighting, people 
will die,‖ he said.312 
Some reports indicate that the purpose of the attack was to free some NDV fighters who had 
supposedly been arrested; other sources believed the goal was simply to demonstrate Ateke‘s 
capacity for mayhem in order to strengthen his bargaining position and extort some payment in 
return for refraining from causing any further disruption on Election Day.
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 Later the same day 
Ateke reportedly reached a settlement with the local government chairman in his home town of 
Okrika to refrain from disrupting the elections there in exchange for an unspecified payment.
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The results in Okrika were then massively rigged in favor of the PDP.
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Since the August fighting between Rivers‘ gangs and the military, Soboma George and Ateke 
Tom are, once again, being described as wanted men. A military spokesperson told Human 
Rights Watch that he ―suspected‖ Soboma George was killed in the August fighting but these 
claims were widely dismissed by civil society activists. The same spokesperson affirmed that 
―God willing, we will catch Ateke.‖316 As of this writing Ateke remained at large. 
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Impunity for the Sponsors of Violence in Rivers 
One of the most notorious theatres of pre-election violence in 2006 and 2007 occurred in the 
town of Bodo in Gokana local government, where armed groups sponsored by two prominent 
Rivers politicians, including the current Secretary to the State Government, unleashed mayhem 
in the course of a long-running political turf war.
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The example of Bodo is by no means atypical. No government official has been held to account 
or even presented with criminal charges for having helped to arm the criminal gangs that have 
grown so powerful in Rivers State in the years since 2003, least of all former Governor Peter 
Odili. The impunity enjoyed by politicians is so widespread that some residents of the state are 
not even aware that their sponsorship of armed gangs is in and of itself illegal. One former gang 
member in Port Harcourt suggested to Human Rights Watch that, ―If the government would pass 
a law preventing the politicians from giving arms to our people, it would help Rivers a lot.‖318 
Impunity and 2007’s Post-Election Crisis 
Soon after being sworn into office in June 2007, current Rivers Governor Celestine Omehia 
announced a plan to award payments of N1 million ($7700) each to any youths in armed groups 
who agree to ―renounce violence.‖ 
The Rivers State government‘s ―policy‖ was harshly criticized by local activists who complained 
that it was unaccompanied by any measure to reintegrate members of cults and other armed 
gangs into society, did not spell out who or how people would qualify, and in fact did not appear 
to be part of any rational policy at all. The government also made no mention of any plan to hold 
accountable individuals responsible for large numbers of murders and other violent abuses, such 
as Ateke Tom, or their former political sponsors such as ex-Governor Peter Odili or some current 
government officials in the state.  
In a July 2007 interview, Hassan Douglas, Chairman of Rivers State Niger Delta Peace and 
Crisis Resolution Committee—one of six committees announced under a federal coordinating 
committee—derided the plan‘s critics and said that the program had already brought peace to the 
entirety of Rivers State. ―Rivers State right now is a heaven for investors,‖ Douglas said to 
Human Rights Watch. ―No panic, no more militias, no more hostage taking. No more fighting in 
any part of the state right now. Rivers State is now like it was before 1999, within the space of 
only one month our Governor has done this.‖319 Weeks later, Port Harcourt was engulfed in the 
violent chaos described above.  
Government policies, exemplified by the Rivers State Government‘s ―millionaires‖ program, 
have not only been ineffective but have largely missed the point. When the military‘s Joint Task 
Force intervened in August 2007 to combat warring gangs, many Port Harcourt residents 
welcomed the move in principle but worried that the bloodshed would prove pointless unless the 
politicians who sponsored and helped arm those gangs were held to account. As one leading 
human rights activist put it: 
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What will this military intervention do to the whole idea of the politicians paying, motivating, 
recruiting and keeping and protecting these militants? That is the whole problem…The 
politicians just a couple of months ago paid these boys to win the elections for them- they paid 
them and also gave them the [unofficial] license to go and do oil bunkering. I don‘t see anything 
coming out of this unless these politicians are dealt with.
320
 
 
 
 
 
279
 Patrick Naagbanton, ―Funeral Song for Prince Igodo and Others,‖ The Port Harcourt 
Telegraph, June 6, 2007. 
280
 ―2007: Assembly Approves N183 Billion as Rivers Budget,‖ Rivers State House of Assembly 
Press Release, http://www.riversassembly.org/news/58-
2007%253A_ASSEMBLY_APPROVES_N183BN_AS_RIVERS_BUDGET.php (accessed July 
13, 2007). This is roughly five times the national average across all state governments. See 
Human Rights Watch, Chop Fine, pp. 75-79. 
281
 Election monitoring report on the ongoing Nigeria federal and state general elections, 
April/May 2003 (executive summary), Environmental Rights Action. Reproduced in Nigeria 
Today, April 26, 2003. 
282
 Governor Peter Odili reportedly won roughly 98% of all votes cast. Human Rights Watch 
interviews with member of 2003 election observer mission, Abuja, Februay 2007. 
283
 Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt, December 2005, August 2006 and April 
2007.  
284
 Along with Governor Peter Odili, former Secretary to the State Government and Federal 
Transportation Minister Abiye Sekibo reportedly played a central role in sponsoring the violent 
activities of Ateke Tom‘s NDV in particular. See Human Rights Watch, Rivers and Blood, pp. 2-
3 and 4-6 ; Human Rights Watch, Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence,pp. 
14-19. 
285
 Human Rights Watch interview with Ateke Tom, Rivers State, April 13, 2007. 
286
 Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt, August 2006 and April 2007. 
287
 Human Rights Watch interview, Port Harcourt, April 11, 2007. 
288
 See Human Rights Watch, Rivers and Blood,pp. 4-6 and 9-10. 
289
 See Human Rights Watch, Rivers and Blood. 
204 
 
290
 Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt, August 2006 and April 2007.  
291
 See ―Foreign Hostages Freed in Nigeria,‖ BBC News Online, June 23, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6234008.stm (accessed July 16, 2007). 
292
 As of July 16, 2007, three young children had been taken hostage and subsequently released 
by armed groups in the Delta. These included two children of wealthy Nigerians and the three-
year old daughter of an expatriate resident of Port Harcourt. See ―Nigeria kidnappers free UK 
girl,‖ BBC News Online, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6282846.stm (accessed 
July 16, 2007). 
293
 Human Rights Watch, Rivers and Blood. 
294
 Human Rights Watch interviews with civil society activists and gang members, Port 
Harcourt, August 2006 and April 2007. 
295
 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews and email correspondence with civil society 
activists, journalists and former cult members, June and July 2007. 
296
 Human Rights Watch interviews with activists and cult members, Port Harcourt, April 2007. 
See also Patrick Naagbanton, ―Funeral Song for Prince Igodo and Others,‖ The Port Harcourt 
Telegraph, June 6, 2007. 
297
 Human Rights Watch interview, Port Harcourt, April 16, 2007. 
298
 Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt and Abuja, April 2007. See also Robyn 
Dixon, ―Niger Delta‘s politicians ease way into office by using thugs,‖ Los Angeles Times, April 
21, 2007, citing a member of the Buccaneers cult group claiming that cult groups were paid N10 
million to help rig the elections. 
299
 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Anyakwee Nsirimovu, Port Harcourt, August 
21, 2007. 
300
 Doctors Without Borders, ―Field News: MSF Trauma Center Admits 71 Over Two Weeks in 
Port Harcourt, Nigeria,‖ August 13, 2007, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/2007/08-
14-2007.cfm (accessed August 21, 2007). 
301
 Ibid. 
302
 Ibid. 
303
 Voice of America, ―Tenuous Calm Returns to Nigerian Oil City After Deadly Battles,‖ 
August 19, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-08-19-voa16.cfm (accessed August 21, 
2007). 
304
 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews, Port Harcourt, August 21, 2007. 
205 
 
305
 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with military spokesperson, Port Harcourt, August 
21, 2007. 
306
 Human Rights Watch interview, Port Harcourt, April 12, 2007. 
307
 Like other prominent militia leaders, Ateke and his militia have several different camps 
scattered throughout the creeks. 
308
 Human Rights Watch interview with Ateke Tom, Rivers State, April 13, 2007. 
309
 Human Rights Watch interviews, camp of Ateke Tom, Rivers State, April 13, 2007. 
310
 See ―Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence, Fraud,‖ Human Rights Watch news release, April 
17, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm. 
311
 Human Rights Watch interview with activist, Port Harcourt, April 14, 2007. 
312
 Robyn Dixon, ―Niger Delta‘s politicians ease way into office by using thugs,‖ Los Angeles 
Times, April 21, 2007. 
313
 Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt, April 2007; civil society activist reports on 
file with Human Rights Watch. 
314
 Human Rights Watch interviews with cult members and civil society groups, Port Harcourt 
and Abuja, April 2007. 
315
 See ―Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence, Fraud,‖ Human Rights Watch news release, April 
17, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm.  
316
 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with military spokesperson Major Sagir Musa, Port 
Harcourt, August 21, 2007. 
317
 Two prominent Rivers State politicians hail from Gokana— Kenneth Kobani, the State 
Commissioner for Finance, and Gabriel Pidomson, a member of the Rivers State House of 
Assembly. In what local analysts called a struggle for position ahead of the 2007 elections, gangs 
allegedly linked to the two politicians carried out a series of brutal attacks on one another in and 
around Bodo during August 2006. At least a dozen people were killed and the community was 
plunged into a state of insecurity and terror for several weeks. Apparently alarmed by the scale 
of the violence and worried that it might set a precedent for the 2007 elections, the federal 
government‘s State Security Service took the unusual step of arresting both Kobani and 
Pidomson. After several weeks in detention, however, both men were released and left to resume 
their posts in government. Neither was charged with any crime or received any other sort of 
formal sanction. See Patrick Naagbanton, ―The Bodo War of Attrition,‖ July 31, 2006, 
http://www.cehrd.org/files/The_Bodo_War_of_Attrition2.doc (accessed July 12, 2007). 
318
 Human Rights Watch interview, Port Harcourt, April 12, 2007. 
206 
 
319
 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alh. Hassan Douglas, Chairman, Niger Delta 
Peace and Crisis Resolution Committee, July 16, 2007. 
320
 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Anyakwee Nisirmovu, April 20, 2007. 
Available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/9.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
208 
 
APPENDIX K: BIVARIATE ANALYSIS (CROSS TABULATION) 
Table 4:3.1 Harassment of Party Leaders Opposed to Imposition of Candidates According 
to Background Factors  
 
 
Background Factors 
 
 
Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
Disagree/  
Strongly Disagree 
 
209 
 
 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
 
54.6% 
26.0% 
 
 
P-value=0.017 
 
 
 
18.5% 
18.4% 
 
 
 
26.8% 
35.7% 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
54.0% 
57.3% 
57.6% 
62.7% 
47.2% 
45.2% 
25.0% 
45.3% 
 
 
P-value=0.002 
 
12.6% 
16.9% 
15.1% 
14.4% 
20.2% 
24.2% 
35.4% 
22.6% 
 
33.3% 
25.9% 
27.4% 
22.9% 
32.6% 
30.7% 
39.6% 
32.0% 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
52.6% 
51.7% 
77.8% 
 
 
P-value=0.104 
 
16.2% 
21.6% 
11.1% 
 
31.2% 
26.7% 
11.1% 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
 
56.8% 
53.7% 
 
35.7% 
 
 
P-value=0.198 
 
15.5% 
18.2% 
 
21.4% 
 
27.7% 
28.2% 
 
42.9% 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
49.5% 
52.1% 
 
P-value=0.201 
 
 
16.8% 
18.9% 
 
 
33.7% 
29.0% 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
51.4% 
50.5% 
55.2% 
58.9% 
 
18.7% 
18.8% 
17.0% 
11.8% 
 
29.9% 
30.8% 
27.9% 
29.4% 
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Table 4.3.2 Election Did Not Follow Due Process and Rule of Law According to 
Background Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
48.5% 
50.8% 
 
 
P-value=0.225 
 
 
12.6% 
6.7% 
 
 
39.0% 
42.4% 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
53.0% 
39.3% 
55.0% 
52.2% 
41.4% 
48.3% 
55.3% 
48.0% 
 
 
P-value=0.096 
 
8.4% 
20.2% 
3.0% 
13.9% 
12.9% 
14.5% 
2.1% 
10.0% 
 
38.5% 
40.5% 
42.0% 
33.9% 
46.0% 
37.1% 
42.6% 
42.0% 
 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
50.8% 
46.8% 
33.3% 
 
 
P-value=0.022 
 
11.4% 
10.8% 
 
 
37.8% 
42.4% 
66.7% 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
48.9% 
49.2% 
 
47.3% 
 
 
 
9.0% 
13.3% 
 
1.8% 
 
42.1% 
37.6% 
 
50.9% 
 
 
P-value=0.817 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
56.7% 
47.9% 
 
 
P-value=0.001 
 
16.3% 
20.5% 
 
26.9% 
31.6% 
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P-value=0.038 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
44.1% 
50.4% 
 
 
P-value=0.002 
 
 
6.8% 
13.4% 
 
 
49.3% 
36.1% 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
51.5% 
47.6% 
51.6% 
43.8% 
 
 
P-value=0.610 
 
5.8% 
13.2% 
9.7% 
6.3% 
 
42.7% 
39.2% 
38.7% 
50.0% 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
64.0% 
34.7% 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
12.2% 
9.7% 
 
23.8% 
55.6% 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
66.4% 
40.5% 
36.7% 
58.0% 
53.5% 
66.3% 
22.1% 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
4.2% 
19.0% 
2.2% 
9.9% 
12.1% 
5.4% 
24.2% 
 
29.5% 
40.5% 
61.1% 
32.1% 
34.4% 
28.2% 
53.7% 
 
TABLE 4.3.3 Candidates Produced by Primary Elections were not Based on Merit 
According to Background Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
56.7% 
53.0% 
 
 
P-value=0.588 
 
 
8.6 
7.6 
 
 
34.8 
39.5 
AGE    
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<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
46.5 
52.3 
53.9 
57.1 
48.9 
57.1 
66.6 
 
 
P-value=0.001 
2.3 
11.6 
9.6 
10.2 
11.1 
12.7 
4.2 
51.2 
36.0 
36.6 
33.0 
40.0 
30.2 
29.1 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
59.2 
48.1 
72.2 
 
 
P-value=0.007 
 
9.3 
6.5 
11.1 
 
31.6 
45.4 
16.7 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
 
53.1 
56 
 
57.9 
 
 
P-value=0.328 
 
6.8 
9.3 
 
5.3 
 
40.1 
34.7 
 
36.8 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
43.3 
56.5 
 
 
P-value=0.010 
 
 
4.9 
9.9 
 
 
46.7 
33.4 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
52.9 
61.2 
46.7 
41.1 
 
 
P-value=0.001 
 
5.8 
6.6 
13.9 
11.8 
 
 
41.4 
32.2 
39.4 
47.0 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
66.7 
45.0 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
7.0 
9.6 
 
26.3 
45.4 
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STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
34.4 
46.9 
56.0 
56.6 
67.0 
74.2 
53.1 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
3.0 
14.8 
Nil 
15.7 
11.0 
11.3 
4.1 
 
62.6 
38.3 
44.1 
27.7 
22.0 
14.5 
42.9 
 
Table 4.3.4 Poor Leadership Can Result From Imposition of Candidates on the People 
According to Background Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
85.3 
85.9 
 
 
P-value=0.178 
 
 
6.3 
8.6 
 
 
8.4 
5.4 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
91.9 
85.6 
86.4 
86.3 
86.5 
75.0 
81.3 
 
 
P-value=0.215 
 
3.4 
4.8 
4.9 
6.0 
7.9 
14.1 
16.7 
 
4.6 
9.6 
8.8 
7.7 
5.6 
10.9 
2.1 
 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
87.4 
82.4 
82.4 
 
 
P-value=0.167 
 
5.7 
9.1 
5.9 
 
 
6.8 
8.6 
11.8 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
87.7 
85.7 
 
75.4 
 
5.5 
7.3 
 
8.8 
 
6.8 
7.0 
 
15.8 
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P-value=0.305 
 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
83.4 
86.3 
 
 
P-value=0.217 
 
 
8.8 
6.0 
 
 
7.7 
7.7 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
87.4 
86.3 
82.7 
88.2 
 
 
P-value=0.053 
 
4.9 
8.0 
5.6 
Nil  
 
7.8 
5.7 
11.8 
11.8 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
90.5 
80.7 
 
 
P-value=0.003 
 
5.4 
8.4 
 
4.1 
10.8 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
92.0 
91.4 
93.4 
90.3 
79.8 
85.2 
68.4 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
2.0 
4.9 
3.3 
3.7 
11.1 
2.1 
20.4 
 
6.0 
3.7 
3.3 
6.1 
9.1 
12.7 
11.2 
 
TABLE 4.3.5 Nigeria’s Democracy Will Not Grow if There is Imposition of Candidates 
according to Background Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
90.4 
91.3 
 
 
 
 
6.5 
4.3 
 
 
3.1 
4.3 
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P-value=0.031 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
96.6 
94.2 
88.0 
91.5 
88.8 
84.1 
85.5 
 
 
P-value=0.064 
 
2.3 
3.5 
8.0 
6.0 
6.7 
11.1 
8.3 
 
1.1 
2.3 
4.0 
2.6 
4.4 
4.8 
6.3 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
92.4 
88.3 
94.4 
 
P-value=0.066 
 
4.2 
8.6 
Nil 
 
 
3.4 
3.1 
5.6 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
93.2 
89.7 
 
92.9 
 
 
P-value=0.482 
 
3.4 
6.6 
 
5.3 
 
3.4 
3.7 
 
1.8 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
92.3 
90.2 
 
 
P-value=0.585 
 
 
5.5 
5.8 
 
 
2.3 
3.9 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
94.2 
90.2 
90.2 
94.1 
 
 
P-value=0.775 
 
2.9 
6.6 
6.1 
Nil 
 
 
2.9 
3.1 
3.6 
5.9 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
93.6 
88.0 
 
P-value=0.064 
 
3.5 
8.1 
 
2.9 
3.9 
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Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
99.0 
84.0 
95.5 
98.7 
81.8 
89.4 
86.7 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
Nil 
9.9 
2.2 
1.2 
8.1 
8.2 
11.2 
 
1.0 
6.2 
2.2 
Nil 
10.1 
2.0 
2.0 
 
Table 6: The Greatest Challenge to Democracy in Nigeria is the Abuse of Power and the 
Failure of Political Class to follow Due Process and the Rule of Law According to 
Background Factors  
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
92.7 
94.6 
 
P-value=0.454 
 
 
4.5 
4.8 
 
 
 
2.8 
0.5 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
96.6 
91.8 
91.3 
89.9 
93.3 
93.8 
97.9 
 
 
P-value=0.247 
 
2.3 
3.5 
8.7 
6.8 
5.6 
3.1 
2.1 
 
1.1 
4.7 
Nil 
3.4 
1.1 
3.1 
Nil 
 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
95.1 
89.7 
94.5 
 
 
P-value=0.159 
 
3.4 
7.3 
Nil 
 
 
1.6 
3.0 
5.6 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
 
91.2 
94.5 
 
4.7 
4.6 
 
4.0 
0.9 
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Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
89.5 
 
 
P-value=0.048 
 
3.5 
 
7.1 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
96.1 
91.9 
 
 
P-value=0.403 
 
 
2.7 
5.5 
 
 
1.0 
2.5 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
91.3 
94.0 
92.8 
94.1 
 
P-value=0.019 
 
4.8 
3.7 
6.1 
5.9 
 
3.9 
2.3 
1.2 
Nil 
 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
94.6 
92.0 
 
P-value=0.125 
 
4.7 
4.5 
 
0.6 
3.6 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
96.0 
80.5 
97.8 
97.6 
93.0 
88.6 
97.9 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
3.0 
17.1 
1.1 
2.4 
5.0 
5.2 
Nil 
 
1.0 
2.4 
1.1 
Nil 
2.0 
6.2 
2.0 
Table 4.3.7 Voting Process Violated Democratic Rules/Principles According to Background 
Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
53.1 
58.1 
 
P-value=0.173 
 
 
12.4 
11.3 
 
 
34.5 
30.7 
AGE    
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<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
54.7 
49.5 
47.2 
52.6 
53.4 
59.4 
66.7 
 
 
P-value=0.009 
7.0 
18.1 
11.3 
9.5 
10.0 
14.1 
14.6 
38.4 
32.5 
41.5 
37.9 
36.6 
26.5 
18.8 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
54.7 
52.3 
72.2 
 
P-value=0.095 
 
13.6 
10.7 
5.6 
 
 
31.6 
36.9 
22.3 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
53.4 
54.5 
 
59.6 
 
 
P-value=0.889 
 
10.3 
12.6 
 
12.3 
 
36.3 
32.8 
 
28.1 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
55.5 
52.4 
 
 
P-value=0.056 
 
 
7.6 
14.5 
 
 
37.0 
33.1 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
54.7 
55.4 
53.3 
41.2 
 
P-value=0.302 
 
5.7 
13.9 
12.1 
11.8 
 
39.6 
30.7 
34.5 
47.1 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
67.6 
42.3 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
16.4 
8.0 
 
16.1 
49.8 
STATE 
Adamawa 
 
62.6 
 
5.1 
 
32.3 
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Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
43.9 
76.1 
45.3 
66.0 
61.8 
22.2 
9.8 
1.1 
14.1 
11.0 
11.3 
31.0 
 
46.3 
22.8 
37.7 
23.0 
26.8 
47.0 
Table 4.3.8 Poverty Is Responsible For the Inability of Delegates and Voters to Choose 
Candidates Independently of What Their Leaders Tell Them According to Background 
Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
79.4 
74.7 
 
P-value=0.247 
 
 
6.1 
4.8 
 
 
14.4 
20.5 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
78.2 
77.6 
82.0 
77.1 
70.0 
78.1 
77.1 
 
 
P-value=0.001 
 
2.3 
5.6 
5.7 
1.7 
11.1 
6.3 
14.6 
 
19.5 
16.9 
12.3 
21.2 
18.9 
15.7 
8.3 
 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
82.9 
69.1 
88.9 
 
P-value=0.001 
 
4.3 
8.2 
5.6 
 
12.7 
22.7 
5.6 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
79.1 
78.2 
 
75.4 
 
 
P-value=0.545 
 
3.4 
6.2 
 
7.0 
 
17.6 
15.6 
 
17.6 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
 
 
73.9 
 
 
6.5 
 
 
19.6 
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Tertiary/ Others 80.5 
 
 
P-value=0.445 
5.0 14.4 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
76.7 
79.7 
75.8 
82.4 
 
 
P-value=0.575 
 
3.7 
5.6 
6.7 
5.9 
 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
85.0 
71.6 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
6.3 
5.3 
 
8.7 
23.1 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
83.0 
80.5 
77.4 
86.1 
86.0 
80.4 
55.0 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
5.0 
3.7 
2.2 
3.5 
4.0 
4.1 
17.0 
 
12.0 
15.9 
20.4 
10.5 
10.0 
15.5 
28.0 
Table 4.3.9 Votes Were Influenced By Monetary Inducement According To Background 
Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
75.0 
74.0 
 
 
P-value=0.205 
 
 
6.6 
5.4 
 
 
18.3 
20.6 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
 
77.7 
77.2 
70.4 
77.0 
66.7 
79.7 
 
7.1 
8.0 
10.5 
4.3 
8.9 
Nil 
 
15.3 
14.8 
19.1 
18.8 
24.5 
20.3 
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      55-59 
      60+ 
75.0 
75.5 
 
 
P-value=0.003 
2.1 
5.7 
23.0 
18.9 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
79.7 
64.9 
88.9 
 
P-value=0.001 
 
5.9 
7.4 
Nil 
 
 
14.4 
27.8 
11.2 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
78.1 
74.7 
 
68.4 
 
P-value=0.054 
 
9.6 
5.3 
 
5.3 
 
12.4 
20.1 
 
26.3 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
71.8 
75.5 
 
 
P-value=0.004 
 
 
3.3 
7.8 
 
 
24.9 
16.8 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
77.1 
73.6 
78.7 
64.7 
 
P-value=0.459 
 
6.7 
5.1 
7.3 
11.8 
 
16.2 
21.3 
14.0 
23.5 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
84.8 
65.2 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
5.4 
7.1 
 
9.8 
27.7 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
75.5 
71.6 
90.4 
73.8 
83.0 
86.6 
43.0 
 
 
5.1 
18.5 
1.1 
8.3 
5.0 
5.2 
3.0 
 
19.4 
9.9 
8.7 
17.9 
12.0 
8.2 
54.0 
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P-value=0.000 
 
Table 4.3.10 Votes Were Influenced by Ethnic Sentiments According to Background 
Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
63.8 
68.6 
 
 
P-value=0.393 
 
 
14.7 
9.7 
 
 
21.6 
21.6 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
64.7 
66.3 
67.0 
66.9 
65.2 
59.4 
70.9 
58.5 
 
 
P-value=0.387 
 
14.1 
19.1 
10.7 
9.6 
9.0 
18.8 
8.3 
18.9 
 
21.2 
14.6 
22.4 
23.4 
25.9 
21.9 
20.8 
22.7 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
69.2 
57.9 
88.9 
 
P-value=0.015 
 
12.7 
13.9 
Nil 
 
 
18.1 
28.2 
11.2 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
72.4 
63.7 
 
59.6 
 
P-value=0.317 
 
11.7 
13.7 
10.5 
 
 
15.9 
22.5 
29.8 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
62.1 
65.9 
 
P-value=0.171 
 
 
12.6 
13.9 
 
 
25.3 
20.2 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
 
76.2 
 
10.5 
 
13.4 
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Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
64.9 
61.6 
47.0 
 
P-value=0.145 
14.4 
12.6 
11.8 
20.7 
25.8 
41.2 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
69.3 
61.2 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
16.8 
9.9 
 
13.9 
28.8 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
50.6 
77.2 
78.5 
78.3 
68.0 
73.2 
36.0 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
27.8 
10.1 
2.2 
10.8 
11.0 
4.1 
25.0 
 
21.7 
12.7 
19.4 
10.8 
21.0 
22.7 
39.0 
 
Table 4.3.11 Voting Process Influenced by Intimidation/Fraud According to Background 
Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
49.4 
55.4 
 
P-value-=0.490 
 
 
11.9 
12.9 
 
 
38.6 
31.7 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
43.6 
53.5 
62.3 
47.4 
43.3 
51.5 
56.3 
 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
25.3 
13.6 
9.4 
9.5 
6.7 
15.6 
4.2 
 
31.0 
32.9 
28.3 
43.1 
50.0 
32.8 
39.6 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
57.9 
38.8 
61.1 
 
13.1 
12.1 
Nil 
 
29.0 
49.2 
38.9 
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P-value=0.000 
 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
51.3 
50.6 
 
54.4 
 
P-value=0.005 
 
19.9 
10.3 
 
5.3 
 
28.8 
39.1 
40.3 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
49.4 
53.5 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
 
8.2 
14.7 
 
 
42.4 
31.7 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
60.4 
49.0 
52.7 
37.5 
 
P-value=0.568 
 
10.4 
12.5 
13.3 
6.3 
 
29.3 
38.5 
33.9 
56.3 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
63.6 
39.3 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
11.6 
12.8 
 
24.7 
47.9 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
46.5 
45.7 
52.7 
59.3 
59.0 
70.9 
25.0 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
17.2 
23.5 
4.3 
14.0 
19.0 
7.3 
2.0 
 
36.4 
30.8 
43.0 
26.8 
22.0 
21.9 
73.0 
 
Table 4.3.12 Votes Influenced By Use Of Force According To Background Factors 
 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
38.5 
45.7 
 
 
15.7 
14.3 
 
 
45.7 
46.2 
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P-value=0.758 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
34.4 
45.5 
32.7 
42.9 
37.5 
36.0 
43.8 
41.5 
 
P-value=0.149 
 
12.6 
12.5 
21,8 
10.5 
14.8 
18.8 
16.7 
18.9 
 
52.9 
42.1 
45.6 
46.5 
47.7 
45.3 
39.6 
39.6 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
38.1 
38.7 
72.2 
 
P-value=0.033 
 
18.2 
12.2 
Nil  
 
43.8 
49.1 
27.8 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
32.2 
40.8 
 
43.9 
 
 
P-value=0.561 
 
16.4 
15.9 
 
8.8 
 
51.4 
43.3 
 
47.3 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
32.4 
40.0 
 
P-value=0.009 
 
 
13.7 
16.8 
 
 
53.9 
43.3 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
31.8 
40.3 
42.1 
29.4 
 
P-value=0.048 
 
7.5 
18.6 
14.6 
17.6 
 
60.7 
41.1 
43.3 
52.9 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
53.3 
25.2 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
14.7 
15.9 
 
31.9 
58.8 
STATE    
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Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
46.3 
35.1 
33.7 
39.6 
19.2 
48.4 
49.0 
 
P-value=0.00 
15.8 
16.9 
2.2 
19.8 
38.4 
9.3 
5.0 
37.9 
48.1 
64.1 
40.7 
42.4 
42.2 
46.0 
Table 4.3.13 Votes Influenced by Intimidation According to Background Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
46.4 
40.0 
 
P-value=0.441 
 
 
14.3 
13.0 
 
 
39.4 
47.1 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
39.6 
46.1 
43.4 
58.6 
42.2 
39.1 
31.2 
 
 
P-value=0.128 
 
14.0 
16.9 
16.0 
7.8 
10.0 
18.8 
18.8 
 
46.6 
37.1 
40.5 
33.6 
47.8 
42.2 
50.0 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
46.2 
43.1 
50.0 
 
P-value=0.122 
 
14.6 
12.5 
11.1 
 
39.2 
44.4 
38.9 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
41.2 
46.4 
 
42.1 
 
P-value=0.849 
 
18.2 
12.9 
 
12.3 
 
40.5 
40.7 
 
45.6 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
36.2 
47.2 
 
 
8.2 
17.2 
 
 
55.5 
35.7 
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P-value=0.000 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
42.0 
45.5 
43.5 
35.3 
 
P-value=0.619 
 
12.1 
13.3 
17.2 
17.6 
 
 
45.8 
41.2 
39.2 
47.0 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
56.6 
33.3 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
13.5 
14.2 
 
 
29.9 
52.6 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
46.5 
45.7 
40.9 
43.5 
38.0 
46.4 
51.0 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
13.1 
24.7 
1.1 
22.4 
26.0 
9.3 
3.0 
 
40.4 
29.6 
58.1 
34.1 
36.0 
44.3 
46.0 
Table 4.3.14 Use of Thugs to Intimidate Voters According to Background Factors 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
      Female 
 
 
28.7 
34.6 
 
P-value=0.433 
 
 
20.3 
15.1 
 
 
51.0 
50.3 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
34.9 
23.9 
36.5 
37.0 
27.8 
31.3 
20.9 
16.9 
 
P-value=0.017 
 
16.3 
28.4 
13.5 
15.5 
16.7 
18.8 
18.8 
30.2 
 
48.8 
47.7 
49.0 
47.4 
55.6 
50.0 
60.4 
52.8 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
 
29.1 
 
19.6 
 
51.3 
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    Islam 
    Others 
32.7 
44.4 
 
P-value=0.088 
19.0 
5.6 
48.3 
50.0 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
33.1 
30.0 
 
31.6 
 
P-value=0.537 
 
15.2 
20.1 
 
21.1 
 
51.7 
49.9 
 
47.3 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
25.0 
31.7 
 
P-value=0.031 
 
 
14.4 
21.3 
 
 
60.6 
47.0 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
31.7 
29.6 
29.9 
41.2 
 
P-value=0.843 
 
16.3 
19.6 
18.9 
11.8 
 
52.0 
50.9 
51.2 
47.0 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
34.9 
26.1 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
21.7 
16.2 
 
43.4 
57.8 
STATE 
Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
 
27.3 
30.8 
40.9 
33.3 
25.0 
34.4 
22.2 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
20.2 
25.9 
3.2 
17.9 
21.0 
10.4 
33.3 
 
 
52.5 
43.2 
55.9 
48.8 
50.0 
55.2 
44.4 
 
Table 15: Use of Security… 
Background Factors Strongly agree/ 
Agree (%) 
Neutral Disagree/ Strongly 
Disagree 
N= 655 
SEX 
      Male 
 
 
39.7 
 
 
19.0 
 
 
41.4 
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      Female 42.5 
 
P-value=0.109 
20.4 37.1 
AGE 
<30 
      30-34 
      35-39 
      40-44 
      45-49 
      50-54 
      55-59 
      60+ 
 
46.0 
43.8 
39.6 
50.0 
33.7 
36.0 
28.8 
 
 
P-value=0.001 
 
12.6 
20.2 
21.7 
17.2 
22.5 
18.8 
25.0 
 
41.4 
35.9 
38.6 
32.8 
43.8 
45.3 
56.2 
RELIGION 
    Christianity 
    Islam 
    Others 
 
38.8 
43.0 
66.6 
 
P-value=0.111 
 
19.3 
21.0 
5.6 
 
41.9 
36.1 
27.8 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 
Married 
Separated/       Divorced/ 
Widowed 
 
43.3 
40.9 
 
36.9 
 
P-value=0.958 
 
18.9 
19.4 
 
19.3 
 
37.8 
39.7 
 
43.8 
EDUCATIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Primary/Secondary 
Tertiary/ Others 
 
 
39.5 
39.5 
 
P-value=0.485 
 
 
19.2 
20.1 
 
 
 
41.2 
40.4 
OCCUPATION 
Unemployed/Retired 
Self Employed/ Others 
Government Services 
Private Services 
 
44.3 
40.0 
38.4 
47.0 
 
P-value=0.872 
 
18.9 
18.7 
20.7 
17.6 
 
POLITICAL PARTY 
     PDP 
     APC 
 
45.0 
36.2 
 
P-value=0.000 
 
20.4 
18.4 
 
34.6 
45.4 
STATE    
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Adamawa 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Enugu 
Ondo 
Edo 
FCT 
 
34.0 
33.3 
81.7 
39.6 
23.0 
32.2 
40.4 
 
P-value=0.000 
26.0 
32.1 
4.3 
22.1 
25.0 
11.5 
16.2 
40.0 
34.6 
14.0 
38.3 
52.0 
56.3 
43.4 
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APPENDIX L (REGRESSION ANALYSIS) 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 Correlations 
 
  
Elections 
outcome 
Votes 
influenced by 
money 
Votes 
influenced by 
leaders/ 
mentors 
Votes 
influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement 
and threats 
Voting process 
influenced by 
intimidation/ 
fraud 
 Votes 
influenced by 
religious 
sentiments 
Votes 
influenced by 
ethnic 
sentiments 
Use of 
security 
agencies to 
intimidate 
delegates 
Pearson Correlation elections outcome 1.000 .341 .303 .395 .381 .266 .321 .289 
Votes influenced by 
money .341 1.000 .441 .479 .471 .327 .412 .361 
Votes influenced by 
leaders/ mentors .303 .441 1.000 .542 .382 .163 .275 .239 
Votes influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement and threats 
.395 .479 .542 1.000 .507 .181 .361 .307 
Voting process influenced 
by intimidation/ fraud .381 .471 .382 .507 1.000 .397 .408 .377 
Votes influenced by 
religious seniments .266 .327 .163 .181 .397 1.000 .527 .227 
Votes influenced by 
ethnic sentiments .321 .412 .275 .361 .408 .527 1.000 .312 
Use of security agencies 
to intimidate delegates .289 .361 .239 .307 .377 .227 .312 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) elections outcome . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Votes influenced by 
money .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Votes influenced by 
leaders/ mentors .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Votes influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement and threats 
.000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Elections outcome 2.72 1.403 651 
Votes influenced by money 2.23 1.230 658 
Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors 2.39 1.193 637 
Votes influenced by a combination of 
Inducement and threats 
2.73 1.397 644 
Voting process influenced by intimidation/ 
fraud 
2.80 1.373 655 
Votes influenced by religious sentiments 2.78 1.396 651 
Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments 2.43 1.201 649 
Use of security agencies to intimidate 
delegates 
2.96 1.307 655 
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Voting process influenced 
by intimidation/ fraud .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 
  
Elections 
outcome 
Votes 
influenced by 
money 
Votes 
influenced by 
leaders/ 
mentors 
Votes 
influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement 
and threats 
Voting process 
influenced by 
intimidation/ 
fraud 
Votes 
influenced by 
religious 
sentiments 
Votes 
influenced by 
ethnic 
sentiments 
 
Use of 
security 
agencies to 
intimidate 
delegates 
 Votes influenced by 
religious seniments .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 
 Votes influenced by 
ethnic sentiments .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 
Use of security agencies 
to intimidate delegates .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N elections outcome 651 651 631 637 648 644 642 648 
Votes influenced by 
money 651 658 637 644 655 651 649 655 
Votes influenced by 
leaders/ mentors 631 637 637 626 634 630 629 635 
Votes influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement and threats 
637 644 626 644 641 638 637 641 
Voting process influenced 
by intimidation/ fraud 648 655 634 641 655 648 647 652 
Votes influenced by 
religious sentiments 644 651 630 638 648 651 644 648 
Votes influenced by 
ethnic sentiments 642 649 629 637 647 644 649 646 
Use of security agencies 
to intimidate delegates 648 655 635 641 652 648 646 655 
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 Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .491(a) .242 .233 1.229 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates, Votes influenced by religious sentiments, 
Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors, Votes influenced by money, Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud, 
Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments, Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats 
b  Dependent Variable: Elections outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
 ANOVA(b) 
 
Model  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 297.311 7 42.473 28.120 .000(a) 
Residual 933.453 618 1.510   
Total 1230.763 625    
a  Predictors: (Constant), Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates, Votes influenced by religious sentiments, 
Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors, Votes influenced by money, Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud, 
Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments, Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats 
b  Dependent Variable: Elections outcome 
 
 
 Coefficients(a) 
 
Model  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) .709 .161  4.409 .000 .393 1.026      
Votes influenced by 
money .074 .051 .065 1.459 .145 -.026 .175 .341 .059 .051 .615 1.627 
Votes influenced by 
leaders/ mentors .074 .051 .063 1.467 .143 -.025 .174 .303 .059 .051 .658 1.519 
Votes influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement and threats 
.191 .047 .190 4.045 .000 .098 .283 .395 .161 .142 .557 1.795 
Voting process influenced 
by intimidation/ fraud .128 .047 .126 2.750 .006 .037 .220 .381 .110 .096 .588 1.701 
Votes influenced by 
religious seniments .084 .043 .084 1.955 .051 .000 .169 .266 .078 .068 .665 1.505 
Votes influenced by 
ethnic sentiments .095 .052 .082 1.828 .068 -.007 .198 .321 .073 .064 .615 1.626 
Use of security agencies 
to intimidate delegates .107 .042 .100 2.545 .011 .024 .190 .289 .102 .089 .797 1.255 
a  Dependent Variable: Q26 elections outcome 
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 Collinearity Diagnostics(a) 
 
Model Dimension 
Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Votes 
influenced by 
money 
Votes 
influenced by 
leaders/ 
mentors 
Votes 
influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement 
and threats 
Voting process 
influenced by 
intimidation/ 
fraud 
Votes 
influenced by 
religious 
seniments 
Votes 
influenced by 
ethnic 
sentiments 
Use of 
security 
agencies to 
intimidate 
delegates (Constant) 
Votes 
influenced by 
money 
1 1 7.155 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .218 5.724 .00 .02 .14 .10 .00 .24 .08 .00 
3 .143 7.085 .10 .17 .00 .01 .00 .05 .05 .50 
4 .127 7.507 .04 .59 .22 .03 .01 .04 .01 .13 
5 .112 7.997 .03 .13 .18 .11 .59 .00 .02 .00 
6 .100 8.459 .02 .02 .10 .17 .10 .21 .59 .02 
7 .077 9.643 .15 .02 .30 .48 .21 .13 .20 .03 
8 .068 10.251 .66 .03 .06 .09 .09 .33 .05 .32 
a  Dependent Variable: Elections outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Residuals Statistics (a) 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 1.46 4.49 2.71 .685 610 
Std. Predicted Value -1.816 2.563 -.010 .994 610 
Standard Error of 
Predicted Value .064 .263 .134 .035 610 
Adjusted Predicted Value 1.47 4.48 2.71 .686 604 
Residual -3.304 3.407 -.012 1.234 604 
Std. Residual -2.688 2.772 -.010 1.004 604 
Stud. Residual -2.706 2.784 -.010 1.011 604 
Deleted Residual -3.348 3.437 -.012 1.251 604 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.720 2.800 -.009 1.012 604 
Mahal. Distance .708 27.693 6.890 4.190 610 
Cook's Distance .000 .018 .002 .003 604 
Centered Leverage Value .001 .044 .011 .007 610 
a  Dependent Variable: Q26 elections outcome 
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APPENDIX M 
STATEMENT BY THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL 
COMMISSION(INEC) ON THE NATIONAL AND STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN 
RIVERS STATE  (20/03/15) 
Pursuant to the Orders of the Court of Appeal, the Independent National Electoral 
Commission(INEC) conducted elections into various seats in both the National and the Rivers 
State House of Assembly yesterday, the 19th of March, 2016. 
Rather unfortunately, some of these elections witnessed the disruption of the process, including 
the barricading of some of the INEC Local Government offices and Registration Area 
Centres(RACs) used for the distribution of Electoral materials which led to the late 
commencement of the exercise in some places and consequently, its smooth take off. 
Of more serious concern was the level of threats, violence and intimidation of election officials 
and voters by well armed thugs and miscreants allegedly acting on behalf of some politicians, 
which marred the elections in some areas. There were reports of numerous attacks resulting in 
fatalities, kidnappings, ballot snatching, diversion of officials and materials, amongst others, 
which necessitated its suspension in 8 Local Government Areas. 
Regrettably, such deviant behaviour has continued today. Several permanent and ad hoc staff 
engaged have been attacked, again resulting in fatalities, while some have been forcibly abducted 
and taken to presently unknown destinations. 
Under such difficult circumstance, the Returning Officers were only able to collate and declare 
results in 1 Federal and 9 State constituencies where the disruption and malpractices were not so 
widespread. 
Having reviewed the situation, the Commission is compelled to suspend all further action 
concerning the exercise in all the other constituencies in the State pending the receipt of a 
comprehensive report from its Field Officials and Monitors. For the avoidance of doubt, it should 
be noted that the suspension does not affect the constituencies where the exercise has been 
completed and the results declared by the Returning Officers. 
 
Oluwole Osaze- Uzzi, 
Director, Voter Education and Publicity, INEC 
 
 
